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In the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, the EU expressed its intention of making Europe 
become ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010’. With less 
than one year left until the deadline, it seems that these goals will be hard to 
meet, even more so with the current global crisis. 
Yet thinking has to go beyond immediate responses to the current crisis to 
discuss the kind of strategy that should be implemented in the medium to long 
term in order not to reproduce the failures of the recent past. In this respect, 
the ‘social investment’ paradigm that emerged in the mid-1990s may provide 
governments and the EU with some guidelines for the macro-economic and 
social policies that need to be implemented in order to promote sustainable 
economic growth and ensure the political and social sustainability of the 
European Social Model. 
This report assesses the diversity feasibility, but also the relevance of the 
social investment strategy in Europe. What policies have been implemented  
in different countries, with what success? What have been the key drivers of 
change or impeding factors in pursuing a social investment strategy? The 
report also questions whether the goals defined in 2000 are still relevant,  
and whether the social investment strategy can help face not only traditional 
European problems but also new issues created by the current crisis. 
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9Executive summary
During the Lisbon Summit in 2000, the European Union – partly inspired by the 
new ‘social investment’ paradigm – adopted a new approach to meet the future 
challenges of ageing populations and the shift towards a knowledge­based and 
service economy. The Union expressed its intention of making Europe become ‘the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge­based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and 
respect for the environment by 2010’. It appears that the strategy was based on the 
view that human capital was the core asset in Europe.
The targets of the Lisbon strategy seemed difficult to achieve for many countries 
even before the global financial crisis of 2008, and it is now clear, with less than one 
year left, that these targets will not be met. In a long­term perspective, Europe faces 
a number of common challenges related to environmental concerns and the threats 
of climate change, deregulated financial markets, mobile global capital, ageing 
populations and de­industrialisation. The current economic crisis has made these 
long­term challenges even more acute. It is therefore of great importance that future 
policies go beyond immediate responses to the current crisis in order to face these 
long­term challenges and to avoid reproducing the failures of the past. 
The contributions to this report give an assessment of the social investment strategy 
as it has been pursued in different national contexts and provide not only a 
framework for reform but also a number of concrete examples of how to promote or 
improve the social investment approach:
• The development of publicly funded child care and education programmes constitutes an 
essential dimension of the social investment approach. Such services express the goals 
of this perspective in two ways: they invest in the human capital of mothers by helping 
them remain in paid work; and they invest in the human capital of children by providing 
them with quality educational stimulation at an early age. From this perspective, many of 
the policies currently being adopted for reconciling work and family life are inadequate. 
Strategies like long parental leave or vouchers for the purchase of private services may 
offer some immediate support to parents but lack the long­term perspective that is central 
in terms of social investment.
• Human capital policies that promote participation in education throughout the life-
course are crucial. Skill needs within advanced industrial societies have changed quite 
dramatically in the past decades. In particular, demand has increased for higher levels 
of skills as well as for cognitive and social skills. Viewed from a historical perspective, 
investment in vocational education followed an economic logic whereby firms in 
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European economies relied on specialised vocational skills. In the knowledge­based post­
industrial economy, however, new skill needs outline an economic logic for the expansion 
of public education policies. Policy agendas aimed at advancing human capital policies as 
part of their social investment strategy need to address the growing economic benefits of 
investing in education.
• If social investment is to be the defining feature of the new welfare state, then one 
should certainly differentiate between ‘varieties of social investment’. Within the field 
of labour market policy, one can identify at least three different approaches that refer to 
different principles and have different objectives: investing in human capital, removing 
obstacles to employment and preventing the depletion of human capital during a period of 
unemployment. While policies geared towards preventing human capital depletion seem 
to have gone out of fashion, countries tend to emphasise either training or policies aiming 
at removing obstacles to labour market participation. Both approaches are connected to 
work incentives. But if the current crisis results in a longer period of high and persistent 
unemployment, strengthening work incentives may be an inadequate response in a context 
of sluggish economic growth and employment losses. In contrast, active labour market 
policies that target human capital seem preferable, including job creation programmes 
aimed at slowing the process of human capital depletion associated with unemployment. 
• There is also reason to think beyond the assumptions of the current era as a knowledge-
based economy, which is the underlying rationale of the Lisbon strategy. A slightly 
different approach, here defined as ‘the learning economy’, focuses more on the rate 
of change and the consequential requirements of constantly renewing capabilities in 
firms and competences for workers. What the comparison of European economies 
shows is, firstly, that innovation tends to thrive in societies where workers are engaged 
in organisational learning and do creative work and, secondly, that creative work is most 
widely diffused in egalitarian societies with broad­based and democratic education 
systems and with labour market institutions that combine flexibility with active labour 
market policies and income maintenance for the unemployed.
• There is thus a need to combine social policies with policies that promote organisational 
change. The focus should be upon social investments and institutional change related to 
the organisation of work and learning. Three tasks stand out as particularly important, 
especially for Southern and Eastern Europe: to expand systems of vocational training 
and aim at new combinations of theory and practice in the overall education systems; 
to develop active labour market policies and institutions that support flexicurity; and to 
reduce inequalities in income and in access to learning. Such a programme would increase 
social cohesion both nationally and for Europe as a whole since it would help reduce 
the big gaps in income between the different parts of Europe. And it would certainly 
strengthen the competitiveness of the region as a whole.
• The social investment approach can be seen as a strategy that aims at simultaneously 
promoting competitiveness and growth, employment and quality of jobs. It is essentially 
about resolving the trade­off between efficiency and equality. Achieving this goal is 
dependant on how credible policies can be formulated and delivered. Different examples 
of best practices can be identified that help to simultaneously widen the tax­base, increase 
fertility, fight poverty and inequality, or improve the financial sustainability of certain key 
programmes such as pension schemes.
These points give examples of a common theme in the various contributions to this 
report, which is that the way we design our institutions is critical for what kinds of 
achievements we can expect. But it is also evident from the contributions that 
politics matter for what kinds of chances the social investment strategy will have in 
the future. Political courage is demanded for anyone who want to bring long­
termism into policy making. We need to put that high on the agenda.
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This report aims at stimulating the scholarly and political debate on the future of the 
social investment approach. By bringing the analytical light to bear on the interplay 
between social, educational and labour market policies, it looks at how different 
European countries face the new requirements of the ‘knowledge­based’ or ‘learning 
economy’ and puts forward some ideas for policy innovation. Both the current 
economic crisis and the common long­term challenges that Europe faces make such 
innovations urgent. With the Lisbon agenda coming to its close in 2010, the time is 
ripe to invent a new future. 
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Introduction
Nathalie Morel, Bruno Palier and Joakim Palme
In a period of deep crisis and with classical neo­liberal solutions for both the 
economy and the welfare state having seemingly run their course, the question 
arises as to what kind of new strategies should be implemented to recover stronger 
growth, more and better jobs and more equality and social cohesion. Thinking has  
to go beyond immediate responses to the current crisis to discuss the kind of 
strategy that should be implemented in the medium to long term in order not to 
reproduce the failures of the recent past.
Ageing populations, the shift to a knowledge­based and service economy, deregulated 
financial markets, mobile global capital, environmental concerns and the threats of 
climate change are all part of a new context that calls into question past policy 
paradigms, whether they be neo­Keynesian or neo­liberal. The current global 
economic crisis is increasing uncertainties and pressures on governments as well as 
ordinary people. The consequences are difficult to overestimate, urgent to address the 
social agenda. The difficulties to raise new resources for long term spending purposes 
are obvious. We can be sure that it will become more difficult, not only because the 
tax bases will be eroded, but also because social protection expenditures, notably 
unemployment insurance, will automatically and massively increase. In the absence 
of adequate social insurance programmes some governments have found themselves 
forced to launch additional spending programmes. 
It is obvious that the threat of a continued and aggravated downturn is forcing 
governments to rethink past policy paradigms. An interesting aspect of the global 
crisis in the financial system is that it is changing our views on what is possible. In 
our recent history we find other examples of how big changes may suddenly appear 
possible, or even inevitable. The unification of Germany is one example; the 
enlargement of the EU is another. How can we rethink the European future, beyond 
the Lisbon Agenda, beyond the big spending on the Common Agricultural Policy and 
with the prolongation of the time horizon with regard to the issue of climate change? 
Whereas investment in physical capital, such as infrastructure, has figured quite 
prominently as a policy instrument, human capital investments have perhaps been 
getting less attention in the debate. There are good reasons to change that.
Since the mid 1990s, a new ‘social investment’ paradigm has begun to emerge. As 
Jane Jenson reminds us in this report, ‘the announced goals of the social investment 
perspective are to increase social inclusion and minimise the intergenerational 15
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transfer of poverty as well as to ensure that the population is well prepared for the 
likely employment conditions (demand for higher educational qualifications; less job 
security; more precarious forms of employment) of contemporary economies. Doing 
so will allow individuals and families to maintain responsibility for their wellbeing 
via market incomes and intra­family exchanges, as well as lessening the threats to 
social protection regimes coming from ageing societies and high dependency ratios. 
The state’s role is to define its interventions and social protection practices so that 
these conditions will be met. In policy terms this implies increased attention to and 
investment in children, human capital and making work pay’.
In 2000, during the Lisbon Summit, the EU adopted part of this strategy when  
it expressed its intention of making Europe become ‘the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge­based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect 
for the environment by 2010’.
With just one year left until the deadline, it seems that the goals of the Lisbon 
Strategy will be hard to meet, even more so with the new global crisis. Some 
countries have been more active than others in pursuing a social investment 
strategy, and the very content and impact of this strategy has differed considerably 
from one country to another.
In the Nordic countries this strategy has a longer history than elsewhere and has 
translated into an investment in high quality, universal childcare provision and 
generous and progressive family policies; massive investment in education and 
training for all; life­long learning; promoting job opportunity and equality for men 
and women; income maintenance programmes and high levels of minimum income, 
along with a relatively high degree of labour market flexibility to facilitate a more 
lively economic development (where non­profitable economic activities leave room 
for new, innovative and profitable ones). The Nordic countries have experienced high 
levels of growth during the last decade and are recognised to be amongst the most 
competitive economies, displaying high employment rates and low levels of 
unemployment, while still maintaining the lowest levels of inequalities. How 
sustainable are such policies in the current period? 
Other countries have also adopted economic and social strategies aimed at 
‘modernising’ (rather than dismantling) their welfare states with the aim of 
reconciling them with renewed economic growth. The UK (through its Third Way 
strategy) or the Netherlands (through flexicurity) are other examples of countries 
which have implemented reforms that are akin to a social investment strategy, i.e. 
reforming the welfare state to adapt it to the new economic context by reorienting  
its spending towards ‘preparing’ rather than ‘repairing’. 
Despite some important reforms or projects (such as the modernising of family 
policy and development of childcare facilities in Germany or attempts at introducing 
more flexibility along with new social protection measures in France), some 
countries seem a long way from adopting this new strategy. In most continental 
European countries, governments are still more preoccupied with balancing their 
old age and health care budgets than with restructuring their welfare system 
towards social investment policies. Looking at their activation strategies, it would 
seem that the policies pursued have led to a dualisation of the labour market and of 
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social protection rather than to better and more equal job opportunities and social 
protection. In continental Europe, economic growth has been slower than in the 
Nordic countries and still partly organised around traditional industrial activities. 
Since all countries are now confronted with a deep financial and systemic crisis, can 
the social investment strategy provide governments and the EU with some guidelines 
for the macro­economic and social policies to be implemented? What are the effects 
of climate change in the context of policy making? How can the discourse on 
sustainable policies for the climate inform policies that are aimed at social and 
economic sustainability? The time has come to reflect on how the various 
components of the ‘social investment’ strategy fit the new social, economic and 
ecological context. What have been the successes and failures of the social investment 
strategy in Europe? Where are the most important policy gaps to be found and how 
can they be filled? 
The fact that investment today means fewer resources for consumption cannot be 
avoided. It may be that we the systems of social investment are affordable if the various 
programmes are adequately designed. The desirability of this is partly a question of 
value judgements and whether or not it is possible to extract the necessary taxes now 
and in the future will depend on what people want and probably on international 
co­operation. This makes the modernisation of our social and economic policies a 
democratic problem with national as well as international dimensions. Each and every 
step in the expansion of social policies in Europe has been subject to political conflicts 
and controversies. Over the past decade or so, to mention increased taxes has been 
somewhat of a ‘third rail’ in European politics. Recent trends and events suggest that 
there is room for change. That it is possible to think the unthinkable. What is at stake 
here is the political and social sustainability of the European Social Model. What is 
needed is the capacity to formulate and deliver credible policies to ensure not only the 
sustainability but also the improvement of the European social model. Can ‘social 
investment strategy’ achieve this? This is the core question of this report.
The chapters presented in this report aim at assessing the diversity, the feasibility 
and the relevance of the social investment strategy in Europe. Which policies have 
been implemented in the different countries, with how much success? Can we 
identify examples of good practice? What have been the key drivers of change or 
impeding factors in pursuing a social investment strategy? Are the goals defined in 
2000 still relevant, and can they help face not only traditional European problems 
but also new issues created by the current crisis? Or do the current times require 
new, alternative strategies? 
The first part of this report – Content and Diversity of the Social Investment Strategies 
– presents the underlying rationale and conceptual background to the social 
investment strategy before taking stock of the various social investment strategies 
implemented in different countries. Behind the notion of ‘social investment’, diverse 
programmes and policies have been developed. The chapters in this first section 
address the different facets of the social investment strategy and the different ways 
in which such social investment policies – seen in a broad sense – have been 
implemented in Europe. In doing so, they look at the political conditions that 
facilitate or hinder the adoption of social investment policies. Through the analysis 
of these various national examples, and through the comparison of these different 
approaches, the contributions address the adequacy of the chosen policy 
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instruments and open for a discussion of the implications of the different strategies 
for the advancement of the Lisbon agenda. 
Jane Jenson’s contribution (‘Redesigning Citizenship Regimes after Neoliberalism. 
Moving Towards Social Investment’) examines the ‘social investment’ paradigm, 
defining its content in different settings to uncover its general policy logic. Stated 
briefly, the social investment strategy implies that spending should be made in the 
form of investments, such as in human capital, to support labour market 
participation in the future as well as the present or to confront new social risks (such 
as family breakdown, low wage work or unstable work, the challenge of balancing 
earning with social care, ageing) and poverty. The author also maps out the changes 
in social citizenship that result from this new social investment approach. Three 
dimensions of social citizenship are examined – rights and duties; access and 
governance; and the responsibility mix between the market, the family, the 
community and the state – in order to document the characteristics of the social 
investment perspective in comparison to two other policy paradigms, those of 
Keynesianism and neo­liberalism.
Kimberly J. Morgan’s chapter (‘Child Care and the Social Investment Model: Political 
Conditions for Reform’) examines the political conditions for reforms that further 
one dimension of the social investment model, the development of publicly funded 
early childhood care and education programmes. Such services express the goals of 
this model in two ways: they invest in the human capital of mothers by helping them 
remain in paid work; and they invest in the human capital of children by providing 
them educational stimulation at an early age. Based on a cross­national analysis,  
this chapter shows that the political conditions for the full achievement of this model 
include widespread societal consensus on the acceptability of mothers’ employment; 
the political domination of left­leaning political parties; powerful public sector 
unions, all of which are rarely obtained outside of Scandinavia. Instead, labour 
market concerns, demographic anxieties, and short­term political expediency are 
more likely to drive governmental policies to reconcile work and family. One result is 
that many of the policies currently being adopted do not necessarily further the aims 
of the social investment ideal. Long parental leaves, vouchers for the purchase of 
private services and inadequately­funded public programmes may offer some 
immediate support to parents but may not produce the kinds of social investments 
that advocates might hope for.
Giuliano Bonoli’s contribution (‘Varieties of Social Investment in Labour Market 
Policy’) examines different types and approaches to active labour market policy 
from the perspective of social investment. Intuitively, active labour market policy 
can be seen as the locus of investment oriented social policy par excellence. Helping 
non­working individuals to find a job is a new approach to labour market policy that 
differs from both traditional left and right wing solutions. Yet active labour market 
polices in the real world display such high degree of variation that it is difficult to 
formulate encompassing judgments with regard to their social investment 
orientation. The author thus develops a conceptual distinction between different 
types of active labour market policy, making reference to different principles that 
can inform labour market policy: protection, investment and recommodification. 
Moira Nelson and John D. Stephens’ chapter on ‘Human Capital Policies and the Social 
Investment Perspective: Explaining the Past and Anticipating the Future’, shows how 
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the social investment perspective provides pride of place to human capital policies 
that improve participation in education throughout the life­course. These policies  
are crucial not only because of the increased dependence on employment for 
wellbeing but also because skill needs within advanced industrialised societies have 
changed quite dramatically in the past three decades. In particular, demand has 
increased for both higher levels of skills as well as cognitive and social skills. Viewed 
from a historical perspective, investment in vocational education can be shown to 
follow an economic logic whereby firms in European economies rely on specialised 
vocational skills. The new skill needs brought on by the development of the 
knowledge­based post­industrial economy, however, outline an economic logic for  
the expansion of public education policies. Policy agendas aimed at advancing human 
capital policies as part of their social investment strategy need to address the growing 
economic benefits to educational investment.
Bengt-Åke Lundvall and Edward Lorenz (‘On the Role of Social Investment in the 
Learning Economy: A European Perspective’) suggest going beyond the idea of  
a knowledge based economy as put forward in the Lisbon agenda and propose a 
slightly different perspective – the learning economy – where the focus is upon  
the rate of change and the consequential requirements of constantly renewing 
capabilities in firms and competences for workers. They show, firstly, that innovation 
thrives in societies where workers are engaged in organisational learning and do 
creative work and secondly, that creative work is most widely diffused in egalitarian 
societies with a broad based and democratic education system and with labour 
market institutions that combine flexibility with active labour market policies and 
income maintenance for the unemployed. The analysis points to the need for 
combining such social policies with policies that promote organisational change. 
Starting from the learning economy perspective the authors argue that the major 
bottleneck for the realisation of the Lisbon Agenda has less to do with insufficient 
investments in research and development and more with big gaps between good  
and current practise in terms of organisational forms at the level of the firm and 
institutional frameworks at the national level.
Rita Nikolai’s contribution, entitled ‘Towards Social Investment? Patterns of Public 
Policy in the OECD World’, seeks to identify empirically which countries can be said 
to have moved towards a social investment strategy and to what extent. 
Transforming social protection systems in a way that favours investment rather 
than compensation entails a shift of expenditures towards such areas as family 
policy, active labour market policies and education and training. This contribution 
traces the development of welfare state change in the more mature OECD member 
states. By using disaggregated programme expenditure and relating expenditure for 
investment measures and compensation expenditures, the author identifies diverse 
spending priorities across countries. Three groups of countries are thus identified. 
Northern European countries form the first group. Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
are characterised by high spending for both investment­related and compensatory 
social policies. Scandinavian welfare states provide a high level of security against 
risks such as old­age or unemployment, but without neglecting the investment­
related policies. The Anglo­Saxon countries, Switzerland and Norway form the 
second group. These countries are characterised by low spending both for age and 
unemployment and for investment­related social policies. With the exception of 
Switzerland and the United States, all countries in this group spend more on 
investment­related compared to spending on compensatory social policies. The  
20
third group is composed of the continental European countries, Japan and Southern 
Europe. These countries spend higher levels on compensatory social policies while 
neglecting investment­related social polices. For instance, Germany, Greece, Japan, 
Spain and Italy exhibit far lower levels of education spending than one might expect 
on the basis of their levels of social spending. 
The second part of the report – ‘The Future of the Social Investment Strategy. 
Challenges for Europe in the Context of the Current Crisis’ – looks beyond the Lisbon 
Agenda and questions the relevance of the social investment strategy for tomorrow’s 
world. Since all countries are now confronted with a deep financial and systemic 
crisis, can the social investment strategy provide governments and the EU with some 
guidelines for the macroeconomic and social policies to be implemented? Europe is 
having some difficulties becoming ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge­
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010’. 
What have been the successes and failures of the social investment strategy in 
Europe? Where are the most important policy gaps to be found and how can they  
be filled? The different contributions warn against short­sighted policies that may 
result from the current crisis and emphasise the importance of taking, instead, a 
long­term perspective and investing in well informed productive social policy.
Kerstin Jacobsson analyses the ‘Achievements and Non­achievements of the 
European Employment Strategy’, with a particular focus on active labour market 
policy and ‘social investment’. She also discusses some ambiguities inherent in the 
European Employment Strategy and Open Method of Coordination as regards aim 
as well as methodology and policy content and the implications of these ambiguities 
for policy­making. Particular attention is given to the challenges connected to the 
enlargement of the EU. The apparent problems of implementing the European 
Employment Strategy are of crucial importance for any discussion of a future for  
the social investment strategy. A general problem here is the weak development of 
industrial relations. Another challenge is to improve local government and other 
stakeholders in the implementation process. Jacobsson argues that the increased 
emphasis (in the re­launched Lisbon strategy) on the differences in national 
contexts for the target settings might be one way to make advancements.
Thomas Lindh looks at ‘The Future Needs for Social Investment in Ageing 
Populations’, using Sweden as a pilot case. Ageing populations all over Europe have 
raised concerns about the sustainability of current welfare systems. The Swedish 
case provides both warnings and examples to learn from for the many fast­ageing 
European countries. The current crisis may very well lead to short­sighted decisions 
that undermine the opportunities to safeguard the welfare systems by a well­
informed productive social policy. In the Great Depression Sweden faced a fertility 
crisis that profoundly affected social policy reform. The early baby boom in the 
1940s that peaked with the return of peace in 1945 has provided both further 
motivation for social policy reforms as well as the means to do so. As the baby 
boomers of the 1940s now retire in the midst of the financial crisis, they are also 
causing a first crisis for the construction of the pension reform in the 1990s by 
releasing the ‘brake’ and lowering pensions to preserve long­run financial 
sustainability. The situation is complicated as the boomers from the 1990s are 
starting to fill the higher education system. Gloomy labour market prospects due  
to the crisis threaten to extend further the already excessively drawn­out period it 
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takes for young people to become established as adults. A new baby boom fills the 
day­care centres and will soon require further expansion of the school system. 
Further on the horizon, the now­retiring boomers will increase the need for elderly 
care and health care and thus strain the intergenerational transfer systems. It is of 
paramount importance for the future welfare state in Sweden as well as in Europe 
that the social investment in the generation, both natives and immigrants, who will 
be taxed to finance it in the 2020s does not fall victim to depressed labour markets, 
failing education systems and pointless salvage packets pouring tax money into 
failing industries. Lindh argues that tight­fisted policy may well undermine the 
future welfare for the elderly. In an ageing Europe with high youth unemployment 
this may easily turn into a general trend. National differences in demographics and 
institutions need to met by appropriate priorities and timing for social policy reform.
Erik Westholm’s chapter (‘A Territorial Approach to Politics of Climate Change’) 
addresses the issue of climate change and raises some questions about the future 
role of politics at the national level in Europe. What future do nation states have if 
(when) politics of climate change becomes the dominating project? Westholm looks 
at spatial politics within the welfare model. The analysis is based on: 1) an 
anticipated deepening of the economic and political globalisation; and 2) an 
increasingly urgent need to address issues related to land use/climate change.  
The two processes are already transforming the agenda for the EU and the Member 
States. In this chapter it is argued that territorial control will be increasingly 
important and that the nation states are likely to continue to be the key institutions 
also in an era marked by increased needs for cross­border collaboration in order to 
dramatically reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. In these efforts the states will 
have to strengthen international institutions and collaborations while at the same 
time using the specific capabilities of the regions and the local communities. 
Bernard Gazier’s contribution (‘The European Employment Strategy in the Tempest: 
Restoring a Long­Term Perspective’) critically examines the policies of ‘flexicurity’, 
situating the flexicurity prescriptions within a wider set of policy agendas currently 
explored or implemented regarding the dynamic adaptation of labour markets to the 
globalised world. It then uses this framework for understanding the present and 
possible position of ‘flexicurity’ in our world in coping with the crisis. Finally, it 
sketches out what could be a renewed agenda for the European Employment Strategy 
and a new component of the wider Lisbon Strategy. Gazier proposes a collective and 
structured version of the ‘social investment’ paradigm, connected to the 
‘Transitional Labour Market’ approach, which aims at developing a ‘re­embedded’ 
version of the European labour markets.
Roger Liddle’s contribution (‘Social Investment after the Crisis: Political Choices for 
Britain and their Implications for the European Union’) begins by discussing the 
UK’s claim to see itself as a successful exemplar of the social investment model in the 
past decade. The second section of the chapter considers the impact of the global 
financial crisis and recession on the UK and argues that we are at a critical juncture 
for social investment strategies. The long­term consequences of the global financial 
crisis are such that they will impose severe constraints on both the scope and volume 
of public expenditure over the next decade. In an environment of ‘tough choices’ and 
spending discipline, the future of the third way social investment model depends not 
only on whether and how public investment is targeted and maximised within the 
overall resources available, but also on the success of more activist policies to 
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promote a return to sustainable economic growth. The final section of the chapter 
reviews the implications for the EU and the future of the Lisbon strategy or whatever 
replaces it.
Joakim Palme (‘The Quest for Sustainable Policies in the EU: The Crisis and Beyond’) 
concludes by reminding us that the emergence of a ‘social investment strategy’ a 
decade ago can partly be seen as response to the pressure for more redistribution by 
the European welfare states as a result of ageing populations. Moreover, the need to 
establish a new gender balance and a flexible working life was seen as critical for 
sustaining the welfare states in the context of deregulated financial markets and 
mobile global capital. In the European Union the need to promote social cohesion in 
countries with open economies has not been diminished by the ‘enlargement’. The 
setting has also changed in other ways as the global financial crisis has turned into  
a crisis of the ‘real’ economy, resulting in rapidly falling growth rates and increasing 
unemployment. The chapter reflects on how the various components of the ‘social 
investment’ strategy fit this new setting. Where are the most important policy gaps 
to be found and how can they be filled? Palme argues that the political and social 
sustainability of the European Social Model is dependent on how credible policies 
can be formulated and delivered. The future economic sustainability of the model 
hinges, of course, on the number of taxpayers that can be mobilised and how 
productive they are. The author discusses principles and gives examples of good 
policies for further reflection.
   * * * * * 
We hope that reading these contributions will stimulate both the scholarly and 
political debate on the future of the social investment approach. In academia, 
discourses on social policy, education and the labour markets have led separate lives 
for a long time. With the broader approaches and concepts such as production 
regimes new ground appears to have opened up, which have provided opportunities 
for cross­fertilisation of perspectives. In politics, discussions about ecological, 
economic, political and social sustainability have been pursued within different 
circles. It is time to change all this, without losing the academic rigour and without 
losing sight of the practical instruments needed to be successful policy wise. The 
economic crisis will, in many ways, impose constraints. Yet it also provides a chance 
to innovate and to prolong the time horizons for policy making. In Europe, with the 
Lisbon agenda coming to its close in 2010, the time is ripe to invent a new future. 


Part I.
Content and Diversity of the  
Social Investment Strategies
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Redesigning Citizenship  
Regimes after Neoliberalism. 
Moving Towards Social Investment 
Jane Jenson 
Neoliberalism profoundly challenged and destabilised post­1945 political projects, 
policy arrangements and practices of governing. In particular, there were concerted 
efforts to roll back existing guarantees to social protection and practices of interest 
intermediation, in the name of a larger role for the market, families and communities. 
In the last decades of the twentieth century almost all countries were subjected to 
pressure for change in their citizenship regimes. This pressure came from neoliberal 
political forces operating both within and outside the country. Classical neoliberalism 
has lost its hegemonic position, however. Long before the financial meltdown of 
autumn 2008 revealed the fundamental limits of financial deregulation and reliance 
on capitalist forces to regulate market relations, there was a recognition in many 
countries that neoliberalism had reached its social policy limits. 
Ideas about ‘social investment’ began to spread from the beginning of the mid 1990s’. 
Social citizenship regimes that rely on this new perspective are intended to sustain  
a different economy than those that came after 1945 – the knowledge­based and 
service economy. The announced goals of the social investment perspective are to 
increase social inclusion and minimise the intergenerational transfer of poverty as 
well as to ensure that the population is well prepared for the likely employment 
conditions (demand for higher educational qualifications; less job security; more 
precarious forms of employment) of contemporary economies. Doing so will allow 
individuals and families to maintain responsibility for their well­being via market 
incomes and intra­family exchanges, as well as lessening the threats to social 
protection regimes coming from ageing societies and high dependency ratios. The 
state’s role is to define its interventions and social citizenship practices so that these 
conditions will be met. In policy terms this implies increased attention to and 
investment in children, human capital and making work pay.
The contention of this paper is that, from a variety of positions and in order to serve  
a variety of objectives, governments adjusted their social policies to incorporate the 
social investment perspective. In doing so they did not try to return to the Keynesian 
past; they did not reject all of the social thinking of neoliberalism. They did, however, 
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begin to retreat from classical neoliberalism’s emphasis on markets and 
communities as the main pillars of well­being and started to identify ways to better 
address the new social risks of contemporary economic and social relations. In doing 
so, they were redesigning social citizenship and relations between the state and 
citizens more broadly.
The social investment perspective never achieved consensus. It is most often used to 
frame the contemporary policy interventions of Nordic welfare regimes (Esping­
Andersen with Palier 2008) or liberal regimes (Jenson 2007).1 Bismarckian regimes 
have been slow to move towards social investment, while the European Union may 
have flirted with it over making a commitment. The social investment perspective is 
not confined to Europe, and can be found in the social policy perspectives of several 
Latin American countries as well as international organisations, especially the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development. Despite both this lack  
of consensus and widely varying expressions of it, there is merit in undertaking a 
systematic analysis of the general terms of the social investment perspective. 
The Social Investment Perspective and Social Citizenship 
Consensus is growing that the classic neoliberalism of Thatcher, Reagan, and forced 
structural adjustments are giving way to something else. There is less agreement, 
however, on what is emerging. Multiple labels are suggested: the third way (Giddens 
1998); ‘inclusive liberalism’ (Porter and Craig 2004); the LEGO paradigm (Jenson 
and Saint­Martin 2006); the ‘developmental welfare state’ (Hemerijck 2007) or 
simply a ‘new welfare state’ (Esping­Andersen et al. 2002), for example. Of course, 
this lack of consensus either about naming a policy trend or about uncovering varied 
expressions and implementations of an idea is not unusual. After 1945 even 
Keynesianism ideas were domesticated in a variety of ways by national governments 
and they were often labelled as something other than ‘Keynesian’. After the fact, 
however, the general trend toward countercyclical spending linked to social 
protection was identifiable in numerous locations and jurisdictions (Hall 1989). 
The analytic task, then, is to go beyond local expressions to uncover the policy logic. 
Doing so reveals growing policy enthusiasm for a social investment perspective and 
the adjustments in social citizenship that result.2 Its logic differs from those of the 
social state of the Keynesian era or the privatisation emphasis in neo liberalism. 
In order to undertake this mapping, I use the heuristic of the citizenship regime, an 
analytic grid that permits one to make visible three intersecting dimensions of social 
citizenship: rights and duties, access and governance, and the responsibility mix 
(Jenson and Phillips 1996). Doing so in a comparative fashion provides a 
documentation of the characteristics of the social investment perspective compared 
to two other policy paradigms, those of Keynesianism and neoliberalism. 
1.  The exception to this generalisation is the United States under George W. Bush.
2.  I am not claiming that this perspective is particularly progressive or particularly non­progressive. Assessment of the social 
investment perspective according to its consequences for a fair and just distribution of wealth or for the promotion of equality is 
a task for another paper. The one undertaken here is to describe the perspective and its consequences for social citizenship, the 
notion being that it is always helpful to know what is really going on.
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The Responsibility Mix 
The responsibility mix refers first and foremost to the distribution of tasks in what 
we can label the ‘welfare diamond,’ represented in Figure 1. This four­cornered 
image captures the distribution of responsibility for well­being in the market, family, 
community and state. That which is assigned to the state constitutes an essential 
element of social citizenship. 
Figure 1.
When Keynesian economics dominated in the post­1945 years, all welfare regimes 
allocated a major role to the market as the foundation of well­being for most citizens 
and their family. The role of the other three sectors was to fill gaps left by market 
provision of income or services, while the state in particular would compensate for 
inadequate or limited market access (because of age, illness, family circumstances, 
lack of education and skills and so on) or to make it possible to withdraw from or 
remain outside the labour market (so as to engage in training, parenting and so on). 
Under the influence of Keynesianism macro­economic thinking the prevailing 
assumption was that social spending ‘would complement the market economy: it 
would be an instrument of automatic countercyclical stabilization, it would ensure 
an educated and healthy workforce; and it would provide the complex social 
infrastructure essential to an urban economy’ (Banting 1987: 185). It would also 
complement the family’s contribution to intergenerational well­being and 
reproduction. The community corner of the welfare diamond was important because 
many social services were publicly funded but actually provided by organisations in 
the third sector and anchored in the community. Church­based hospitals, senior 
residences, schools and so on provided many health and education services, often 
using public funds. Sometimes the partnership was quite explicit, as in the 
Bismarckian welfare regimes of continental Europe, where religious institutions 
and unions organised and ran pension funds and provided social services. 
Sometimes the partnership was very important but less visible, as in liberal welfare 
regimes where the growth of the welfare state also involved the expansion of non­
profit agencies providing services of all kinds, at least partially with public funds. 
In post­1945 social states, policy communities tended to describe government 
spending on social programmes and services as expenditures on social security for 
social protection, as well as serving to stimulate the economy in times of downturns 
in growth and employment; social spending was viewed, in other words, as a support 
State
Family Market
Community
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for the economy as well as individuals and families. In contrast to this set of ideas, 
the neoliberal perspective of the 1980s assumed that markets could and should 
generate all well­being and it spread the diagnosis that social spending and state 
intervention were in conflict with economic prosperity. Such ideas generated 
neoliberals’ vision of the proper responsibility mix, downplaying the role of the state 
in favour of ‘structural adjustments’. Relationships across the welfare diamond had 
to be redesigned so as to allow markets especially but also community­based 
organisations to reclaim their ‘rightful’ space in the allocation of well­being and to 
shrink the space of social citizenship. Families were also called on to ‘exercise 
greater responsibility’ for themselves. 
Under the influence of neoliberals, governments limited access to social programmes 
and redesigned programmes. Those for the unemployed and social assistance 
recipients were targeted for cutbacks if not elimination, at the same time that 
programmes were intended to ensure that the ‘employables’ (particularly young 
people and lone parents) would be supplied to the labour market rather than going on 
to social assistance. The neoliberal perspective was particularly enthusiastic about the 
role of the community sector, seeing it as an alternative source for collective solidarity 
to that of the state. Communities and organisations were called on to organise 
themselves to become more business­like, and as such they could hope to be given 
contracts to provide services such as job training or services to the vulnerable elderly. 
The social investment perspective’s macro­economic analysis retains the focus on 
the supply­side that neoliberalism instituted and it is in this context that talk of 
social investment (rather than spending) provides discursive coherence. When 
enthusiastic about the market, it is of course natural to speak of investments. 
Therefore, as more activities are organised according to market principles, 
individuals and their families are called on ‘to invest in their own human capital’ so 
as to succeed in the labour market. At the same time they must invest in their own 
futures, via savings for their retirement pensions and their children’s education. 
However, in contrast to neoliberal ideas, the state is also meant to share some of this 
responsibility, by ensuring adequate services (for example, child care) as well as by 
income transfers to make up for the fact that market incomes are often not high 
enough to meet family needs.3 It must also ensure access to the means of acquiring 
human capital, that is education and training (see Nelson and Stephens, and Palme, 
chapters 4 and 12 this volume). Such themes also clearly signal that the perspective is 
not simply an anti­poverty measure; social investments are for the middle­class too. 
In other words, it is an understanding of public interventions that rallies those who 
want social policy to focus on education, including early childhood education, on 
training, and on making work pay as well as those who are concerned about child 
poverty. Sharing the OECD’s key notion that social spending is not a burden but an 
investment in economic growth, developed in the mid­1990s, the European Union 
could quickly move towards its own version, describing social policy as a productive 
factor under the Dutch Presidency of 1997 (Hemerijck 2007: 2). 
Despite allocating a larger role to the state and opening up greater space for social 
citizenship, the social investment perspective does not reject the premise of either 
Keynesians or neoliberals that the market ought to be the primary source of well­
being. It too emphasises the importance of paid employment and other forms of 
3.  For example, a survey in 2003 found that eight of the EU 15 countries had instituted an in­work benefit (Immervoll et al., 2007: 
35). Sweden added its own in­work tax credit in 2008. 
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market income. But, whereas neoliberals assumed that market participation was the 
solution, the social investment perspective is suspicious that the market may not be 
producing sufficient and adequate employment for everyone. A common social 
investment prescription is the need to ‘make work pay,’ not only by making it 
competitive with social benefits rates but also by supplementing wages, providing 
low­cost services, or both. 
 
It is in these terms that early childhood education and care (ECEC) can become  
a support for economic growth and social development. In the social investment 
perspective ECEC is not simply a family matter, as it was for liberal welfare regimes 
until very recently. Nor is it simply a support for workers, as it was initially in social 
democratic regimes.4 Asset­building is another favourite of the promoters of the 
social investment perspective.5 It involves public and private strategies intended to 
encourage and enable low­income persons to save and accumulate assets. Described 
as social investment, the plans often target adult savers through micro­credit 
programmes, but they are also popular as tools for promoting the capacity to invest 
in children and their human capital.6 In the United Kingdom, since 2002 the Child 
Trust Fund makes several payments into an account in the child’s name (at birth and 
age 7); this money can not be accessed by parents while the amount is higher for 
low­income children. Canada’s asset building programme for human capital 
acquisition is Learning Bonds, established in 2004 and targeted to children living in 
low­income families.7 
Policy communities’ focus on both ECEC and asset­building requires the state to 
underwrite activities which for Keynesians as much as neoliberals were private 
matters. In both cases neoliberals’ emphasis on individual and family responsibility 
is muted, but there is also care to avoid the ‘limits’ of early welfare programmes, such 
as those that might have encouraged families to choose parental care over labour 
market participation as well as transfers for current consumption. 
4.  Both Esping­Andersen et al. (2002) and the OECD’s Starting Strong project, initiated in 1998, have made this argument. 
5.  The case for asset­building as a new welfare policy approach, in comparison the outdated models is made in OECD (2003: ch. 1).
6.  The OECD (2003: 17) makes the case for these instruments being social investments in this way: ‘In a publicly funded asset­
building scheme, the funds that match household savings or constitute the endowments of a “baby bond” programme really are 
not government current expenditures. They are savings, just like those of the households they benefit. Forget how government 
budgets may treat them; in the national economic accounts, they ought to be counted as “government saving”, which is to say 
“government investment”. In effect and under the rules of the schemes, governments transfer to households a portion of current 
revenues as a claim on human or physical capital. This forms the foundation for the idea of social investment. Following the 
reasoning above, it ought to be possible to simulate ex ante and to measure ex post social investment’s net return over time, in 
terms of both economic growth and reduced income transfers because (if the arguments for Asset Building are correct) fewer 
people would live in poverty’.
7.  See: http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/hip/lld/cesg/publicsection/CESP/Canada_Learning_Bond_General.shtml 
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Table 1. Three perspectives on the responsibility mix of the citizenship regime.
 Keynesian 
perspective
Neoliberal 
perspective
Social investment 
perspective
Responsibility 
mix principally 
involves:
 
Market, state, family Market, family, 
community
Market, family, state, 
community
Market Can provide well­
being for all, with a 
few exceptions
Should provide well­
being for all
May not provide 
sufficiently for all
Family Children are the 
responsibility of the 
family
Families need to 
take responsibility 
and make choices for 
themselves
Families have primary 
responsibility for 
children, but the state has 
responsibility too
State Should spend to 
provide protection 
against social risks
Spending should be 
limited, because the 
state can create the 
risk of dependency
Spending should be 
investments, such as 
in human capital to 
support labour market 
participation in the future 
as well as present or to 
confront new social risks 
and poverty
Community Represents citizens 
and advocates. 
Provides services 
in the shadow of the 
welfare state
May serve as a 
cushion to spending 
cutbacks and market 
failure
Potential partner in the 
provision of services, and 
source of local as well as 
expert knowledge
Rights and Duties of Citizenship
Beginning in the 1940s, citizenship rights were often distributed according to one’s 
relationship to the labour market. In European corporatist (Bismarckian) welfare 
regimes for example, access to social rights depended on contributions to various 
social security regimes. In liberal regimes access to many social benefits depended 
on the relationship to the labour market, in that a non­relationship, either of one’s 
own or a family breadwinner, opened access to the programmes of the social safety 
net. Furthermore, while social democratic regimes provided more universal rights, 
the employment nexus to social policy thinking was central to shaping social rights 
to retraining, pensions, leaves and so on.
Neoliberalism set out to dismantle many of these rights. Nonetheless, the story 
ended up being one more of redesign than retrenchment. As Francis Castles’ detailed 
quantitative data analysis of the original OECD countries shows, stability rather 
than decline in spending levels is the story (Castles 2005: 414–18). He documents 
clear shifts in the composition of spending, with cash transfers declining relative to 
services (Castles 2005: 419). 
The social investment perspective alters thinking about social citizenship and social 
rights in two ways, and these intersect to shape spending patterns. The first is 
increasing attention to children. If the youngest are future citizens, by middle 
childhood and the teen years, children have gained new rights and have become a 
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focus of citizenship discourse (Jenson 2001). The European Union, for example, 
begins its action programme for the Renewed Social Agenda with attention to 
children and youth, stressing access to education and combating child poverty 
(European Union 2008). This followed from the 2005 Youth Pact which promised 
not only to fight child poverty by fostering social inclusion but also to promote the 
political participation and rights of young people. 
The second alteration introduces a new risk analysis into visions of social 
citizenship. New social risks can be defined generally as the result of income and 
service gaps in post­industrial labour markets as well as demographic and social 
transformations. The working­age population as well as several specific categories, 
such as lone­parent families and those in need of social care, are at risk of social 
exclusion as well as low income.8 Compared to the labour market of the industrial 
era, there has been a loss of well­paid and traditionally male jobs in production and 
an increase in low­paid and often precarious service work that may leave people 
among the ‘working poor’. These labour market shifts associated with the emergence 
of knowledge­based as well as service­sector employment create gaps in skills and 
earning capabilities. There has also been an increase in the female employment rate, 
as the service sector balloons and wages contract, making two incomes essential to 
keeping a family. Socially, family transformations mean smaller families and a 
significant increase in lone­parent families. Demographically, there has been a 
decline in the fertility rate and an increase in life expectancy. 
Restructuring of labour markets and transformations of family and demography 
bring challenges of two broad types to conceptualising social rights and duties.  
The first relates to the means of ensuring income security via labour market 
participation. In post­1945 citizenship regimes, even social democratic ones, only 
men had the duty to seek paid employment. If women did so, until recently, their 
action was treated as a ‘choice’. The male breadwinner family is not a pillar of the 
social investment perspective. If a single male wage supported several adults and 
children 50 years ago, this is less true today, both because of job losses in the 
industrial sector and the rise of the service sector with its traditionally lower­paying 
jobs. More generally, the polarisation of the post­industrial income structure in 
many countries has generated an increase in low­income rates among young 
families, whether lone­parent or couples, and therefore the appearance of what has 
been termed ‘child poverty’ in many policy circles. 
Neoliberals treated the consequences of these restructuring as ‘private matters’ or 
as justification for harsh forms of workfare (Bonoli, chapter 3 this volume). Their 
mantra was ‘any job is a good job,’ with little attention going to needs for supports 
such as transportation, training or childcare in order to stay in work. Active labour 
market policies have replaced these harsher policies. If ALMP were familiar in 
Nordic countries from earlier decades, they are now found, albeit often after 
mutation, in all regime types. ‘Making work pay’ is the slogan of choice everywhere 
from the liberal regime of Tony Blair to the European Union’s Lisbon Strategy (see 
Bonoli, chapter 3, this volume).
Responses everywhere include not only ALMP but also the redesign of programmes 
that actually discourage people from taking up work because they would lose social 
8.  For studies relying on these definitions see Esping­Anderson et al. (2002), Jenson (2004), Bonoli (2005) and Taylor­Gooby 
(2004).
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benefits. As Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder (1999) put it in their manifesto: ‘A 
welfare system that puts limits on an individual’s ability to find a job must be 
reformed. Modern social democrats want to transform the safety net of entitlements 
into a springboard to personal responsibility’. Achieving these ends would involve 
income transfer to be sure, but additional services for social care as well as activation 
were understood to be needed as well. 
Of course social care needs are a challenge to increasing employment rates. There 
are now serious contradictions within the models for balancing work and family and 
social reproduction that were used when designing social citizenship rights after 
1945. For example, women’s higher labour­force participation means reduced 
availability for full­time family caring while lone­parent families have only one adult 
to provide both income and care. Ageing populations mean more vulnerable elderly 
in need of social care, whether formal or informal. 
Governments have responded to the new structure of risk, albeit at different rates 
and in different ways. For example, Germany’s improved parental leaves and 
childcare provision represents deployment of these instruments to respond to 
several new social risks such as changing family structure, women’s labour force 
participation and demography. Much more than in Sweden or Britain, the German 
programmes treat declining fertility as a social risk. The focus on children, breaking 
intergenerational cycles of poverty and improving the future that is the core of the 
social investment perspective takes this form in Germany (Huster et al. 2008: 18):
Under the guiding idea that Germany needs ‘more children in the families and more families 
in society’, the federal government identifies three priorities with regard to children, youths 
and families for the current legislative period (2005–2009): support of young parents during 
the family formation phase (see the Day Care Development Act and the new Parental Benefit 
Act), strengthening the bond between the generations (see the new federal model programme 
‘multigeneration facilities’) and more attention to be paid to children ‘born on the dark side of 
life’ (meaning children who grow up under difficult social and economic conditions).
In a detailed analysis of spending patterns Francis Castles (2005: 420), comparing 
the years from 1990 to 2001 across 21 OECD countries, concludes that ‘… although 
the pace of structural change has not been dramatic, it has been quite consistent, 
suggesting a developmental tendency of precisely the kind predicted by the “new 
social risks” hypothesis’. Across all regime types services have gained ground in the 
expenditure mix. With the exception of the Bismarckian continental cases, the shift 
was particularly pronounced in the last period for which he has data, 1998–2001 
(Castles 2005: 419). Changes in spending are the result, as Figure 2 documents. In all 
regime types, the 1999 numbers are higher than those of 1980, with the usual pattern 
of cross­regime generosity also being respected.
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Figure 2. Spending trends on services for new social risks, by regime type, % GDP.
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Source: developed from Taylor­Gooby. 2004:16.
The social investment perspective privileges investment in human capital and, not 
surprisingly, a variety of programmes seek to increase the human capital spending 
on children and young people. As Tony Blair, speaking in 2004 put it: ‘Together we 
need to build a childcare system that meets the needs of today’s family life, that is 
secure enough to fulfill children’s opportunities. … We must, above all, ensure the 
best possible start in life for all our children who are our strength and our future’ 
(quoted in Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2005). Nor are these simply pious words  
(OECD 2006: 92):
… despite a very low base in many countries, provision for children under 3 is undergoing 
profound change, and receives growing government attention and funding. Since [1998] 
countries have introduced or made progress in policies that: introduce or improve parental 
leave (Canada, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom); increase family­friendly work practices 
(Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway); introduce public­private partnerships into the provision 
of ECEC (Denmark, Sweden, Finland); and provide significantly greater access to early 
childhood services (e.g. Australia, Finland, Korea, Mexico, Portugal). Strategies have also 
been employed to address access barriers to centre­based services especially for low­income 
families (Belgium, France, Ireland, Korea) or to address supply­side barriers in low­income 
neighbourhoods (Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Korea and Mexico).
While coverage rates are still not as high as demand – although Nordic countries are 
close to meeting demand – their change is significant. 
 
With their emphasis on community involvement and social development, the 
design of ECEC often reinforces a more general shift, pioneered under 
neoliberalism and continued into the present, towards decentralised service 
delivery and sometimes design.
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Table 2. Three perspectives on social rights and duties. 
Keynesian 
perspective
Neoliberal 
perspective
Social investment 
perspective
Social goals Provide social 
protection
Avoid policy 
instruments that 
foster dependency; 
promote autonomy
Invest in prevention 
and human and social 
capital, in order to 
ensure growth and 
prosperity
Vision of 
equality
Equality of 
condition and equal 
opportunities
Inequality is 
inherent in markets 
and is necessary to 
motivate economic 
actors 
Equality of opportunity
Risks to be 
covered by social 
and labour 
market policies
Unemployment, 
disability and 
sickness, extra costs 
of children, loss 
of income due to 
retirement or absence 
of a male breadwinner
Disability, sickness, 
threat of crime and 
social disorder, 
ageing
Family breakdown, low 
wage work or unstable 
work, challenge of 
balancing earning with 
social care, demography
Citizens’ duties With respect to the 
labour market: all 
citizens have a duty to 
work, but only male 
breadwinners must 
have paid work
All citizens have 
a duty to ensure 
they have sufficient 
income
All citizens have a duty 
to work but they also 
may have a right to 
adequate income, if the 
market does not provide
With respect to 
women’s labour 
market activity: 
‘choice’ 
‘Choice’ only for 
those women who 
can afford it
‘Choice’ only for those 
women who can afford it
With respect to 
education: young 
people must remain 
in school until the 
end of mandatory 
schooling 
Young people 
should remain in 
school until able to 
support oneself and 
one’s family
Invest own human 
capital and that of their 
family members, from 
preschool through post­
secondary education 
Citizens’ rights Income security 
benefits when 
families fail to 
provide or when 
ill­health and age 
make employment 
impossible
A minimum of 
income security 
for the deserving 
poorest of the poor, 
with requirement 
of reciprocal 
responsibility 
(workfare)
Income security 
benefits not only when 
ill­health and age make 
employment impossible, 
but also when markets 
fail to provide sufficient 
income. Reciprocal 
responsibility applies
Publicly funded 
services, some 
universally provided, 
some targeted
Publicly funded 
services only for 
those without 
adequate income or 
other means
Publicly funded services 
for those without 
adequate income and / 
or in need of support to 
enter employment and / 
or when the market fails 
to provide the service at 
an affordable price
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Education provided 
publicly from 
kindergarten 
Education provided 
publicly from 
kindergarten 
to high school. 
Sometimes 
reduced support 
for post­secondary 
education 
institutions 
Public support for early 
childhood education and 
care. 
Education provided 
publicly from 
kindergarten to high 
school. Reduced support 
for post­secondary 
education institutions 
and expectation of 
greater contribution 
from individuals. 
Expectation of 
individual investment in 
life­long learning
Governance Arrangements and Citizenship Regimes 
Instruments of governance are not neutral tools; they import objectives into a 
pro gramme as much as they translate policy goals. For example, we have already 
seen the social investment perspective’s reliance on asset­building tools as well as on 
promoting investments in human capital, even from the pre­school years. These 
instruments are a logical result of a social policy discourse constructed in terms of 
‘investment,’ one that locates pay­offs from public spending in the medium and 
long­term. 
This is a different notion of time than the one inscribed in the citizenship regimes 
associated with either Keynesianism or neoliberalism. In the Keynesian perspective 
the here­and­now was the most important timeframe and social citizenship focused 
on inequalities, inequities and challenges of the present that would be addressed in 
the present. The counter­cyclical economic instruments obviously supported such  
a notion of time. 
One innovation of the neoliberal perspective was its focus on the future. As the 
standard analysis put it, spending in the present would risk mortgaging the well­
being of future generations; it was better to keep debt low than to do that. The social 
investment perspective also looks to the future but in a somewhat different way. The 
results produced by any investment are located in the future, whereas consumption 
(labelled an expense by accountants) is something that occurs in the present. In this 
perspective then, for social spending to be effective, and therefore worthwhile, it 
must not simply be consumed in the present to meet current needs, but it must be an 
investment that will pay off and reap rewards in the future. 
In this discourse, it is acceptable for the state to have a significant role, but only when 
it is behaving like a good business would, seeking to increase the promise of future 
profits. Spending for current needs, in contrast, must be canny and limited. There are, 
however, certain core costs which must be met so as to keep the enterprise solvent 
– that is to provide some protection against the costs of social exclusion. But such 
spending on items which are not really investments should be limited, directed only 
where it is ‘needed’. The focus on the future also focuses policy attention on results 
(outcomes) and to life­course analyses based time­series information. 
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Social protection and security regimes put into place after 1945 fit well with 
traditional governance forms that have centralised bureaucracies, relying on 
hierarchical relations of accountability, focusing on different results among social 
groups and having concerns that spending conforms to the rules. Neoliberals prefer 
the privatisation of state services. They denigrate ‘bureaucrats’ and call on state 
employers to behave in more businesslike ways and learn how to manage as the 
private sector does, including by focusing on the ‘bottom line’. When proponents of 
social investment regrouped, they did not reject all of neoliberalism. Indeed, the very 
label ‘social investment’ served to project the image of the more businesslike, 
market­friendly and dynamic entrepreneurial state as well as one that was more 
responsive to community needs and concerns. It fit well with the ideology of the new 
public management that many governments had embraced since the 1980s as well as 
the shift of responsibility to other levels of government. Janet Newman and her 
colleagues (2004: 204) summarise changes this way:
The role of the state shifts from that of ‘governing’ through direct forms of control 
(hierarchical governance), to that of ‘governance’, in which the state must collaborate with 
a wide range of actors in networks that cut across the public, private and voluntary sectors, 
and operate across different levels of decision making. Public administration and social 
policy literatures variously describe the ways in which governments – in the UK, the USA and 
across much of Western Europe – have attempted to shift the focus towards various forms 
of co­production with other agencies and with citizens themselves through partnerships, 
community involvement and strategies of ‘responsibilisation’.
Beginning under neoliberalism there has been an increasing attention to the local 
and community levels of governance. This vision of the advantages of community 
and local involvement was retained in the social investment perspective. It leads to a 
willingness to collaborate with intermediary groups, but prefers them as partners in 
policy design and service delivery rather than as advocates for a constituency or as a 
social partner.9 As Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder put it in their 1999 manifesto: 
‘Modern social democrats solve problems where they can best be solved. Some 
problems can now only be tackled at European level: others, such as the recent 
financial crises, require increased international co­operation. But, as a general 
principle, power should be devolved to the lowest possible level’ (Blair and Schroeder 
1999). Commitment to governance practices that engage communities and NGOs is 
found throughout the European Union and its member states, reflected in numerous 
funding programmes as well as rules of engagement for the Open Method of Coordi­
nation. However, there is often a gap between commitment and practical success.
Patterns of access to political power have also altered with changing citizenship 
regimes. In the Keynesian world organised interests and associations were 
acceptable, indeed valued, parts of the representational system and this not only 
where corporatism was the norm. With its critiques of ‘statism’ and too much 
reliance on the public sector for the provision of well­being, neoliberalism assaulted 
existing relationships of representation, especially those involving organised labour. 
Beyond their attacks on trade unions, neoliberals mounted an assault on the 
identities of advocacy groups, labelling them ‘special interests’ and seeking to 
delegitimate their claims in the eyes of the public (Jenson and Phillips 1996). 
Neoliberals favoured forms of representation that appeared to allow ‘individuals’ 
and not groups to seek representation. The social investment perspective’s focus on 
9.  This lack of legitimacy for collective actors, especially the social partners, within the social investment perspective provided 
the main line of criticism of the original Third Way by Jacques Delors (2002: 12ff.). 
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the community demonstrates the influence of a growing belief in the advantages  
of ‘the local,’ of subsidiarity and of citizen engagement. The design of governance 
arrangements in the emerging citizenship regimes relies extensively on notions of 
consultation, communication and local involvement. 
Table 3. Three perspectives on the governance dimension of social citizenship.
Keynesian 
perspective
Neoliberal 
perspective
Social investment 
perspective
Time horizon in 
governance
Present, so as to avoid 
the past
Present, so as 
not to hobble the 
future
Future, which 
requires action in 
the present
Preferred forms  
of governance
Weberian 
hierarchical/
bureaucratic
Corporate models 
plus privatisation
Networking and 
partnerships
Ideal form of 
intergovernmental 
relations
State­building via 
conditionality
Unilateralism and 
downloading
Asymmetrical 
collaboration via 
results­based co­
ordination 
Focus for evaluation  
of success
Inputs (spending) Bottom line (costs) Outcomes (cost­
benefit)
Evidence base  
for policy
Cross­sectional data 
identifying social 
‘problems’
Time­series 
data illustrating 
growing deficits
Longitudinal 
data identifying 
and tracking 
social investment 
opportunities and 
outcomes
Expectation of 
community sector 
An organised 
expression of social 
needs and solidarity, 
meriting public 
support as part of 
the institutions of 
representation
Part of the private 
sector, often 
representing, a 
‘special interest’. 
Might be harnessed 
by government to 
respond to pressing 
social needs 
An organised 
expression of social 
needs and solidarity 
that requires public 
investment to build 
its capacity for 
partnerships 
Expectation of 
private sector
Wealth­creating 
sector
Model for wealth 
creation and 
regulation
Wealth­creating 
partner and model 
for regulation
Why the Social Investment Perspective?
When these ideas about social citizenship are described together, as constituting  
a policy perspective, 1996 and 1997 become years of major change for social 
citizenship. By the mid­1990s, straightforward neoliberalism had hit an ideational, 
political and economic wall. There were clear signs of an organised critique of 
neoliberals’ premise that social policy generated negative economic outcomes. In the 
European Union, policy communities composed of European and national decision 
makers as well as academics argued that social policy provisions could be productive 
factors contributing to economic performance. There was a contingent convergence 
around ideas about a developmental welfare state, that depends in large part on a 
‘child­centred social investment strategy’ and a ‘human capital investment push’  
as well as pension reform (Hemerijck 2007: 12–13). Where did this come from?
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The Contradictions of Neoliberalism
The promised cutbacks in state activity and massive savings in state expenditures 
failed to materialise, despite the insistence by neoliberals that their main goal was 
slashing state spending. Nonetheless, and despite the continued spending, social 
problems deepened and poverty rates mounted. Resistance to retrenchment and 
neoliberal politicians began to generate electoral successes for the political left in 
Europe. In 1997, the Asian crisis – a precursor of the current financial crisis and a 
signal that was ignored because it did not touch the United States or Europe with 
much force – destabilised the international economy and the international financial 
institutions in a frightening way. 
The Asian crisis triggered fundamental reassessments of economic and social policy 
in much of the world. In several international organisations it finally became 
possible to question neoliberal analyses.10 A poverty reduction paradigm, in 
gestation for a number of years, took shape in the early and mid­1990s around a set  
of explicit and quantifiable goals for international development. They originated in 
agreements and resolutions of the world conferences organised by the United 
Nations in the first half of the 1990s, were adopted by the development ministers of 
the OECD in 1996, and were confirmed by the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration of 8 September 2000. These actions were generating social policy 
intended to be a sort of ‘safety net’ (Deacon 1997: ch. 3), but nonetheless they did 
constitute a rehabilitation of social policy as a legitimate form of state action. By 
1997 the World Bank had also published its annual World Development Report with 
the title The State in a Changing World. 
Another location in which the contradiction between the promises of neoliberalism 
and its outcomes occurred was in the OECD. In the 1980s, the OECD had been the 
leader of the ‘welfare as a burden’ position, diffusing the key idea among its 
membership and within policy communities at its 1980s conference on the welfare 
state in crisis, that ‘social policy in many countries creates obstacles to growth’ 
(quoted in Deacon 1997: 71). However, by the early 1990s concerns about stability and 
the limits of structural adjustment in the OECD and elsewhere, bubbled up in the 
idea sets of OECD officials. Social cohesion became a key word in policy discussion, 
and warnings appeared of the need to balance attention to economic restructuring 
with caution about societal cohesion, in order to sustain that very restructuring 
(Jenson 1998: 3, 5). This was followed by other institutions and groups noticing that 
neoliberalism seemed to have particularly negative effects on children and ‘child 
poverty’ emerged as an object of policy.
 
Nonetheless, identification of the contradictions can not by itself account for the 
emergence of a social investment perspective. That rapidly growing and entrenched 
poverty was identified as the key contradiction does reflect a shift away from the 
social citizenship paradigm of the post­1945 decades. This step was important 
because other diagnoses did exist, such as ‘lack of sufficient markets’ (which 
neoliberals continued to claim) or ‘insufficient redistribution,’ ‘too much liberalism’ 
and so on. But why settle on social investment? 
10.  On the main global IOs and the OECD see Deacon (1997: ch. 3). 
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Rallying Around Social Investment
Work on the diffusion of ideas has frequently noted that those that spread best are 
ones that can draw together numerous positions and sustain a moderate to high level 
of ambiguity. The ideas that work best are those that have scientific legitimacy, often 
having been generated by academic research, but that also provide a common sense 
meaning open to multiple interpretations. Social investment is one such quasi­
concept, as was Keynesianism.11
 
Keynesians are demand focussed, and their preferred instruments are those that 
create employment. The shift to supply­side analyses under neoliberalism focussed 
attention on ‘problems of supply’ and on solutions that called on workers to make 
themselves more employable. The social investment perspective retains a supply­
side focus, but adds the notion that poverty and lack of access to services (including 
education) can hinder adequate supply. 
As the OECD moved away from its classic neoliberalism it became one of the first 
institutional promoters of the notion of social investment for Europe and elsewhere. 
Social investment was considered by many more institutions than the OECD, of 
course, but that IO gave it an early boost as an approach to ‘modernisation’ of social 
policy. Ambiguous in its simultaneous backward and forward gaze, the term was 
useful for the OECD both to refer back to neoliberals’ preference for markets as 
decision locales and to make claims for new spending, all the while allowing a 
distinction to be made between the ‘bad old days’ of social protection and promising 
future of social investment. Orientations adopted in a 1992 ministerial conference 
included the premise that ‘non­inflationary growth of output and jobs, and political 
and social stability are enhanced by the role of social expenditures as investments in 
society’ (quoted in Deacon et al., 1997: 71). This position led to the argument that 
there was a need to spend rather than simply cut back in the social realm. The 1996 
high­level conference, Beyond 2000: The New Social Policy Agenda, concluded with  
a call for a ‘social investment approach for a future welfare state’. OECD experts 
immediately began diffusing a social investment argument structured in now 
familiar terms: ‘Today’s labour­market, social, macro­economic and demographic 
realities look starkly different from those prevailing when the welfare state was 
constructed. Social expenditure must move towards underwriting social 
investment, helping recipients to get re­established in the labour market and society, 
instead of merely ensuring that failure to do so does not result in destitution’ 
(Pearson and Scherer 1997: 6, 9). Sharing the OECD’s key notion that social spending 
is not a burden but an investment in economic growth, the European Union also 
began describing social policy as a productive factor in 1997 (Hemerijck 2007: 2).  
This mixing of economic and social objectives is inherently ambiguous.
Intellectuals from a variety of milieus became the promoters of the social 
investment perspective, including its child­centred focus. Their contribution was 
often to expand the ambiguity of the concept further, however. Perhaps the best­
known intellectual promoting social investment in the European context and in 
terms very similar to those already developed by the OECD in the mid­1990s is Gøsta 
Esping­Andersen. For him, a real ‘child­centred social investment strategy’ is what 
11.  Peter Hall’s classic collection on the diffusion of Keynesian ideas after 1945 made this point: ‘To be Keynesian bespoke a 
general posture rather than a specific creed. Indeed the very ambiguity of Keynesian ideas enhanced their power in the political 
sphere. By reading slightly different emphases into these ideas, an otherwise disparate set of groups could unite under the same 
banner’ (Hall in Hall 1989: 367). 
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the Nordic welfare states have been doing, and is done best there (Esping­Andersen 
et al. 2002: 51). This strategy is essentially one to ensure ‘social inclusion and a 
competitive knowledge economy’ via activation, making work pay and reducing 
workless households, the need for all of which are included in the chapter on child­
centred social investment (Esping­Andersen et al. 2002: ch. 2). 
His notions of social investment are quite different from those of another well­
known European intellectual, Anthony Giddens (1998), who called in the mid­1990s 
for a ‘social investment state’ that would invest in human and social capital. His 
formulations were close to those of Tony Blair’s New Labour, which frequently 
described its actions as being social investments. In other words, Giddens’ use of the 
idea of social investment was more supply­side oriented and more limited in its 
proposed interventions than were Esping­Andersen’s proposals. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the latter is critical of New Labour and calls instead for his own ‘truly 
effective and sustainable social investment strategy … biased towards preventive 
policy’ (Esping­Andersen et al. 2002: 5). We see, in other words, not only a battle 
between two well­known intellectuals struggling for policy influence but also the 
range and ambiguity of the notion. Policy communities could appeal to one version 
or the other or even combine the two, as the European Union did in its preparations 
for the renewal of the Lisbon strategy between 2006 and 2008 (Jenson 2008).
But What about the Financial Crisis?
The social policy initiatives developed over the last decade around the goals of healthy 
child development, increasing human capital and activation are the result of this 
process of rallying around a set of ideas. But, is the social investment perspective 
solid? If the Asian financial crisis was a factor loosening the grip of neoliberal ideas in 
some of the major international organisations and if concerns about social cohesion 
and its risks prompted European and other governments to adjust their calculus of 
the ‘costs’ of social policy, this does not mean that the social investment perspective 
will thrive in the current financial meltdown. Enthusiasm in the United States for 
‘throwing money at the problem’ as well as ‘rescuing’ industries and banks drives 
social policy even further into the shadows. Spending on childcare and human capital 
does not appear to promise fast payoffs to crisis managers. Reducing poverty by 
creating quality jobs does not appeal to governments driven to ‘create jobs,’ any jobs.
The challenge is, in other words, to resist falling into practices that will simply leave 
social policy – and the citizens who depend on it – on its own, in order to save the 
macro­economic infrastructure. The lesson taught by the promoters of the social 
investment from the years of neoliberalism is that a solid economy depends on 
sustainable social policy practices. Returning to neoliberals’ obsession with 
redesigning macro­economic and financial structures by slashing the social 
protections of some (autoworkers) and failing to provide for others (where have  
all the children gone?) is a detour Europeans must resist. There is another way.
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Child Care and the  
Social Investment Model:  
Political Conditions for Reform 
Kimberly J. Morgan
After many years of neglect by policy­makers and scholars alike, the social 
investment approach to social policy has put the spotlight on the issue of child care. 
Child care is a linchpin of the social investment approach, which seeks to shift the 
emphasis of public spending from passive transfers towards active, human­capital 
boosting investments. Broadly­available, high­quality child care should achieve this 
by providing developmentally­stimulating programmes to young children while also 
enabling mothers to be in paid employment. For women, this prevents the skills 
degradation that accompanies time out of paid work and also helps combat child 
poverty by boosting household income. Another, less often noted, effect results from 
the fact that childcare services are a source of employment, often for lower­income 
women who might otherwise struggle to find a foothold in the labour market.
In short, child care embodies the multiple goals of the social investment model and  
it is for that reason that social investment advocates such as Gøsta Esping­Andersen 
have put it at the centre of their analyses, arguing that broad­based access to child 
care is crucial to fighting child poverty, reducing inequality, and promoting societal 
well­being. The need to improve childcare provision also has become increasingly 
prominent in European Union policy since the adoption of the European 
Employment Strategy in the late 1990s. As part of the strategy, the member states 
agreed at the 2002 European Council meeting in Barcelona that by 2010 they should 
provide child care for at least 90 per cent of children aged three to the mandatory 
school age, and 33 per cent of children below the age of three. The OECD also has 
been beating the drum for variants of the social investment model for years, 
championing active labour market policies, ‘flexicurity’, and expanded childcare 
provision.1 These organisations can only plead the case for child care, however, as 
domestic political processes ultimately determine adoption of significant social 
policy reforms (Jacobsson, chapter 7 this volume).
1.  See, for instance, the series of reports released by the OECD about work­family policy arrangements in different countries, 
titled Babies and Bosses. On the OECD’s role in promoting particular social policy visions, see Rianne Mahon and Stephen 
McBride, eds (2008), The OECD and Transnational Governance Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press
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What then are the domestic preconditions for the adoption of a social investment 
model in child care? Answering this question is complex as significantly increased 
spending on child care does not necessarily represent an embrace of the social 
investment model. A further complication lies in the fact that there is no unified model 
of reform. The task of this chapter then is to characterise the nature of recent changes 
that have taken place, compare these reforms to the social investment ideals that are 
commonly articulated, and then probe the political forces driving these reforms.
The chapter focuses on three ‘path­shifters’ – Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
UK – who have broken from what appeared to be entrenched immobility on 
childcare policy. The common conditions for reform in these three countries are a 
broadly­shared sense of crisis in the status quo and push for political modernisation 
by reform architects on either the left or the right. Although governments in these 
countries have adopted elements of the social investment model, both in rhetoric and 
in concrete policies, furthering this model has not always been the main goal of 
reform: often, short­term political calculations and other concerns have dominated 
the policymaking process. Moreover, although these path­shifters have adopted 
important elements of the social investment model, they fall short in their lesser 
commitment to gender equality and refusal to develop a ‘service state’ that would use 
trained, decently­paid, public sector workers to deliver high­quality services for all.
Trends in Childcare Policy
For years, policymakers paid scant attention to child care in most of Western 
Europe. Only a few countries began developing an infrastructure of childcare 
services relatively early – by the 1960s and early 1970s – that laid the foundation  
for the universally­available services they are today. Denmark and Sweden went the 
furthest in this regard, followed by Finland and Norway, and in continental Europe, 
France and Belgium had universal long­day preschool programmes for children 
above the age of 2­1/2 by the 1980s. In the rest of Western Europe, many countries 
developed preschool and kindergarten programmes that would become widely 
available but many of these programmes were open for only part of the day or part  
of the week and thus unhelpful for working mothers.
The period of stasis around child care started to come to an end by the mid to late 
1990s. As figure 1 shows, the general trend across Western Europe has been 
increased spending on in­kind, family­related services, but there is still a sizeable 
gap between countries clustered along the conventional typology. Figure 2 singles 
out some of the ‘path­shifters’ who have made the most significant change in policy 
in recent years: the UK, the Netherlands, and, more recently Germany, with France 
and Sweden shown for comparison as countries that had achieved fairly high levels  
of spending prior to the mid­1990s. It should be noted that the data only go through 
2005 and thus fail to capture recent German reforms that expand the generosity of 
parental leave and increase spending on child care.
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Figure 1. In-kind spending on the family as percentage of total public expenditures, welfare 
regime clusters, 1980–2005.
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Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database.
Spending in this category includes day care, home help services, and other in­kind services.
Clusters include the following countries: Liberal: Australia, Canada, Ireland, UK, US; Conservative: Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland; Social Democratic: Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
Figure 2. In-kind spending on families as a percentage of total public expenditures, select 
countries, 1980–2005.
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Of course, spending trends offer an imperfect indicator, as the mere fact that 
countries are spending more on family­related benefits and services does not 
necessarily mean they are pursuing a social investment strategy. What types of 
childcare reforms would be congruent with such a strategy? As shown by Jane 
Jenson in this volume (see chapter 1), a central theme of this discourse is the need to 
promote women’s participation in paid work. Childcare policies should therefore be 
structured to support and encourage mothers’ employment, with appropriate 
schedules or after­school services that enable full­time paid work. The programmes 
themselves can also be a source of employment, particularly for less­educated 
women. Beyond this, a social investment focus should lead policymakers to pay 
considerable attention to the quality of services being provided. Advocates of the 
model often hold up child care as a way to combat child poverty, both by raising 
family income through mothers’ employment, but also through the provision of 
developmentally enriching services to low­income children (Esping­Andersen 
2003). More generally, early education programmes are held up as an investment in 
the human capital of a nation’s children, so that they can be productive workers in 
the future. The terminology increasingly used by policymakers and advocates  
– early childhood education and care (ECEC) – encompasses the two dimensions of 
these programmes. Finally, in discussions over the social investment model, concern 
about gender equality is at times, but not consistently, raised. In EU policy papers 
and statements, OECD documents, and intellectual debate, there has been a growing 
realisation that simply increasing spending on child care is not enough to promote 
the integration of women into paid work: deeply­rooted inequalities in the division  
of unpaid work also need to be addressed. We might therefore expect that policy­
makers who are fully committed to the social investment model would seek to tackle 
these larger issues, through the creation of daddy­only parental leave time for 
instance, or other measures that encourage men to take on more domestic 
responsibilities.
By these measures, how do our three path­shifters look in the extent of their 
commitment to the social investment model?
Childcare Policy in the Path­Shifters:  
The UK, the Netherlands, and Germany
Based on rhetoric alone, the UK appears committed to social investment­type ideals: 
New Labour was one of the original champions of this approach as part of its Third 
Way between the Old Left and New Right, and New Labour governments have 
repeatedly couched their proposals for expanded child care and family support in 
social investment language. It has taken some time for these investments to 
materialise, but many reforms follow a social investment logic, with an emphasis on 
activating women’s employment and combating child poverty. Policy changes since 
1997 include the gradual expansion of paid maternity leave from 14 weeks to a 
12­month entitlement scheduled to come into effect in 2010, enactment of an unpaid 
parental leave entitlement of 13 weeks (as required by the European Union), and the 
creation of a right for parents of children under six to request a more flexible work 
schedule, which their employers must seriously consider. There also have been 
expanded tax subsidies for child care, obligations placed on local authorities to 
assure adequate access to these services, and guarantees of a certain amount of free 
nursery school care for all three and four year olds.
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Not all elements of the social investment model have received equal weight. For 
instance, the concern about child poverty has been more important than the goal  
of assuring access to services for all working parents, as many of the subsidies have 
been targeted to poor families and prioritised part­day educational services. Gender 
equality also has not been a high priority, although the better­paid maternity leave 
will be of great help to many women, and, in a bow to gender equality concerns, men 
are entitled to take up to six months of the leave. However, the government has 
refused to change the name to a parental leave, perhaps because this might stoke 
expectations of higher remuneration and other reforms to encourage fathers to take 
the leave, and policy­makers seem to think few men will take up the option.
UK childcare policy also falls short of the social investment model in its often 
inadequate attention to both childcare quality and the quality of jobs in the childcare 
sector. The core problem is that reforms have encouraged a private childcare market 
through a combination of municipal grants and tax subsidies. The 2006 Childcare 
Act explicitly bars local authorities from providing child care directly as long as 
there are private actors willing to do so. Yet, given the personnel­intensive nature of 
childcare services (e.g. high staff­child ratios), private childcare markets are difficult 
to sustain without extensive subsidies. Indeed, such markets generally emerge in 
countries with a low­wage labour force, high degree of income inequality, and/or a 
large (and often illegal) immigrant population that can serve as household and day 
care centre workers. In the UK, reliance on inadequately­subsidised private 
providers has produced the outcome that prevails in the US: services of very 
irregular (and often inferior) quality that are staffed by a low­wage and unstable 
workforce, yet that are still expensive for parents – particularly for lower­income 
families (Penn 2007).
This vitiates some of the benefits of child care for social investment. The cost of care 
in the UK is often two to three times higher for lower­income parents, leaving these 
families to depend on cheaper, lower­quality care and multiple care arrangements 
that do little for child development. The childcare sector also generally does not offer 
lower­income women a pathway towards stable, trained, and decently­remunerated 
work: childcare workers tend to cycle in and out of the sector, often acquiring limited 
skills and experience, much as in the United States. To the credit of the Labour 
government, the quality issue has received more attention recently. However, 
inadequately subsidised private services are unlikely to provide the kind of 
stimulating care at reasonable cost that is essential for the goals of the social 
investment model to be met.
The Dutch reforms since the 1990s have emphasised the activation of women’s 
employment but also paid less attention to gender equality or the quality of the 
services. Certainly, one should not underestimate the magnitude of the shift in 
Dutch policy towards working mothers and their children. For decades, the 
Netherlands had very limited access to full­day child care and low rates of mothers’ 
employment. In a significant U­turn that began in the 1990s, Social Democratic­
Liberal governments adopted measures to support and increase women’s workforce 
participation, including a right of all employees to work part time and increased 
subsidies for child care. The proportion of children in publicly­subsidised child care 
has increased significantly, achieved largely through demand­side subsidies of 
private childcare providers.
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In terms of the dominant political goals, activating women’s employment in some 
form or other was more important than promoting gender equality in paid and 
unpaid work. Officially, the above reforms were supposed to promote egalitarian 
objectives by enabling a combinatie scenario, whereby each parent would work 
part­time and children would attend day care part­time. In practice, only about eight 
percent of couples with young children practice the combinatie scenario; in most, 
mothers reduce their working time, often to very short hours, while fathers’ time in 
paid work is actually higher than that of other men. Perhaps this simply reflects 
parents’ preferences in how to divide paid work and care, but given how costly Dutch 
day care is – owing to inadequate public subsidies – many parents have few options 
but to use day care part time. A lack of attention to gender equality also is evident in 
the approach to parental leave: the fairly short (four­month) and reasonably paid 
maternity leave was preserved, but there was no impetus towards a longer, well­paid 
parental leave that would encourage male participation; instead, there is an unpaid 
version that complies with EU requirements (as in the UK).
Finally, less attention has been paid to ensuring that all parents can access good 
quality care. Again, this reflects the decision to subsidise a private childcare market 
indirectly through demand­side subsidies. As in the UK, staff are low­paid, and there 
is a bifurcation between education and care, with those working in child care less 
educated and trained than those in the education sector. At the same time, the cost of 
care for parents is often quite high, including for lower­income parents, although, in 
contrast to the UK, costs are more successfully income­gradated so that lower­
income parents are not paying relatively more of their income on day care than are 
higher­income parents (Adema 2007). In short, on promoting gender equality, child 
development, and job quality for less­educated workers, the Netherlands falls short 
of the social investment approach.
In Germany, we might also think that the drive to expand access to child care has 
followed a social investment logic, given that Social Democratic Chancellor 
Schroeder publicly avowed his commitment to a Neue Mitte in economic and social 
policy. Employment­activating reforms followed, but the Social Democratic­Green 
governments of the late 1990s and early 2000s did little to specifically promote 
mothers’ employment. There was an important reform in childcare policy in 2004, 
the Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz, which required local authorities to provide 
sufficient access to childcare for children below the age of three, supported by 1.5 
billion euros that were to be saved through labour market reforms. However, this law 
reflected an intensifying concern about low fertility rates – some of the lowest in 
Western Europe – as evidenced by reports commissioned, and statements made, by 
the SPD Family Minister, Renate Schmidt.
Pro­natalist discourses became even more prominent around the more recent 
SPD­CDA reforms: a 2008 law, the Kinderförderungsgesetz, creates a right to child 
care for all children from the age of one, and in 2007 the governing coalition agreed 
to devote 4 billion euros over five years to expand the availability of child care. 
Another reform increased tax breaks for parents’ childcare costs. Finally, major 
changes also were made to the parenting benefit and leave, which had been long (up 
to three years), means­tested, and poorly paid (about 500€ a month). The new leave/
benefit is for 12 months and pays workers two thirds of their salary, up to a ceiling. 
An effort to make the leave gender egalitarian was somewhat successful: in its initial 
incarnation, the leave was to be 10 months with two reserved for the father (or the 
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parent who did not take most of the leave). When concerns were voiced that the leave 
time mothers likely would take would be too short, it was lengthened to 12 months, 
plus two extra months for the father. Although the decision to set aside a father’s 
quota was an important one from the standpoint of gender equality principles, the 
Nordic experience shows that most men will take at most the two months allotted to 
them, and no more.
As in the UK and the Netherlands, less attention has been paid to the quality of 
childcare services, or the staff responsible for delivering them. This is surprising 
given that some claim a PISA­shock – a reaction to the low ranking German students 
achieved on the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment – was one 
driver of the reforms (Rüling 2008). Problems in the quality of care had already been 
publicised: a well­publicised study of German kindergartens from the 1990s found 
that only one third could be considered good quality, with the rest either mediocre or 
poor quality. Yet, the tradition of subsidiarity, and thus deference to ‘Länder’, 
municipalities, and the voluntary sector that runs many of these programmes, 
impedes national efforts to impose standards or a common curriculum (Evers,  
Lewis and Riedel 2005).
In sum, there have been a host of reforms driven by a varying array of motivations, 
only some of which are congruent with the social investment model. Childcare 
services are expanding and more resources have gone towards maternity and 
parental leaves, but some services are of questionable value both for children and  
as a source of employment for less­skilled, female workers. In many cases, policy­
makers are attempting to promote work­family ‘reconciliation’ but are not 
necessarily tackling the deeper sources of gender inequality in paid work or care.
What political, economic and social forces appear to be driving these varied reforms?
The Politics of Reform
One common factor among these three path­shifting countries is that all were 
extremely poor performers on the dimensions that have dominated policy debate  
in each country. Startlingly high rates of child poverty in the UK were the main 
motivating force for their reforms, as was the very low prevalence of mothers’ 
employment in the Netherlands. Similarly, a sense of crisis over low fertility rates in 
Germany jumpstarted the overhaul of a conservative and passive approach to family 
policy. In each case, political actors from across the spectrum came to agree on the 
existence of the problem (even if they did not agree on how to deal with it), which 
catalysed political energies and enabled policymakers to overcome some of the 
obstacles to policy reform. Thus, the UK overcame longstanding cultural and 
political opposition to a government role in the family, the Dutch dropped much of 
their traditional antipathy to out­of­home care for young children (although use of 
such care only part­time helped smooth the transition), and German policymakers 
have been able to circumvent some of the inter­governmental obstacles that stand in 
the way of a national childcare policy.
A second observation to make about path­shifting countries is that in each one, the 
architects of the reforms were preoccupied with the need to modernise not only the 
welfare state but their own political parties through appeals to a valuable political 
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constituency – middle class couples with children in which, increasingly, mothers 
want or feel obliged to be in paid work. In Germany, for instance, the CDU embrace  
of reforms to promote mothers’ employment resulted from internal party debate 
over the need to capture the votes of younger men and women with more gender 
egalitarian aspirations. In the UK, Blair’s New Labour sought to revitalise the 
political fortunes of the party by promoting not only a new set of ideas, but by 
tailoring programmes and policies to meet the day to day needs of families. The 
resonance of these policies with the public – many of whom welcome more generous 
family benefits and services – helped dampen controversy around them; instead, 
opponents have had to basically get on board with the broad objectives of the 
reforms, albeit with some grumbling (e.g. the CSU in Germany, the CDA in the 
Netherlands, and Conservatives in Britain).
A third observation is that these two factors alone are not enough to generate a full 
social investment orientation in childcare policy. In fact, looking across a broader 
array of OECD countries makes plain how rare such an approach is. Only some of the 
Nordic countries have achieved this through an ‘educare’ approach to child care that 
fuses educational and care­giving motivations, but also includes a strong focus on 
gender equality. Even so, only Denmark and Sweden offer a sufficient supply of 
high­quality services staffed by skilled and decently­remunerated employees, and if 
one really wants to be exacting, one would remark that family day care – run by less 
well­trained personnel – makes up a sizable portion of the Danish childcare system. 
In short, only a few countries have childcare systems that embody the deeper goals of 
the social investment model, and countries such as Sweden and Denmark possess 
many attributes that are conducive to gender­egalitarian, child­oriented, and active 
social policy. Left political power, strong and encompassing unions, high levels of 
female political representation, political centralisation, social and cultural 
homogeneity – all of these factors likely played a role in the forging of their approach 
to families and working parents.
This is not to say that important elements of the social investment model have not 
been adopted by other countries, as in fact they have. However, observing the 
limitations of each country’s approach does explain why they are unlikely to fully 
meet the goals of the social investment model in child care. The UK has made some 
progress in combating child poverty, but child poverty rates remain high compared 
to other European countries. Similarly, Dutch policies in recent years have 
contributed to a rapid increase in women’s employment, but largely through part­
time work. Gender inequality in paid and unpaid work thus remains quite 
significant. German fertility rates are inching up, but are unlikely to attain French or 
Nordic levels any time soon.
The crucial element missing from the more recent path­shifters is a commitment to 
what Evelyne Huber and John Stephens label a ‘service state’ of not only publicly­
funded services, but state­provided ones. Such a system is more likely to meet the 
varied goals of the social investment model, not only supporting mothers’ 
employment through access to child care, but making sure that services are high­
quality and provide good jobs to their employees. Access to such programmes can be 
truly universal, not mediated by markets that tend to stratify access by income and 
education. Such a model is found most comprehensively in the Nordic countries and 
reflects the strength of social democratic political power, although there is a 
Republican variant found in France and, to a lesser extent, in Belgium that shaped 
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their universal preschool systems. Probably just as important as left­wing political 
power is the existence of public­sector unions, either at the onset of these pro­
grammes or as a result of them, which can protect the employees who work for them.
Yet, the social investment model as advocated by New Labour and other 
‘modernised’ variants of the left rejects state provision as archaic while valorising 
markets as a superior (and, from the standpoint of the state, cheaper) form of service 
delivery. In the EU proclamations about the social investment model, there are 
assertions that states must promote higher­quality jobs, but no discussion about how 
this will be achieved, whereas the OECD generally favours market­based reforms 
and efforts to keep down the burden of taxation. Even in the Nordic countries, public 
provision has come under attack, although the push for market­delivered services 
has had more impact on other policy areas, such as old­age care service, while the 
state­run childcare system has proven more resistant.
In sum, although the social investment model was inspired initially by the 
successes achieved by the Nordic countries in promoting women’s employment, 
diminishing poverty and inequality and fostering high fertility rates, a crucial 
lesson – about the merits of public provision and not just financing – was lost along 
the way. Recent reforms in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK show that left 
party and union power is no longer a necessary condition for the enactment of 
broad­based childcare programmes, but it remains essential for the achievement  
of the model’s deeper objectives.
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Varieties of Social Investment  
in Labour Market Policy 
Giuliano Bonoli
The notion of ‘social investment’ makes reference to interventions that aim at helping 
disadvantaged people by improving their life chances, particularly their chances to 
enter and succeed in education and in the labour market. As stated by Jane Jenson in 
this volume, from an abstract point of view, they can be distinguished from both the 
more traditional social policy approach based on income or job protection and from 
the neo­liberal one based on deregulation and (re­)commodification, a concept used 
by sociologists which refers to the strengthening of work incentives. While these 
three conceptions of social policy may be easy to distinguish in the realm of 
principles it may be more difficult to ascribe precise policy instruments to one or the 
other approach. Active labour market policies, a label that can encompass an 
extremely broad range of interventions, are a case in point.
The objective of this chapter is to examine different types of and approaches to 
active labour market policy from the perspective of social investment, on the basis of 
the definition given above. I first develop a conceptual distinction between different 
types of active labour market policy, making reference to different principles that 
can inform labour market policy: protection, investment and re­commodification. 
On this basis I identify three approaches to active labour market policy that reflect 
the definition of social investment given above, and a fourth approach based on 
re­commodification only. Next, on the basis of expenditure and institutional data,  
I look for the different approaches in the real world. I conclude that both 
conceptually and empirically there are arguments for differentiating between 
different social investment approaches within active labour market policy.
Intuitively, active labour market policy can be seen as the locus of investment 
oriented social policy par excellence. Helping non­working individuals to find a job  
is a new approach to labour market policy that differs from both traditional left and 
right wing solutions. Yet active labour market polices in the real world display such 
high degree of variation, that it is difficult to formulate encompassing judgments 
with regard to their social investment orientation.
Active labour market policies have different origins. In Sweden, active labour market 
polices were developed as early as the 1950s, with the objective of improving the 
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match between supply and demand of labour in the context of a rapidly evolving 
economy, essentially by financing extensive vocational training programmes 
(Swenson 2002). At the opposite extreme, a different variant of active labour market 
policy has been developed since the 1980s in the English­speaking world. The US and 
the UK have seen the adoption of welfare to work polices, which combine positive 
and negative incentives for social assistance recipients to move into employment. 
Work requirements for able bodied individuals on social benefits had always existed, 
but were not seriously enforced. The first steps in this direction were taken by 
conservative governments, and the resulting polices have a distinct punitive and 
social control flavour. According to King, key welfare to work polices developed in 
the UK and in the US in the late 1980s/early 1990s ‘have, at their core, the 
assumption that work­welfare beneficiaries have an insufficiently developed sense of 
their duty to the rest of society’ (King 1995). At the time, welfare to work was seen by 
many as part of a conservative attack on the welfare state. The term ‘workfare’ was 
coined to describe what was considered to be a major shift away from postwar 
principles of social citizenship (Peck 2001).
Variations in terms of content are compounded by a fundamental ambiguity of active 
labour market polices, which in most cases, tend to combine stronger work 
incentives with at least some investment in human capital. The result is that most 
active labour market policies are difficult to classify under the traditional categories 
used in comparative social policy. This problem is clearly spelt out by Jochen Clasen:
[…] it is sometimes difficult to classify a particular policy as an example of either welfare 
retrenchment or welfare expansion. For instance, the potential expenditure involved in 
activation programmes is higher than in maintaining passive cash support. [… However]  
from the perspective of individual claimants, obligatory activation might be seen exclusively 
as welfare restriction (Clasen 2000:90).
Some authors have attempted to deal with this problem by distinguishing between 
two types of active labour market policies, or activation: those which are about 
improving human capital, and those which use essentially negative incentives to 
move people from social assistance into employment. Examples of such 
classifications are found in Torfing (1999) who distinguishes between ‘offensive’  
and ‘defensive’ workfare. Offensive workfare, which is the term used to describe the 
Danish variant of activation, relies on improving skills and empowerment rather 
than on sanctions and benefit reduction, as is the ‘defensive’ variant found in the US. 
In a similar vein, Barbier distinguishes between ‘liberal activation’, characterised by 
stronger work incentives, benefit conditionality and the use of sanctions, and ‘uni­
versalist activation’, which is found in the Nordic countries and continues to rely on 
extensive investment in human capital essentially through training (Barbier 2004).
Dichotomies between human investment and incentive­based approaches to 
activation are useful in making sense of an ambiguous concept. They are also helpful 
as a first attempt to operationalise the definition of social investment presented at 
the beginning of this paper: only active labour market policies that promote 
investment in human capital count as social investment. Those based on stronger 
work incentives do not, yet we are left with at least three problems.
First, much of the novelty of the current approach to labour market policy lies in the 
simultaneous application of both approaches: investment in human capital and 
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stronger work incentives. This quality has been highlighted also in the governmental 
discourse that has been used to accompany key reforms. In Germany, for example, 
Gehrard Schroeder’s motto in labour market policy was fordern und foerdern (to 
promote and to demand). By forcing policies into one of the two categories 
highlighted above, we may fail to grasp what is distinctive about them. 
Second, the dichotomy highlighted above makes sense in terms of philosophies 
underling an active labour market policy. However, individual examples of programme 
activities are sometimes difficult to ascribe to one or the other approach. Supported 
employment and job coaching programmes are based in intensive counselling of 
particularly weak jobless people. They may not directly involve investment in human 
capital, but by supporting job seekers they increase the likelihood that these will profit 
from previously made investments. Job subsidies, in the same vein, can be considered 
as a re­commodification tool or as a help in overcoming the type of statistical 
discrimination to which unemployed people are subjected. Upon closer scrutiny, much 
of what is found in the toolbox of active labour market policy cannot easily be classified 
under the binary classifications mentioned above. 
Third, the distinction between two types of activation depending on their preferred 
tools may open the way to a more value­based understanding of these policies, 
distinguishing between those which are in the interest of beneficiaries (by investing 
in their human capital) and those that have essentially a cost containment objective 
(pushing people into labour market regardless of job quality). The problem with such 
an understanding is that, as shown by the evaluation literature, in the field of active 
labour market policy, good intentions are not always followed by success (Martin 
and Grubb 2001, OECD 2006, Eichhorst et al. 2008).
Investment in training for unemployed people, for example, has often been found to 
be rather unhelpful in bringing them back to employment (Friedlander and Burtless 
1995, Greenberg et al. 2003, Hamilton et al. 2001, Martin and Grubb 2001). Only 
longer training programmes leading to the acquisition of skills and titles that are 
recognised by employers seem to have a positive impact on jobless people’s chances 
to re­enter employment. Similarly, work experience programmes in the public sector 
have had little effect in promoting labour market re­entry, especially when 
participation entitled participants to a new term of unemployment insurance 
compensation (Sianesi 2002, Martin and Grubb 2001). 
On the other hand, policies that are clearly geared towards promoting quick labour 
market re­entry and at maximising work incentives tend to impact more positively 
on participants’ chances to re­enter the labour market. These include work search 
programmes, tax credits, coaching programmes, and sanctions (Svarer 2007, Blank 
2002, Hamilton et al. 2001, Martin and Grubb 2001). 
These three problems suggest that, in the real world of active labour market policy, it 
will be rather difficult to identify the type of interventions that fulfil the definition of 
social investment given at the beginning of this paper and those that do not. 
Faced with the rather intractable conceptual issues mentioned above, in this section I 
try to develop an understanding of active labour market policy that reflects the 
complexity of the field. First, one needs to work with a much more fine grained 
distinction of the tools available to active labour market policy than is usually the case. 
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Second, I assume that social investment can take different forms in labour market 
policy. One of them is investment in human capital, but policy can also help 
disadvantaged people succeed in the labour market through other channels. As a 
result, one can identify different varieties of social investment. Third, I claim that most 
of the tools of active labour market policy can be characterised by a peculiar mix of the 
three key principles of labour market policy: income (or status) protection; social 
investment and (re­)commodification. The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 1. 
The axis shown in figure 1 illustrates the various policy options available in the labour 
market field, with special attention paid to those that are commonly labelled as active. 
The two extremes represent, respectively, traditional social democratic1 and liberal 
solutions to labour market policies. In the middle, one finds the investment option. 
Different tools of active labour market policy emphasise different principles. 
Figure 1. Labour market policy options arranged according to three principles: protection, 
investment and re-commodification.
PROTECTION INVESTMENT RECOMMODIFICATION
Employment 
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Early 
retirement
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vocational 
training
Education
Job search 
programmes
Counselling
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Tax credits
Childcare
Retrenchment
Workfare
Deregulation
The clearest example of investment oriented labour market policy is found in the 
middle of the axis reproduced in Figure 1. Providing jobless people with a second 
chance in term of vocational training is likely to improve their chances to succeed in 
the labour market, as shown by several studies (OECD, 2006).
A different type of active labour market policy (ALMP) is found toward the protection 
end of the axis. In some cases, measures that are described as ‘active’ do not really have 
the objective of increasing the likelihood of labour market (re­)entry. Their goal is to 
keep unemployed people occupied, often in order to prevent the depletion of human 
capital associated with an unemployment spell. This type of ALMP sometimes 
referred to as ‘parking’ in the specialist literature, consist of work experience 
programmes in the public or non­profit sector, but also some training, typically shorter 
courses, which have very little impact in the chances of finding a job. These measures, 
insofar as they somewhat protect human capital from deteriorating during an 
unemployment spell, can be considered as a form of social investment.
Many tools of active labour market policy are about removing obstacles to labour 
market participation, without directly investing in jobless people’s human capital. 
1.  Given variation in Social democratic parties’ policy preferences across countries, it is difficult to identify a traditional Social 
democratic response to labour market problems. A preference for generous income replacement benefits that reduce workers’ 
dependence on labour market participation is nonetheless a common theme throughout the postwar years. In Sweden, this 
preference was combined with an emphasis on human capital investment, most notably through the Rehn­Meidner model. 
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These are found towards the ‘ RECOMMODIFICATION’ end of the axis presented in 
Figure 1, and include job search programmes, counselling, job subsidies, tax credits, 
and the provision of childcare services. These tools address different obstacles to 
employment. Job subsides, for example, can help long term unemployed people 
overcome statistical discrimination by employers. Hiring a long­term unemployed 
person is considered a high­risk recruitment decision by employers. A temporary job 
subsidy can constitute an incentive for employers to accept the additional risk and as 
a result increase the chances of disadvantaged jobless people to re­enter the labour 
market. Job search programmes can help jobless people who are unfamiliar with 
recruitment procedures overcome significant barriers to labour market entry. These 
measures have emerged as some of the most effective ways to help jobless people 
back into employment.
Workfare, or the implementation of benefit conditionality and sanctions, is also part 
of the active labour market policy toolbox. However, the mechanism used in this case 
is not social investment as defined above, but rather re­commodification. As seen 
above, these measures have been shown in the evaluation literature to be rather 
effective in pushing people back into employment, but the mechanism used is 
negative incentives rather enabling jobless people to be more successful in the labour 
market. Re­commodification, rather than social investment, is the key underlying 
principle of these active measures. 
The liberal route to activation has also been questioned in relation to its longer term 
effects. In fact, put under pressure by sanctions and time limits on benefit recipiency, 
beneficiaries may accept any kind of job, including low paid and insecure ones which 
do not really lift them out of poverty in a sustainable manner. 
Unfortunately there are few empirical studies that have addressed the question of 
job quality after activation and the longer­term effects of policy. Those available 
concern the latter and tend to show that training programmes take longer to produce 
an effect. An American study comparing the impact of human capital investment 
and work first programmes over five years, found that work first programme perform 
better in the short term and that human capital development programmes catch up 
so that by the end of the observation period, the proportion of beneficiaries in 
employment is roughly the same (Friedlander and Burtless 1995).
Obviously it can be rather difficult to precisely position given labour market policy 
tools on the protection – investment – re­commodification axis. In this respect, 
Figure 1 can be seen as a tentative approach to a more fine­grained understanding of 
active labour market policy that allows us to identify at least three different varieties 
of social investment in active labour market policy. These pursue different 
objectives, but are consistent with the social investment definition given above: they 
try to help disadvantaged (in this case, jobless) people by improving their chances to 
succeed in the labour market.
In short, the policies represented in the middle of the protection – investment – re­
commodification axis, are those which are most closely related to the notion of social 
investment and reflect investment in human capital. A second group of policies, that 
make reference to both investment and re­commodification, have a more modest 
objective, i.e. to remove obstacles to labour market participation. In doing this, they 
also aim at helping disadvantaged people succeed in the labour market and hence 
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qualify as social investment according to the definition adopted in this paper. 
Finally, some active labour market policies pursue the more or less explicit objective 
of reducing the rate of human capital depletion that occurs during an unemployment 
spell. In some ways, these policies reflect the notion of social investment too, by 
protecting previous investments in human capital more than by making new ones. 
ALMP Expenditure Profiles
The most straightforward way to describe real world policies in relation to the 
distinction suggested here, is by looking at expenditure data on the different types of 
labour market policy. Unfortunately, the available data are only partly adequate to 
this purpose, since the categorisation of ALMP spending used by the OECD is 
different from the one developed here. It is nonetheless possible to find measures 
that come close to each of the three varieties of active labour market policy identified 
above. Spending on training can be assumed to reflect the extent of investment in 
human capital made within the active labour market policy system in a country. This 
measurement is imprecise, as many ‘parking’ programmes are probably classified 
within training. Policies aiming ad reducing obstacles to employment are reflected 
in the following OECD spending categories: PES (Public employment services) and 
administration, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, 
and start­up incentives. Finally, the policies aiming at reducing the rate of human 
capital depletion during unemployment may be captured by the item ‘direct job 
creation’, which includes temporary work in the public sector or in non­profit 
organisations, offered to unemployed persons (OECD 2009).
 
61
Figure 2. ALMP spending profiles in selected OECD countries, 2005.
Source: OECD 2007. Re­entry facilitation includes the following OECD categories: PES and administration, 
employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, start­up incentives.
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On this basis, it is possible to describe ALMP spending profiles for different 
countries. Figure 2 presents such profiles for selected OECD countries representing 
the main welfare regimes. ALMP’s spending profiles only partly reflect the standard 
welfare regime typology. The Nordic countries clearly put most emphasis on human 
capital investment, somewhat less on facilitating labour market re­entry and very 
little on direct job creation. Continental European countries display very different 
profiles. France is closer to the Nordic countries, whereas Germany and the 
Netherlands put most emphasis on facilitating labour market re­entry. Italy, instead, 
is a low spender in every field of ALMP. The two liberal welfare states included also 
display very different spending patterns. The UK emphasises spending on re­entry 
facilitation, whereas the US spends very little on each category of tools. In the latter 
case, the key trend in labour market policy has been to strengthen work incentives by 
limiting eligibility in time and by enforcing benefit conditionality and sanctions.
In relation to the distinction presented above, we do find some countries that better 
reflect one or the other approach. Denmark and Sweden strongly emphasise training 
and, to a comparatively lesser extent, re­entry facilitation. A rather unusual cluster 
of countries: the UK, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent, Germany share a 
preference of re­entry facilitation. Other countries have less clearly defined ALMP 
spending profiles. It should also be noted that the picture presented in Figure 2 
refers to 2005. A few years earlier, results would have been different, especially with 
regard to direct job creation. In 1995, France and Germany spent 0.3 per cent of GDP 
each on these programmes, and Sweden 0.4 per cent of GDP (OECD stat.). Direct job 
creation is clearly on the decline throughout the OECD world. 
Countries have developed ALMP systems that were consistent with the overall 
direction of their labour market policy. As a result, Germany and France, which 
responded to the employment crises of the 1980s by reducing labour supply, 
reinforced this choice by developing an ALMP system based on measures designed 
to provide alternatives to market employment, such as direct job creation in the 
public or non profit sector. The result of this approach was a further reduction in 
labour supply. Sweden during the 1980s and early 1990s experienced a shift away 
from an ALMP system oriented towards reinforcing labour market participation to 
one aiming at limiting open unemployment (Anxo and Niklasson 2006).
More recently, however, one sees limited convergence towards an ALMP system 
geared towards market employment. This is reflected in the ALMP’s spending 
profiles presented in Figure 2, and the emphasis placed by many countries on 
measures facilitating re­entry. 
In addition to the spending data reviewed above, two recently assembled databases 
allow us to tap into cross­national differences in active labour market policy. Both  
of them rely on the collection of institutional information which is then coded and 
sometimes aggregated into indexes. The databases have been produced by the 
Danish Ministry of Finance (Hasselpflug 2005) and by the OECD (OECD 2007). 
These two data sources provide a useful overview of institutional variation in 
ALMPs across several countries. However, they present a number of problems.  
First, they report mostly information on formal rules, and little in relation to 
implementation. Second, the variety of policies found across the OECD makes it 
extremely difficult to code the information obtained. Third, many countries have 
different unemployment compensation regimes, typically for short and long­term 
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unemployed. These may be very different in relation to their activation component, 
but not necessarily comparable across countries. 
Table 1 provides information on the intensity of work incentives. Among those 
available, it uses indicators that are relatively simple to collect and measure. The 
first column focuses on the generosity of unemployment benefit. Though not, strictly 
speaking, part of activation, passive benefits and their level have a big impact on work 
incentives. They must therefore be taken into account when describing an ALMP 
regime. The second indicator refers to the existence or not of a systematic activation 
approach, meaning that after a given duration, all unemployed persons are requested 
to join some labour market programme. Systematic activation arguably reinforces 
work incentives. By requesting participation in labour market programmes, 
systematic activation makes the non­employment option less attractive for at least 
some unemployed people. The third indicator focuses on the maintenance of work 
incentives during participation in a labour market programme. Finally, column 4, 
provides a synthetic index summing up the information contained in the previous 
three columns.
Table 1. Indicators of the intensity of work incentives, selected OECD countries mid 2000s
(1)
Short term 
unemployment 
benefit 
replacement 
rate
(2)
Systematic 
activation (every 
beneficiary 
receives an offer 
after a given 
time)
(3)
Continuing 
job search 
requirement and 
 verification during 
participation in 
ALMPs
(4) 
Synthetic 
index of work 
incentive 
intensity
Denmark 63.0 1 1 6.09
Finland 54.0 0 1 4.08
Sweden 62.0 1 2 7.65
France 67.0 0 0 1.9
Germany 60.0 0.5 1 4.96
Netherlands 65.0 1 2 7.41
United Kingdom 41.0 1 0 6.39
United States 62.0 0 1 3.43
Italy 63.0 0 0 1.86
Notes : 
(1) Net replacement rate of unemployment benefit at initial phase of unemployment, for single person without 
children, 100% of AW, year 2005 (source: OECD Benefits and Wages); (2) Indicator developed on the basis of 
information provided in OECD 2007, according to the following scores: 0 = no automatic activation; 0.5 = for some 
groups; 1 = for all; (3) indicator developed on the basis of information provided in OECD 2007 and Hasselpflug 2005, 
according to the following scores: 0 = no requirement; 1 = job search requirement but no verification or various 
requirements; 2 = Job search requirement and verification.; (4) synthetic index based on indicators presented in 
columns 1–3. Unweighted average of z­scores of the indicators, standardised to vary between 0 and 10.
With all the necessary caveats made above, one can see some interesting parallels 
between ALMP’s spending profiles and the information on work incentive intensity 
provide in Table 1. First, the countries that emphasised re­entry facilitation the 
most, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, are also those that tend to put more 
pressure on unemployed people. Work incentives are rather strong in the Nordic 
64
countries as well, but much weaker in France and in Italy. The result for the US may 
be striking (rather low work incentives), but concerns unemployment benefit, 
whereas most of the debate on activation in that country has focused on social 
assistance (AFDC/TANF).
Conclusion
If social investment is to be the defining feature of the new welfare state, then one 
should certainly differentiate between varieties of social investment. Within the 
field of labour market policy, one can identify at least three different approaches that 
refer to different principles and have different objectives: investing in human capital, 
removing obstacles to employment and preventing the depletion of human capital 
during an unemployment spell. None of these three approaches can be subsumed 
under one of the two traditional principles in labour market policy: protection and 
commodification. The notion of social investment seems an adequate way to 
describe them. 
Investment­oriented labour market policy takes different shapes in different 
countries. As shown in the second part of this paper, different emphases are found 
across countries, in a way that only partly reflects traditional welfare regime 
typologies. While policies geared towards preventing human capital depletion seem 
to have gone out of fashion, countries tend to emphasise either training or polices 
aiming at removing obstacles to labour market participation. Both approaches are 
connected to rather work incentives.
This may change if the economic crisis of the late 2000s results in a longer period of 
high and persistent unemployment. Strengthening work incentives may be an 
inadequate response in a context of sluggish economic growth and employment 
losses. In contrast, active labour market policies that target human capital may gain 
interest, including job creation programmes aiming at slowing the process of human 
capital depletion associated with unemployment. 
The latter observation points in the direction of a link between the type of active 
labour market policy and the economic cycle. Ideally, in a downturn, the system 
should be geared towards avoiding human capital depletion and upskilling, putting 
emphasis on tools like job creation programmes and vocational training. In an 
upswing, much more emphasis should be put on re­entry facilitation, so as to make 
sure that obstacles to employment are removed. In reality, such adjustments are 
difficult. On the one hand, periods of employment growth tend to be short lived, and 
are more easily identified ex post than ex ante. On the other hand, when economies 
enter recession, ALMPs should shift to the costlier variants of training and job 
creation, precisely when spending on passive benefits is on the increase and concerns 
for public deficits tend to arise. In order to be able to respond to shifts in the 
economic cycle, an ALMP system would need to be able to spot changes in labour 
market trends, and quickly adapt the menu of available options to what fits with the 
particular economic situation art a given point in time.
The ideas behind the debate on social investment popularised among other by Third 
Way politicians and theorists seem to translate differently in different national 
contexts. This is not something surprising, and is reminiscent of what happened in 
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previous instances of spreading of influential ideas in economic and social policy. 
Students of social investment should take this point seriously and work with 
sufficiently broad and differentiated definitions so as to capture the different ways in 
which a set of ideas is translated into national contexts. 
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Human Capital Policies  
and the Social Investment 
Perspective: Explaining the Past 
and Anticipating the Future 
Moira Nelson and John D. Stephens 
Introduction
Human capital investment assumes pride of place within the social investment 
perspective. Whereas the consequences of harsher economic conditions are 
considered ‘private matters’ according to neo­liberals (see Jensen, chapter 1 this 
volume), the social investment perspective sees a central role for the state in 
addressing new forms of social and economic inequality, thereby clearly subsuming 
education and training policies within the broader category of social policies. In fact, 
‘social investment’ can be understood as a concept for the integration of social and 
education policy (see Nikolai, chapter 6 this volume). In contrast to conventional 
social policies, however, human capital investment and other policy tools within the 
social investment perspective are future oriented (see Jensen’s chapter), anticipating 
impending risks and designing policies to prevent potential losses. 
Since human capital investment is able to address risks to individual and national 
well­being, it is necessary to place education and training policies at the top of the 
policymaking agendas. Indeed, framing investment in human capital as a credible 
solution to present economic woes is vital to the success of the European Social 
Model (see Palme, chapter 12 this volume) and the full realisation of the Lisbon 
Strategy (see Lundvall and Lorenz, chapter 5 this volume). This study provides part 
of the answer to the question of how to place education and training policies firmly 
on diverse policy agendas by explaining the historical causes of variations in human 
capital investment across advanced industrialised countries. 
In this chapter, we outline why human capital investment is so crucial to the social 
investment perspective. We then lay out different types of education and training 
policies and explain patterns of investment in these policies. The Nordic countries, 
owing to strong social democratic parties, the absence of entrenched Christian 
democratic parties, consensual decision­making institutions, and a large state 
68
structure, exhibit high investment in education and training policies and 
transparent certification policies. Countries with strong Christian democratic 
parties invest less intensively in all forms of education except vocational education. 
The establishment of modern certification policies in these countries is also 
particularly difficult. More market­orientated countries, such as Canada or Ireland, 
largely lack the political consensus to establish wide­reaching state intervention in 
education and training to the extent of these other countries. The conclusion 
discusses the implications of these findings for the development of future social 
investment strategies.
A social investment strategy holds the potential to address new risks stemming from 
diverse economic and demographic transformations. Nikolai’s (see chapter 6) 
contribution provides a useful discussion of the emergence of the concept of a ‘Social 
Investment State’ as well as the degree to which different countries exhibit policies 
that speak to the social investment agenda. As she mentions, the lack of a 
qualification is a serious risk for workers operating in a globalised and knowledge­
based world. We start our analysis from this insight. Not only are low­skilled 
workers at risk but also the failure to address the needs of this group with public 
policies may result in lower economic growth and growing inequality. With these 
workers in mind we are particularly interested in gauging the extent to which shifts 
in skill needs, driven by economic changes, are met with adequate responses in the 
form of education and training policies.
Five interrelated economic developments fundamentally alter the skill demands of 
labour markets in advanced industrialised economies. Due to both high trade flows 
(1) and liberalised capital markets (2), low­skilled jobs have moved abroad, 
prompting the expansion of predominantly high­skilled industries in their place. In 
a similar way, technological change (3) increases skill intensity, or the application of 
skills in the production process, whereas the expansion of the service sector (4) calls 
for social skills because production today is more customer orientated. Finally, the 
increased rate of technological change (5) makes ongoing training a characteristic  
of the present economic environment rather than a passing trend. This last 
development has found resonance within the discussion on the knowledge economy. 
This state of affairs calls for reforms in education and training policy. In the first 
place, the skills one learns during the stage of compulsory education are not 
sufficient for finding stable employment throughout the remainder of the career.  
At the same time, the stage of compulsory education has become more important in 
building cognitive skills. Therefore, high investment in education and training needs 
to begin with early childhood development and continue throughout the duration of 
one’s career. 
We identify at least two ways in which education policy can respond to new skill 
needs. First, education policy influences the acquisition of skills. The experience that 
early and compulsory education was effective in developing cognitive skills led to its 
extension in the promotion of high quality day care and primary and secondary. 
Since demand for higher levels of skills has also increased, investment in higher 
education and workplace training is also highly relevant. Access to such policies can 
be expanded by way of financial aid policies to low income households and sector­ or 
economy­wide training regulations. Active labour market policies also target the 
needs of marginalised workers by providing them with the training or job experience 
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with which to find stable employment. Together, spending on various levels of 
education and the regulation of continuing training improve individuals’ ability to 
adapt to new skill demands by facilitating skill acquisition. 
Table 1. Human Capital Indicators by Country and Regime.
Our conceptualisation of education policy as facilitating skill acquisition resonates 
strongly with the contribution from Lundvall. Lundvall (see chapter 5) refers the 
concept of a ‘learning economy’ to express the centrality of learning today in 
replacing obsolete skills with more marketable ones. The high rate of skill 
obsolescence, in his view, demands not only broad changes in company organisation 
to facilitate the learning process but also state involvement in order to ward off 
polarisation. Our analysis shares the view that skill obsolescence is the defining 
characteristic of the current period but departs from Lundvall’s study in two ways. 
First, by looking at education and training policies throughout the lifecourse, we 
choose to concentrate on the early and compulsory education in addition to 
continuing training policies. Second, we are primarily concerned with the spending 
on and regulation of education and training policies rather than the quality of 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Social Democratic Welfare States - Industry CMEs
Sweden 0,91 1,52 36 7,7 2,2 1,2 0,24 7 74
Norway 1,32 1,77 37 7,6 2,1 1,6 0,25 8 69
Denmark 1,27 3,47 31 8,5 2,7 2,1 0,38 8 65
Finland 1,25 0,55 32 6,4 2,1 1,2 0,12 11 63
Mean 1,19 1,83 34,0 7,6 2,3 1,5 0,25 8,5 67,6
Christian Democratic Welfare States
  Industry Coordinated Market Economies
Austria -0,13 0,27 22 5,7 1,3 0,5 0,13
Belgium 0,08 0,27 53 6,3 1,4 0,5 0,15 17 58
Netherlands 0,89 0,47 43 5,1 1,3 0,4 0,47 10 63
Germany -0,04 -0,13 34 4,8 1,2 0,4 0,14 10 59
Switzerland -0,29 -0,03 23 5,8 1,4 0,1 0,23 17 53
  
France 1,19 0,16 28 5,6 1,0 0,6 0,13
Italy -1,29 0,03 35 4,8 0,9 0,1 0,04
Mean 0,06 0,15 34,0 5,4 1,2 0,4 0,18 13,5 58,1
Australia 1,15 -0,86 9 4,9 1,2 0,2 0,06 17 56
Canada 0,07 0,39 5 5,2 1,8 0,3 0,07 17 57
Ireland 0,02 -0,61 6 4,3 1,2 0,2 0,16 24 46
New Zealand 1,27 0,26 7 6,7 1,7 0,0 20 51
UK 1,20 -0,29 11 5,3 1,1 0,1 0,07 23 49
USA -0,58 -0,42 3 5,7 1,4 0,2 0,05 22 53
Mean 0,52 -0,26 6,8 5,4 1,4 0,2 0,08 20,5 52,0
Group Coordinated Market Economy
Japan -0,26 -0,92 16 3,6 0,5
Table 1:  Human Capital Indicators by Country and Regime
Public 
Education 
Spending 
% of GDP
Public 
Tertiary 
Education 
Spending
Daycare 
Spending % 
of GDP
ALMP 
Spending per 
% 
unemployed
% with Low 
Literacy
% 
Information 
Age Literate
Mixed 
Economies
Liberal Welfare 
States - LMEs
Skill 
Transparency 
Index
Skill 
Acquistion 
Index
% with 
Vocational 
Education 
0,3 0,06
70
education and training that is actually provided. Both our analyses identify the 
Nordic model as exceptional in the provision of social investment policies, however, 
which suggests some level of agreement between policy inputs (such as the spending 
variables in our analysis) and the policy outputs (e.g. discretionary learning in 
Lundvall’s study or the literacy outcome measures derived from the International 
Adult Literacy Study). In addition to acquiring new skills, however, workers also 
need to be able to signal their training to employers more frequently. Workers are 
not only acquiring new skills more often, which need to be clearly certified to retain 
value in the eyes of potential employers, but are also facing potential employers on a 
more regular basis due to company restructuring and lower job tenure. More flexible 
certification policies are particularly needed if workers have acquired skills 
informally or wish to apply their skills to industries or occupations that differ in 
some way from their initial qualification. Some countries have a long tradition of 
developing certification policies at a centralised level, a tradition that avoids 
problems of disjointed certification procedures across regions. More recent policy 
developments include accreditation of prior learning, modularisation, and the 
development of a national qualifications framework. Accreditation of prior learning 
policies provide formal recognition to skills learned informally. Modularisation 
refers to a method of structuring degree programmes by thematic groups, which 
improves completion by facilitating temporary breaks, and can provide better 
oversight into how the content of different degree programmes corresponds to one 
another. A qualifications framework provides clear information on the content of 
degree programmes as well as shared skill sets between different qualifications. 
Together, these policies improve the transparency of certifications. Indices of 
policies facilitating skill acquisition and skill transparency developed by Nelson 
(2008) are shown in the first two columns of Table 1. The third column displays an 
indicator of vocational education and the next four columns present various 
indication of spending on education and training. The final two columns display two 
indicators of general skill levels derived from the International Adult Literacy 
Survey. The countries are grouped by the type of welfare state and production 
regime they belong to (see below). 
Table 2. Promising Educational Policies and their Determinants.
Skill Acquisition Skill Transparency
Social Democracy Positive Positive
Christian Democracy Contingent Negative
Conservatism Contingent Positive
Veto Points (referendum, 
strong bicameralism, 
parliamentarism, federalism) Negative Negative
Strong State Positive Positive
Social Partners Contingent Contingent
Wage Bargaining Contingent Contingent
Method: The results above are estimated with regression analysis (Nelson 2008).
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Table 2 shows the abbreviated results of Nelson’s (2008) analysis of the party­
political and institutional factors that explain the cross­national differences in the 
indices skill acquisition and skill transparency. These factors were included because 
they have been shown to be strongly related to traditional measures of welfare state 
effort, such as total social spending (e.g. see Huber and Stephens 2001), and, more 
recently to educational spending, such as those in columns 4–7 of Table 1 (Iversen 
and Stephens 2008). What unites these studies is the view that the type(s) of political 
part(y)(ies) in power as well as the structure of the policymaking process matter for 
the generosity of public policies. Parties are distinguished according to whether they 
are more left (social democratic) or more right (conservative) and if they are religious 
(Christian democratic). Institutional structure matters as well. High numbers of 
veto points, or the number of points in the policymaking process at which dissenting 
voices can block policy (e.g. referendum, strong second chamber such as the 
Bundesrat or Senate), can slow down progressive public policy initiatives. The way in 
which the social partners (workers and employers) are organised also plays a 
significant role. Although accounts vary in the precise explanation for why they 
matter, highly centralised trade unions, employer organisations, and wage 
bargaining institutions are generally associated with higher levels of support for 
public policies. 
Of the theories explaining the level of social benefits, the Power Resources (PRT) 
theory and the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach are the most influential and, 
since they will be referenced later, demand a bit more elaboration here. In its original 
formulation, PRT argued that welfare state effort, even more so welfare state 
redistribution, was dependent on the ‘power resources’ of the working class, which 
was most often measured by union density and left government (Korpi 1983; 
Stephens 1979). It was later extended to accommodate the existence of the multi­
class Christian democratic parties which have been influential in most continental 
European countries (Esping­Andersen 1990; Huber et al. 1993; Huber & Stephens 
2001; Van Kersbergen 1995). PRT largely sees the development of social policy as an 
effort to reduce social inequality and increase equal opportunity, thus generous 
welfare state have clear winners (the less well to do) and losers (the affluent). 
PRT’s redistribution­based view of the welfare state can be contrasted to VoC’s 
risk­based view of the welfare state. The VoC approach views generous social policies 
as resolving contracting, or trust, issues between skilled workers and their 
employers. This approach contends that there are two basic type of production 
regimes, Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs). The former rely relatively more on specific skills, which are skills that can 
only be used in a given firm or industry (i.e firm­specific skills and industry­specific 
skills). In CMEs, promoting firm­based training involving these skills entails 
contracting problems. Both the worker and the employer will fear that they will not 
benefit from apprenticeship training: the workers will fear not being able to find a job 
after the training is complete (since there are only limited firms that use these skills) 
whereas the employer will fear that other firms will steal their freshly trained 
apprentices on whom they have spent so much time and money training. Social 
policy and institutions that promote coordination help to reduce these fears and 
promote training. Social policy, according to the VoC approach, is therefore not 
about taking from one group to make another group better off, but rather about using 
public policies to make new forms of coordination possible by reducing the risks to 
cooperation faced by different actors.
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The results shown in Table 2 suggest that the relationship between aspects of the 
policymaking arena and education policy outcomes is often dependent on the 
particular combination of institutions and actors that exist in arena particular 
country. For instance, contexts with entrenched Christian democratic government 
can demonstrate either a relatively strong capacity to expand educational 
opportunities (Netherlands) or particular difficulties in doing so (Germany). The 
impact of strong Christian democratic government is therefore contingent on other 
factors, such as the number of veto points. 
For other characteristics of the policymaking arena, Table 2 shows the relationship 
to education policy outcomes is clearly positive or negative, independent of the 
remaining contextual variables. Policies that promote skill acquisition and skill 
transparency are abundant in countries with strong social democratic parties and a 
large and powerful state. Where many veto points are in place, however, these 
policies are relatively weak. This is also true for the case of transparent certification 
policies in countries with strong Christian democratic parties.
For the other indicators of educational and training effort in Table 1 (columns 3–7), 
one can see a clear contrast between the measure of vocational education, an 
indicator of specific skill training, and the educational and training spending 
variable which are indictors of general skill education and training effort. As VoC 
would predict, vocational education is strongly related to production regime type.  
By contrast, the measures of general skill effort cut across production regime type  
as they are distinctly higher in the social democratic welfare state regime. 
In sum, this section has described the role of human capital policies in addressing 
changed economic conditions, which call for higher levels of skills as well as more 
cognitive and social skills. A preliminary analysis relates the expansion of these 
policies to the presence of social democracy, strong states, low veto points, and, in 
part, weak Christian democracy. The next section explores more in­depth how 
political parties influence investment in particular education and training policies 
with a focus on the policies discussed as facilitating skill acquisition.
Explaining the Development of Human Capital Investment 
Policies: Vocational Training and the Origins of Education and 
Training Systems
This section assesses more carefully the historical process through which training 
systems and related economic institutions developed. Table 3 summarises our 
explanation of cross­national differences in human capital regimes. This table 
essentially displays how electoral systems and the presence of a strong Christian 
democratic party combine to explain the tax regime and welfare regime, labour 
market institutions and education policy. Advanced industrialised economies tend 
to fall into one of the three categories in the table. These three clusters did not 
always exist as such but developed through a historical process. Recent research 
indeed suggests that the clear clustering of countries into three distinct social 
policies regimes did not occur until the 1970s (Danforth 2009). By this time, 
divisions between continental and Scandinavian countries had become clear, as the 
rapid expansion of public health, education and welfare services in the latter and not 
the former was becoming evident. 
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Table 3. Synthesis of Power Resources and Varieties of Capitalism: 
Political Coalitions and Education Policy.
Pre-conditions: 
Production 
regime, 
representation 
system, and 
cleavage 
structure
Dominant 
Parties
Constituency Tax Regime 
and Welfare 
State 
Labor Market 
Institutions 
Education 
Policy
LME with 
majoritarian 
electoral 
system
Secular Center 
and Right 
Parties
Upper income 
and middle 
class 
Weak tax base 
for public 
policies 
including 
education policy
Weak 
unions and 
decentralised 
bargaining; 
flexible labour 
markets for all 
workers
Moderate­
low public 
spending; in 
some countries, 
private 
investment in 
tertiary and day 
care
CME with PR 
and absence of a 
strong CD party
Social 
Democracy
Workers 
including 
‘outsiders‘ and 
middle class
Strong tax base 
from income 
and VAT taxes 
for universal 
programmes
Strong unions 
including 
‘outsiders’, 
moderate EPL; 
coordinated 
bargaining
Strong public 
spending on all 
levels; strong 
vocational 
training
CME with PR 
and a strong CD 
party
Christian 
Democracy 
or Christian 
Democracy 
/ Social 
Democracy 
Coalition
Multi­class 
but outsiders 
excluded
Contribution 
based 
financing for 
transfer­based 
programmes
Moderate 
strength unions 
excluding 
outsiders, 
coordinated 
bargaining, 
strong EPL 
Moderate public 
education; weak 
day care and 
ALMP; strong 
vocational 
training system
The emergence of distinct skill training regimes, on the other hand, was apparent by 
the end of the nineteenth century and fully developed by the beginning of the post­
World War II period. Some countries exhibited high rates of firm­based training 
whereas others relied more heavily on general school­based training. In firm­based 
training regimes, many skills learned through training are specific to the firm or 
industry, meaning that only a singular firm or those within a particular industry can 
make use of these skills. In countries where production relies heavily on industry­
specific skills (e.g. Germany), the portability of skills within a given industry makes 
employers wary of investing for fear that they will lose these workers to other firms. 
In countries with strong firm­based training, various institutions buttressed the 
continued production of these specific skills throughout the twentieth century. 
According to the logic of the VoC approach, strong business organisations sustain 
firm investment in apprentices through sanctioning, monitoring, and standard­
setting practices (Culpepper 2003; Hall & Soskice 2001). Whereas organisational 
strength resolves collective action problems between firms, workers remain willing 
to invest in specific skills only in the presence of generous social policy and 
employment protection legislation. Coordinated market economies (CMEs); 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Benelux countries, the Nordic countries; are 
characterised by the presence of these institutions. Liberal market economies 
(LMEs), Antipodes, Canada, Ireland, the UK, and the US; largely lack these 
74
institutions, precluding strong firm­based training. The figures for percentage of  
age cohorts in vocational training in the third column of Table 2 show very large 
differences between LMEs and CMEs.
Proportional electoral (PR) systems also support firm­based training systems, 
although the mechanism is more indirect. For reasons outlined in Iversen and 
Soskice (2006) (see also Iversen 2005; Iversen & Stephens 2008b) PR systems favour 
left governments or, in polities with religious cleavages, Christian democratic/ left 
coalitions, while majoritarian, plurality systems are favorable to right party 
government. In addition, PR supports the representation of different classes within 
the collective bargaining arena (which is necessary for the creation of labour market 
regulation (Crouch 1993; Cusack et al 2007; Martin & Swank 2004). Left governments, 
in turn, support generous social policy, which protects workers with specific skills 
against relatively larger work­related risks. Thus, PR, along with strong business and 
labour organisation helps explain the capacity of coordinated market economies to 
maintain strong investment in firm­ and industry­specific vocational skills.
Explaining the Development of Human Capital Investment 
Policies: The Development of General Skill Systems
Due to the vast economic changes that have occurred over the last few decades, 
studies have increasingly focused on other policies besides vocational training such 
as higher education and day care. Iversen and Stephens (2008a) provide a theoretical 
account for cross national investment in different human capital policies. For 
vocational education, they rely largely on the VoC approach. For general skills, 
however, their explanation draws primarily on PRT. Extending PRT to explain 
variations in education effort is not unproblematic since it would appear that 
education, especially tertiary education, benefits the offspring of upper income 
groups more than lower income groups. However, this is no different from earnings 
related transfers and it has been shown that earnings related transfers can be 
redistributive depending on the incidence of the taxes with which they are financed 
and the relation of the transfer amounts to pre­tax and transfer income (Korpi and 
Palme 1998; Stephens 1995). Based on such calculations, it appears that spending on 
higher education is redistributive (Iversen and Stephens 2008b: 613). Moreover, one 
of the main objectives of left parties in educational policy has been something other 
than redistribution. It has been to improve educational opportunity for the offspring 
of lower income groups. In the early post­war period, social democratic parties have 
championed universal secondary education and the reduction of early age tracking 
and followed this up with expansion of access to tertiary education.
The first row in Table 3 includes countries with market­orientated economies 
(LMEs). Production in these countries relies on general skills, and the conservative 
orientation of the policy­making apparatus and weak organisation of the social 
partners support only weak investment in education policies. 
Countries conforming to the last two rows in Table 3 exhibit PR electoral systems 
that favor the formation of center­left coalitions (CMEs). In the first case, where 
Christian democratic parties are not present, workers are represented within the 
social democratic party. Able to rely on this strong support base and interested in 
addressing the needs of low­skilled workers, social democratic parties in these 
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countries invested strongly in public education at all levels. As we saw in Table 1, it is 
indeed true that for measures of general education effort; the percent of GDP devoted 
to public education, public higher education, and public day care (early childhood 
education) and active labour market policy spending; the Nordic countries stand out 
as devoting a high level of resources to education.
The last row in Table 3 indicates a more complex situation than the two already 
described. Christian democratic parties are well established but their cross­class 
constituent base does not include low­skilled workers. For this reason, whereas 
Christian democratic parties are frequently seen to support social policy more than 
other types of more centre and right parties, they tend to prefer occupational policies 
to universal ones. This trend is also evident in the education policies in countries 
with a strong Christian democratic party. Vocational training is well developed but 
public investment in education is weak. Typically, these continental European 
countries did not follow the Nordic path of reducing tracking in and universalising 
secondary education and expanding access to higher education in the first three 
postwar decades nor did they embrace active labor market policy or later work and 
family reconciliation policies, such as day care and parental leave, as the Nordic 
countries did.
The clusters in education policy developed in Table 3 hold salient implications for the 
skills and well­being of low­skilled workers. Low­skilled workers in LMEs face weak 
opportunities to acquire skills at every stage of their development. These workers are 
relegated to low­paid, residual employment. CMEs with a strong Christian 
democratic party demonstrate slightly stronger investment in education policies. 
However, to the extent that lower skilled workers in these countries rely on 
vocational training to secure lifelong employment, the system is under considerable 
strain. The state typically does not play a large role in structuring education in these 
countries that further frustrates efforts to reform vocational training systems to 
address needs for new types of skills, namely more theoretical skills provided in 
higher vocational and tertiary education. CMEs without a Christian democratic 
party not only support vocational training but also expand public employment, 
which helps to absorb workers who do not enter the vocational training system.
To summarise, the partisan composition of government and the reliance on general 
versus specific skills goes some way towards explaining how countries developed 
education policies during the twentieth century. A different question is how to expand 
educational investment today in countries where it is currently relatively low. The 
discussion here has suggested that partisanship and electoral institutions are highly 
influential in shaping reform potential, and, in the case of the Nordic countries (the 
middle row in Table 3), support adjustment to an information age knowledge based 
post industrial economy. To be sure, the economic payoffs to high educational 
investment in Nordic countries may have simply been fortuitous, driven foremost by 
concerns for equal opportunity and gender equality more than efficiency ones. 
In any case, the last two columns of Table 2 which show national average percentages 
of the population with low literacy and information age literacy according to the 
International Adult Literacy Study indicate that the Nordic countries spending of 
education and training have resulted in high levels of general skills in the adult 
population. In building an over­arching social investment agenda, however, stressing 
the economic advantages to high educational investment may help to establish a 
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social investment strategy based on human capital policies in countries where  
the political system is more responsive to market­orientated concerns. As other 
countries become aware of the advantages of the Nordic education and training 
model for the skill levels of their work forces, they may be moved to adopt features of 
them. Indeed, if the Open Method of Coordination succeeds in spreading education 
and training best practices to European Union countries we might anticipate a 
reduction of differences base past patterns of partisanship. A case in point is the 
recent German legislation (which will give greater access to day care) passed by the 
Grand Coalition government in Germany and shepherded through by a Christian 
Democratic minister, Ursula von der Leyen. Von der Leyen was influenced by the 
Scandinavian model but fertility concerns and not gender equality was central to the 
German debate on the legislation (von Wahl 2008).
Conclusion
This chapter aimed at laying out the political logic underlying the passage of various 
education policies, ranging from day care to vocational training and active labour 
market policies. Differences in vocational education were visible by the end of the 
nineteenth century, when current distinctions in the nature of capitalist 
organisation had already been established, as demonstrated by work within the 
Varieties of Capitalism approach. Coordinated Market Economies, buttressed by 
successful left and religious parties as well as strong collective bargaining 
institutions, already demonstrated a competitive advantage in the production of 
specific skills via vocational training whereas Liberal Market Economies revealed a 
clear predisposition towards market­orientated modes of economic organisation  
and a reliance on general skills. The expansion of additional public education 
policies, which improves general skills in all countries, can be best explained with 
reference to the Power Resource Theory’s emphasis on partisan alignments. Iversen 
and Stephens’ (2008) analysis shows that spending on day care, primary, secondary 
and tertiary education, and active labour market policies is strongly related to social 
democratic government. Nelson (2008) related these and other education policies to 
new skill demands across advanced welfare states brought on by widespread 
economic change. Specifically, higher skills as well as cognitive and social skills are 
in high demand today, and comprehensive human capital policies are necessary to 
respond to these changed skill needs. 
There are many implications of these findings for our understanding of the 
appropriate educational policies for the future. In retrospect, Social democratic 
parties appear to have been particularly supportive of all types of education policy. 
Christian democrats have been less consistent, supporting vocational training but 
not high spending on other types of public education policies. Left parties’ 
disposition towards strong public financing for education abides by a political logic 
whereby such policies redistribute to the less­skilled workers that make up their 
constituency. In addition, these policies (e.g. day care, higher education and active 
labour market policies) help workers to adjust their skills to match market needs,  
a mechanism which illuminates an economic logic explaining why parties may 
support their expansion. 
The potential societal economic benefits to public education policies, however, raise 
questions about why some countries lack them. Following Power Resource Theory 
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and the study of Iversen and Stephens, one might explain the relative absence of 
these policies in Coordinated Market Economies with strong Christian democratic 
incumbency as well as LMEs by the availability of private alternatives for the wealthy 
constituents that are well represented in these contexts and the relative 
unwillingness of these individuals to fund education policies, through taxes, for less 
well­off parts of the population. Then again, to the extent that the low level of 
education of these less well­off groups depresses productivity, there may be a trade­off 
between low taxes and economic growth. Particularly since higher levels of general 
skills are demanded at greater rates across advanced welfare states in today’s 
knowledge economy, the costs of low expenditure on education policy are rising. The 
literature and findings discussed here suggest that a strong state supports the passage 
of public education policies and that the presence of many veto points hinders them. 
The findings presented here suggest that despite general increases in all countries 
Christian democratic parties have been distinctively less supportive than left parties. 
Its remains an empirical question if and how Christian democratic and right parties 
alter their preferences over education given the increased salience of skills in the 
production process. Recent developments in continental Europe indicate that a 
partisan realignment on education and training policies and working and family 
reconciliation policies may be underway as Christian democratic parties have shown 
more interest in expanding policies traditional associated with social democrats. 
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On the Role of Social Investment  
in the Learning Economy:  
A European Perspective
Bengt-Åke Lundvall and Edward Lorenz
Introduction
The Lisbon strategy was initiated under the Portuguese Presidency and enacted by 
the European Council 2000. Early on the Lisbon strategy gave strong emphasis to 
the role of knowledge in the economy. ‘The knowledge­based economy’ concept was 
developed in the 1990s by OECD (see Foray and Lundvall 1996). This concept gave a 
specific direction for the Lisbon strategy with emphasis on investment in research 
and education (Rodrigues 2002). 
From the very beginning we have proposed a different terminology. Given the new 
features of the economy we strongly prefer the concept ‘the learning economy’ 
(Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Lorenz and Lundvall 2006). This change in perspective 
leads to a different agenda for public policy and it helps understanding the 
importance of social investments for sustainable economic growth.
The Learning Economy
The concept ‘the learning economy’ refers to a specific phase of capitalist 
development where globalisation, deregulation and information and communication 
technologies speed up the rate of change in different dimensions (on the demand side 
user needs change rapidly and on the supply side there is rapid change in the 
development, diffusion and use of new technology). The learning economy concept 
thus signals that the most important change is that knowledge becomes obsolete 
more rapidly than before; therefore it is imperative for firms to engage in 
organisational learning and for workers to engage constantly in attaining new 
competencies.1 
1.  This can be illustrated by an extreme case referred to in a recent report from the Danish Ministry for Education. Here it is 
claimed that, on average, half the skills a computer engineer has obtained during his or her training will be obsolete one year 
after the exam has been passed, while the ‘halving period’ for all educated wage earners is estimated to be eight years (Ministry of 
Education 1997, p. 56).
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We see the growing emphasis on ‘learning organisations’ as reflecting the new 
context. In a context of rapid change flat organisations with functional flexibility are 
more efficient than hierarchical organisations with barriers between functions 
(Drucker 1993; Senge 1990). In a rapidly changing environment it is not efficient to 
operate in a hierarchical organisation with many vertical layers. It takes too long to 
respond if the information obtained at the lower levels first needs to be transmitted 
to the top of the organisation and then, in the form of directives, back down to the 
bottom of the pyramid. 
We see references to ‘the network society’ (Castells 2000) as capturing another 
important dimension of the learning economy. In the current era of growing 
complexity and rapid change it becomes increasingly difficult to establish all 
relevant competences inside the organisation. To solve this problem firms engage in 
networking and alliances. Relational contracting and networking is used to enhance 
functional flexibility.
The learning economy is characterised by cumulative circular causation. The 
selection by employers of more learning oriented employees and the market 
selection in favour of change­oriented firms accelerate further innovation and 
change. In this context the key to economic success – or to use the Lisbon vocabulary 
to ‘competitiveness’ – is the capacity to transform or substitute the activities most 
exposed to global competition. 
Market based competition is an important driver of change. But it needs support 
from state intervention. And, as we shall see, in the learning economy it is not 
sufficient for governments to promote R and D efforts and the training of scientists 
and engineers. More important is to design institutions in such a way that they 
support organisational and individual learning. In this chapter we argue that 
education systems open for career shifts combining and giving equal weight to 
academic and practical training, and together with labour markets characterised by 
flexicurity (flexible security), constitute institutional settings that support the 
learning economy.
Social Investment in the Learning Economy
The learning economy needs the support from an active welfare state. The most 
fundamental contradiction in the learning economy has to do with the fact that 
while it thrives on the basis of social cohesion if left to itself, mechanisms operating 
within the learning economy tend to undermine social cohesion. 
Without intervention the increase in the rate of change would make it more difficult 
for low­skilled workers to find employment, while the demand for skilled workers 
would grow. The OECD (1994) Job’s Study demonstrated a tendency toward 
polarisation of labour markets operating in all OECD member countries between 
1985 and 1995. In the US the polarisation increased in terms of income differentials, 
while in European countries it took the form of growing differences in access to 
employment between high­skilled and low­skilled workers. The UK combined the 
two forms of polarisation.
In principle public policy strategies may go against the impact of globalisation and 
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accelerating change following different strategies. One strategy is to protect existing 
structures and slow down the rate of change. But neo­protectionism is difficult to 
sustain for longer periods since in the long run it tends to erode the dynamic 
efficiency of the economy. An alternative neo­liberal strategy is to let market forces 
play freely and leave it to the individual (or family) to carry the costs and benefits. 
Many small countries have developed a third strategy that combines a broad 
acceptance of rapid change with public policies that redistribute costs and benefits  
of change. This goes hand in hand with a ‘social investment’ strategy where public 
sector activities are designed to promote economic growth. 
As we shall see below some of the countries most successful in global competition 
have been able to counteract polarisation both in terms of income and in terms of 
access to jobs. In these countries, characterised by small income gaps and low social 
distance, we find high levels of trust and wide use of participatory organisations, 
factors that make firms well adapted to operate in the learning economy. 
Therefore investments in skills – especially those that enhance the capacity to learn 
– for the part of the adult population that has the weakest starting point are crucial 
for the social sustainability of the learning economy. They are necessary to avoid 
polarisation undermining the social cohesion that supports the learning economy.  
In a long­term perspective, such social investments may contribute more to 
‘competitiveness’ in the narrow sense than investment in R and D or science.
In the learning economy it is also important to establish labour market institutions 
that support the formation of learning organisations. Flexicurity – where mobility 
within and across organisational borders is combined with income security for those 
who become unemployed – is an especially attractive institutional set­up. Flexibility 
makes it possible continuously to reshape the capability profile of organisations, 
while high rates of substitution and reasonable length of the period of support make 
employees less risk averse and more willing to take part in and contribute to change.
Social investments may be defined as public expenditure that combines the solution 
of social problems with enhancing economic performance. Seen from the 
perspective of the learning economy there is certainly a need for this kind of 
investment in education and in lifelong learning as well as in active labour markets 
and unemployment support. Inequality does not promote economic growth in the 
learning economy. Big gaps among citizens in terms of social status, culture and skill 
endowments make it more difficult to establish participatory learning in society and 
not least in business organisations. Therefore there is a special need to focus on 
social investment for those who have weak learning capabilities and limited learning 
opportunities and this is what was referred to as ‘new new deal’ in Lundvall (1996).
But it is also important to redesign institutions related to education and labour 
markets so that they promote learning and the formation of learning organisations 
more generally. In this chapter we argue that education systems open for career 
shifts combining and giving equal weight to academic and practical training and 
labour markets characterised by flexicurity constitute institutional settings 
supporting the learning economy.
It is of obvious interest to relate social investment to social capital. Social capital is a 
multi­dimensional concept difficult to define and measure. It has to do with 
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generalised trust and with the orderliness and predictability of co­citizens’ 
behaviour. Here we define it as ‘the willingness and capability of citizens to make 
commitments to each other, collaborate with each other and trust each other in 
processes of exchange and interactive learning across class and family boundaries’. 
Social capital may be enhanced by social investment in a narrow sense but it also 
reflects institutional set ups. 
Robert Putnam (1995) presents activities in civic organisations as the most 
important source of social capital and he actually assumes that public sector 
activities may undermine and substitute for such activities. This has been challenged 
by Nordic scholars such as Rothstein (2001). The ensuing debate seems to conclude 
that while different welfare state regimes may have a different impact the general 
assumption that social investment undermines social capital is wrong (van Oorschot 
2005; van Oorschot 2006). For instance Knack and Keefer (1997) show that 
investment in secondary education is positively correlated with social capital.
Within the perspective of the learning economy the impact of social investment on 
social capital will depend both on political culture and what is regarded as fair, as 
legitimate forms of government intervention in a specific country is path dependent. 
But strategies that aim at building and redistributing skills and access to learning 
may be less controversial in most national systems as compared to passive income 
support. The fact that the Lisbon strategy could be accepted by both governments 
tending toward neo­liberalism and governments tending toward neo­protectionism 
may be explained by the reference to the knowledge based economy as a kind of 
common ‘neutral’ objective to be aimed at.
Mapping Forms of Work Organisation for the EU–15
Lorenz and Valeyre (2005) develop an EU­wide mapping of the adoption of different 
types of work organisation. Drawing on the results of the Third European Survey on 
Working Conditions,2 cluster analysis is used to identify four different systems of 
work organisation: the discretionary learning (DL), lean, Taylorist and traditional 
forms. The two most important dimensions used to distinguish between them are 
respectively problem solving and learning on the job on the one hand, and the degree 
of freedom that the worker has to organise his work activities, on the other. 
Discretionary learning involves complex problem solving and freedom to choose or 
change one’s work methods and pace of work. A typical example would be managers, 
experts or skilled workers with great autonomy. 
The principal difference between the discretionary learning and the lean clusters is 
the relatively high levels of discretion or autonomy in work exercised by employees 
grouped in the former. Over 85 per cent of the employees grouped in the DL cluster 
affirm that they have control over their work pace and work methods whereas only 
slightly over 50 per cent of the employees grouped in the lean cluster affirm this. 
Another difference is that such core ‘lean’ or ‘high performance’ work practices as 
team work, job rotation and the use of quality norms are at average, or below average 
2.  The Third European Survey of Working Conditions on which the mapping is based was directed to approximately 1500 
active persons in each country with the exception of Luxembourg with only 500 respondents. The total survey population is 
21,703 people, of which 17,910 are salaried employees. The analysis presented here is based on the responses of the 8081 salaried 
employees working in establishments with at least 10 people in both industry and services, but excluding agriculture and fishing; 
public administration and social security; education; health and social work and private domestic employees.
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levels in the DL cluster, whereas they are considerably above average in the lean 
cluster. Task complexity also is higher in the DL cluster than it is in the lean cluster. 
Workers in automobile factories where modern management techniques are applied 
would typically fall into the lean category.
Discretionary learning thus refers to work settings where a lot of responsibility is 
allocated to the employee who is expected to solve problems on his or her own. 
Business services are a typical example where many jobs involve a continuous 
confrontation with new and complex problems. Although some of the tasks take 
place in a team, teamwork is not seen as imposing narrow constraints on the work. 
Rather, teamwork may involve brainstorming by professional experts as much as 
collectively solving narrowly defined problems.
Lean production also involves problem solving and learning but here the problems 
appear to be more narrowly defined and the scale of possible solutions less broad. 
The work is highly constrained, notably by constraints linked to the use of numerical 
production targets or performance targets and this points to a more structured or 
bureaucratic style of organisational learning that corresponds rather closely to the 
characteristics of the Japanese or ‘lean production’ model.
The other two clusters are both characterised by relatively low levels of learning and 
problem solving. Taylorism offers the employee very limited access to learning and 
almost no autonomy when it comes to organising daily work. This is a kind of work 
that is widely used in textile factories in the South of Europe. In the traditional 
cluster task complexity is the lowest among the four types of work organisation 
while, at the same time constraints on work rate are relatively low. This class groups 
traditional forms of work organisation where methods are for the most part informal 
and non­codified. This kind of work may be found in small shops and in paid 
domestic work.
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Table 1. National Differences in Forms of Work Organisation.
Percent of employees by country in each organisational class
Discretionary 
learning
Lean production Taylorist 
organisation
Traditional 
organisation
Exposure 
Index
Austria 47.5 21.5 13.1 18.0 96.7
Belgium 38.9 25.1 13.9 22.1 101.2
Denmark 60.0 21.9 6.8 11.3 87.9
Finland 47.8 27.6 12.5 12.1 94.6
France 38.0 33.3 11.1 17.7 99.2
Germany 44.3 19.6 14.3 21.9 99.5
Greece 18.7 25.6 28.0 27.7 114.8
Italy 30.0 23.6 20.9 25.4 107.6
Ireland 24.0 37.8 20.7 17.6 106.5
Luxembourg 42.8 25.4 11.9 20.0 98.6
Netherlands 64.0 17.2 5.3 13.5 86.8
Portugal 26.1 28.1 23.0 22.8 109.6
Spain 20.1 38.8 18.5 22.5 109.2
Sweden 52.6 18.5 7.1 21.7 94.0
UK 34.8 40.6 10.9 13.7 98.7
EU–15 39.1 28.2 13.6 19.1 100.0
Source: Third Working Condition survey. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions.
Table 1 shows that DL­forms of work organisation are most widely diffused in the 
Netherlands, the Nordic countries and to a lesser extent in Germany and Austria, 
while they are little diffused in Ireland and the southern European nations. The lean 
model is most in evidence in the UK, Ireland, and Spain and to a lesser extent in 
France, while it is little developed in the Nordic countries or in Germany, Austria 
and the Netherlands. The Taylorist forms are more present in Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Italy, while similarly, the traditional forms are more in evidence in these 
four southern European nations as well as in Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg.3 
Globalisation, Transformation of Work and International 
Competitiveness
In the last column in table 1 we have presented an ‘exposure index’. The basic idea 
behind it is that different types of jobs are more or less exposed to global competition 
– exposure might take the form of a high probability for outsourcing or it may be that 
jobs will not be viable when confronted with competition from low cost countries 
such as China and India. We assume that exposure increases with the degree of 
standardisation of the job and with the intensity of use of low­skilled labour. 
3.  In Lorenz and Valeyre (2005) logit regression analysis is used to control for differences in sector, occupation and 
establishment size when estimating the impact of nation on the likelihood of employees being grouped in the various forms of 
work organisation. The results also show statistically significant ‘national effect’ when controlling for the structural variables, 
thus pointing to considerable latitude in how work is organised for the same occupation or within the same industrial sector.
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Therefore we assume that the least exposed jobs are jobs involving discretionary 
learning while Taylorist jobs and Traditional Organisation are the most exposed 
and Lean Production falls in between. We have calculated the index using the 
following formula:
Exposure Index=1.0DL+1.5LP+2.0(TAY+TRAD)
In the last column the index has been normalised so that the unweighted average 
equals 100. 
A low value for the index indicates that the economy is less exposed to low wage 
competition from outside Europe. Greece, Portugal and Spain are most exposed 
while the transformation of working life has gone far in Netherlands and in the 
Nordic countries.4 
It might be argued that the inverse of the exposure index gives a good indicator for 
long term sustainable competitiveness.5 Analysis including all of the EU–27 plus 
Norway and covering a more recent period gives a similar pattern; it shows that the 
majority of the new member countries have a structure similar to the one found in 
the south of Europe (Holm et al, forthcoming).6 On this basis it may be argued that a 
strategy aiming at making Europe the most competitive region in the world, with 
social cohesion, should focus upon enhancing the competitiveness in Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy as well as in the new member countries in Eastern Europe 
through social investment and institutional reform. The current Lisbon Strategy is 
complex with many specific sub­objectives. To focus efforts on strengthening the 
weakest of Europe’s learning economies would set clear objectives and easier to 
implement and explain. It would also give the European project a strongly needed 
legitimacy that goes beyond exploiting scale economies through the single market.
Education and Training for Learning Organisations 
Since the discretionary learning forms of work organisation depend on the capacity 
of employees to undertake complex problem­solving tasks in relatively unconstrained 
or ‘organic’ work settings, it can be expected that nations with a high frequency of 
these forms will have made substantial investments in the development of the 
knowledge and skills of their labour forces. Investments in education and training 
take various forms and in what follows we focus first on tertiary or third­level
4.  While a low value on the exposure index indicates that the economy is less vulnerable to ‘globalisation’ it also may be seen as 
explaining difficulties with absorbing low­skilled labour and not least labour with a different ethnical background. Workplaces 
with Taylorist and traditional work organisation may be seen as ‘entrance points’ for immigrants with low skills since they offer 
jobs where workers with limited communication skills can operate efficiently. It means that the integration effort in order to be 
successful needs to be massive and focused upon upgrading skills, including communication skills, in the Nordic countries. The 
current high rates of unemployment among certain ethnical groups in these countries illustrates that this has not yet been fully 
understood among policy makers.
5.  The current situation of Ireland indicates that its ‘strong competitiveness’ based mainly upon low costs and low tax regimes is 
not sustainable.
6.  The analysis of 2005 data for EU–27 and Norway also results in four clusters with similar characteristics as the ones referred 
to in this chapter. The Nordic nations (now including Norway) and the Netherlands stand out for their high use of the DL forms 
of work organisation and low levels of use of Taylorism. The lean forms are most present in the UK and Portugal amongst the 
EU–15 and Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania amongst the new member nations. The Taylorist forms are 
relatively developed in all of the southern nations amongst the EU–15 and in a number of the new member nations including the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. The simple forms are relatively frequent in Spain, Greece 
and Ireland amongst the EU–15 and in Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Cyprus and the Czech Republic amongst the new member 
nations (Holm et al, forthcoming). This implies that most of the new member countries are at least as exposed to globalisation as 
the countries in southern Europe.
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education and second on the continuing vocational training offered by enterprises 
both through external and internal courses. 
While most of the qualifications acquired through third­level education will be 
relatively general and hence transferable on the labour market, the qualifications an 
employee acquires through continuing vocational training will be more firm­
specific. Some of this training will be designed to renew employees’ technical skills 
and knowledge in order to respond to the firm’s requirements in terms of ongoing 
product and process innovation. Other parts of continuing vocational training, 
notably the provision of in­house courses, will be more organisationally focused and 
designed to develop employee competence in the firm­specific routines and 
operating procedures that are required for daily production activities. This latter 
kind of vocational training will be highly complementary to the more informal forms 
of learning that occur on the job, as employees seek solutions to the problems they 
confront in their daily work.
There is a common understanding in most European countries that it is important 
to promote academic training and scientific research. The Framework programmes 
and the Bologna­process are examples of efforts aiming at promoting and 
coordinating such activities. The weaker emphasis on vocational training and 
programmes for training adult workers reflects that in parts of Europe ‘codified 
knowledge’ carries much more status than experience­based knowledge. As we shall 
see below, this bias may be problematic since it neglects the close connection 
between adult vocational training and the creation of jobs characterised by 
discretionary learning.
Figure 1 below shows the correlations between the frequency of the DL forms and 
two of the four measures of human resources for innovation used in Trendchart’s 
innovation benchmarking exercise: the proportion of the population with third­level 
education and the number of science and engineering graduate since 1993 as a 
percentage of the population aged 20–29 years in 2000. The results show a modest 
positive correlation (R­squared = 0.26) between the DL forms and the percent of the 
population with third level education, and no discernible correlation between the DL 
forms and the measure of the importance of new science and engineering graduates.
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Figure 1. Formal education and discretionary learning. 
Figure 2 shows that there are fairly strong positive correlations (R­squared = 0.75 
and 0.52 respectively) between the frequency of the DL forms and two measures of 
firms’ investments in continuing vocational training: the percentage of all firms 
offering such training and the participants in continuing vocational education as a 
percent of employees in all enterprises.
Figure 2 also points to the north/south divide within Europe. The four less 
technologically developed southern nations are characterised by both low levels of 
enterprise continuing vocational training and low use of discretionary learning, 
while the more developed northern and central European nations are characterised 
by relatively high levels of vocational training and by high level use of the 
discretionary learning forms.
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Figure 2. Enterprise continuing vocational training and discretionary learning.
In order to approach an understanding of the underlying structural characteristics 
that are reflected in high levels of discretionary learning we will take a closer look at 
how social equality is linked to equality in access to learning in the Nordic countries. 
Social Capital, Trust and the Egalitarian Nordic Model
According to standard economic analysis Nordic countries should not perform very 
well in a global context where knowledge and innovation is a key to economic 
success. One of the few clear conclusions of new growth theory is that a small­scale 
system should be a handicap and it is only recently that firms in Denmark, Finland 
and Norway have increased the R and D effort to international level. The small scale 
should be a handicap because there are scale economies in the production of new 
Figure 2 
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knowledge in some of the so­called high technology fields. It should also be a 
handicap because it is so much less expensive to apply and use knowledge than it is  
to create knowledge. In this section we use the conceptual ideas developed above to 
demystify this paradox.
At the core of our analysis is the importance of tacit knowledge and experience based 
learning. Most interesting forms of learning take place as an interaction between 
people. Scholars interact with colleagues, firms with customers and the master 
interacts with the apprentice. Within the business organisation interaction among 
specialised experts and across departments is a prerequisite for successful 
innovation. When it comes to implement innovation a close interaction between 
workers and managers is crucial for success. Firms that interact with customers, 
suppliers and knowledge institutions are more successful in terms of innovation 
than those that operate in isolation (Rothwell 1977; Rosenberg 1982; Lundvall 1985). 
How people interact and with whom will reflect the society they live in and the 
education systems that has shaped them. We will argue that in the Nordic countries 
social capital and trust are fundamental resources that make national systems strong 
in terms of incremental innovation, absorption of knowledge produced elsewhere and 
rapid adaptation (Lundvall 2002; Lundvall 2006). First we demonstrate that both the 
level of trust and the level of income equality are high in the Nordic countries. Second 
we show that a fundamental and dynamic indicator of equality – equality in access to 
learning at the workplace – is also strongest in the Nordic countries and Netherlands.
Social Capital and Trust as Key Elements in the Nordic Model
In the US­dominated literature social capital has been presented as rooted in civil 
society and the frequency of participation in civic activities has been used as indicator 
of ‘social capital’ (Woolcock 1998). It has been argued that big government undermine 
civil society and thereby also social capital. The Scandinavian experience shows that 
the growth in the welfare state has not reduced the participation in civic 
organisations and that levels of trust are higher in the Scandinavian countries than in 
countries with small government. There seems, especially, to be correlation between 
general (rather than selective) social welfare programmes and generalised trust.7 
According to the European Social Survey trust among agents seems to be 
consistently higher in the Nordic countries than in most other countries and 
combined with the small size of the system it results in dense interaction among 
agents both within and across organisations.
This gives rise not only to low transaction costs but more importantly, it facilitates 
processes of interactive learning where new insights about technologies and good 
organisational practices are diffused rapidly both within organisations and across 
organisational borders. The most important impact of high degrees of trust is high 
learning benefits. Low social distance between managers and workers and 
willingness to trust partners are key elements behind the relative success of the 
Nordic countries.
7.  Social capital is a somewhat amorphous concept and it has referred both to individual access to social resources and to societal 
characteristics affecting social interaction. Here we define it as ‘the willingness and capability of citizens to make commitments 
to each other, collaborate with each others and trust each other in processes of exchange and interactive learning’.
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While the innovation systems in the Nordic countries may be handicapped in the 
production of codified knowledge especially in certain scale­intensive science based 
sectors they have been highly successful in terms of learning by doing, learning by 
using and learning by interacting.
Degree of Inequality in Access to Organisational  
Learning in Europe 
An egalitarian income distribution might not be the most important dimension of 
social equality. If it is combined with growing gaps in competence between the 
skilled and the low­skilled workers it might result in high rates of underemployment 
and long term unemployment for the low­skilled. The data referred to above on 
organisational models of learning in different European countries makes it possible 
to develop a more dynamic and adequate indicator of inequality. 
Table 2. National Differences in Organisational Models 
(per cent of employees by organisational class).
Discretionary 
learning
Share of managers 
in discretionary 
learning
Share of workers 
in discretionary 
learning
Learning 
Inequality index*
North
Netherlands 64,0 81.6 51.1 37.3
Denmark 60,0 85.0 56.2 35.9
Sweden 52,6 76.4 38.2 50.3
Finland 47,8 62.0 38.5 37.9
Austria 47,5 74.1 44.6 39.9
Centre
Germany 44,3 65.4 36.8 43.8
Luxembourg 42,8 70.3 33.1 52.9
Belgium 38,9 65.7 30.8 53.1
France 38,0 66.5 25.4 61.9
West
UK 34,8 58.9 20.1 65.9
Ireland 24,0 46.7 16.4 64.9
South
Italy 30,0 63.7 20.8 67.3
Portugal 26,1 59.0 18.2 69.2
Spain 20,1 52.4 19.1 63.5
Greece 18,7 40.4 17.0 57.9
Source: Lundvall, Rasmussen and Lorenz (2008).
* The index is constructed by dividing the share of ‘workers’ engaged in discretionary learning by the share of 
’managers’ engaged in discretionary learning and subtracting the resulting percentage from 100. If the share of 
workers and managers were the same, the index would equal 0, and if the share of workers was 0 the index would 
equal 100.
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In table 2 we present an indicator for the social distribution of workplace learning 
opportunities. We distinguish between ‘workers’ and ‘managers’ and we compare 
their access to discretionary learning in different national systems.8 Table 2 shows 
that employees everywhere at the high end of the professional hierarchy have more 
easy access to jobs involving discretionary learning.
But it is also noteworthy that the data indicate that the inequality in access to 
learning is quite different in different countries. In the Nordic countries and 
Netherlands the inequality in the distribution of learning opportunities is moderate 
while it is very substantial in the less developed south. For instance, the proportion 
of the management category engaged in discretionary learning in Portugal is almost 
as high as in Finland (62 per cent in Finland and 59 per cent in Portugal), but the 
proportion of workers engaged in discretionary learning is much lower in Portugal 
(18.2 per cent versus 38.2 per cent). 
This pattern indicates the Nordic countries are egalitarian not only in terms of 
income distribution. Also when it comes to access to learning the distribution is 
more equal than elsewhere. The combination of welfare states offering some kind of 
basic security, equal income distribution and low social distance is reflected in high 
degrees of trust and in a broad participation in change. While there are tendencies 
toward polarisation in the current context also in the Nordic countries they still 
benefit from a kind of social capital that supports dynamic economic efficiency.
To build a capacity to upgrade skills of the low­skilled workers with different cultural 
backgrounds, and to avoid a populist backlash against immigration are major 
challenges for the Nordic countries. This is where the Nordic model, so far, has been 
the least successful. The dimension of the challenge has been underestimated and as 
a result efforts have been too modest.
Linking Modes of Learning to Measures of Employment  
and Unemployment Security
EU member nations display large differences in systems of employment and 
unemployment protection. Systems combining high levels of unemployment 
protection with relatively low levels of employment protection may have an 
advantage in terms of the adoption of the forms of work organisation that promote 
learning and ‘new to the market’ innovation. Organisations which compete on the 
basis of strategies of continuous knowledge exploration tend to have relatively 
porous organisational boundaries so as to permit the insertion of new knowledge 
and ideas from the outside. Job tenures tend to be short as careers are often 
structured around a series of discrete projects rather than advancing within an 
intra­firm hierarchy (Lam 2005; Lam and Lundvall 2006). 
While absence of legal restrictions on hiring and firing will not necessarily result in 
the forms of labour market mobility that contribute to a continuous evolution of the 
firm’s knowledge base, strong systems of employment protection may prove to be an 
obstacle. Well developed systems of unemployment protection, on the other hand, 
may contribute to the development of fluid labour markets. The security of such 
8.  The class of managers includes not only top and middle management but also professionals and technicians (ISCO major 
groups 1, 2 and 3) The worker category includes clerks, service and sales workers as well as craft, plant and machine operators and 
unskilled occupations (ISCO major groups 4 through 9).
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systems provides encourages individuals to commit themselves to what would 
otherwise be perceived as unacceptably risky forms of employment and career paths 
and such forms of protection contribute to accumulation of knowledge for particular 
sectors or regions since in their absence unemployed workers would be under greater 
pressure to relocate. 
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Figure 3. Correlations between discretionary learning and systems of social protection.
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Evidence in support of the view that systems of flexicurity promote the DL forms of 
work organisation is provided in Figure 3 above.9 The top graph shows that there is a 
fairly strong positive relation (R­squared = 0.52) between a measure of the level of 
unemployment protection in a nation and the frequency of discretionary learning. 
The middle graph shows a negative relation (R­squared = 0.36) between a measure of 
the level of employment protection and the frequency of the DL forms. 
The bottom graph in Figure 3 shows an index of flexicurity constructed from the 
measures of employment and unemployment protection. The index is constructed so 
that a nation combining intermediate levels of both unemployment and employment 
security will score higher than a nation combining a high level of unemployment 
security with a high level of employment security, or a nation combining a low level 
employment security with a low level of unemployment security.10 The assumption is 
that the positive effects of a high level of unemployment protection (low level of 
employment protection) cannot compensate for the negative effects of a high level of 
employment protection (low level of unemployment protection). Rather, as the 
literature on flexicurity suggests, what’s required is getting the right mix of 
flexibility and security. The index is positively correlated (R­squared = 0.48) with the 
frequency of the DL forms of work organisation. 
In a paper still in process, Organisational Learning and Systems of Labour Market 
Regulation in Europe’ (Holm et al, forthcoming), we have taken one further step 
towards addressing this research agenda by using multi­level logistic regression to 
explore the relation between individual level outcomes and national systems of 
labour market flexibility and regulation. The analysis provides support for the view 
that the way work is organised is nation­specific and that it varies with the degree of 
labour market mobility and with the way labour markets are regulated.
This perspective has important implications for European policy and in particular 
for the current situation where there is a strong need to face the economic crisis and 
to revitalise the Lisbon agenda. It is true that the Lisbon process set the focus not 
only on economic growth but also on social cohesion. But it appears as if, for the 
Commission, the social dimension has been added as something outside the 
innovation process sometimes seen as a kind of historical burden that Europe is 
obliged to carry when competing with the US, Japan, and China.
Revitalising the Lisbon Agenda
A revitalisation of the Lisbon process should take national learning systems and 
their interrelations with systems of labour market regulation as the point of 
departure for defining a new set of policy strategies. Our results indicate that a 
movement toward a learning economy where a growing proportion of the citizens 
are engaged in jobs offering both learning and a delegation of responsibility can be 
promoted by developing more active and more ambitious labour market policies that 
combine mobility in the labour market with income security and access to training 
9.  The unemployment protection measure in Figure 5 is the average net replacement rate of in­work income over 60 months 
averaged across four family types and two income levels including social assistance in 1999. See OECD, Benefits and Wages, 2002, 
p. 40. The employment protection measure is the OECD’s overall employment protection index for the late 1990s. See OECD 
Employment Outlook, 1999, Ch. 2.
10.  The index is constructed by reversing the scoring on the employment protection index such that high values correspond to 
low levels of protection and multiplying this reversed score by the unemployment index. The resulting flexicurity index has then 
been rescaled so that the maximum score is 100. 
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for workers. In the current crisis, establishing flexible security or ‘flexicurity’ in 
labour markets may be seen as a long­term supplement to short­term attempts that 
try to save existing jobs.
Finally, a major challenge in the learning economy is to establish links between and 
reduce barriers between those who operate on the basis of formal codified academic 
knowledge and those who operate on the basis of experience­based and practical 
knowledge. While science and codified knowledge becomes increasingly important it 
is only when it is linked and combined with tacit and experience­based knowledge 
that it may become transformed into economic and social values (Jensen et al. 2007). 
Education and training systems therefore need to be designed so that they lower 
such barriers. This implies a need to make education systems more broad based so 
that they give more equal weight to academic training and to vocational training. 
Academic training needs to be connected to the solution of practical problems and 
vocational training needs to demystify science and prepare workers for the use of 
advanced technologies (Lundvall et al. 2008). 
In the learning economy strong competitiveness will emanate from the dynamic 
interaction between research­ and experience­based forms of knowledge and this 
requires that all kinds of barriers between those with practical skills and those with 
theoretical skills are reduced. Again we see this as a challenge especially for the 
South and East of Europe. But also in France, Germany and the UK there might be  
a need for radical reforms in this respect (Lam and Lundvall 2006; Lorenz and 
Lundvall 2006). 
Summing Up
The Lisbon strategy aims at making Europe the most competitive region in the world 
and at Social cohesion. A radical new element in the Lisbon Strategy was its emphasis on 
the knowledge­based economy. In this chapter we have proposed a shift in perspective 
where the focus is upon how learning takes place in different parts of Europe. 
Seen in this light there is a need to focus and to revitalise the Lisbon strategy. The 
focus should be upon social investments and institutional change related to the 
organisation of work and learning especially in the South and East of Europe. We see 
three tasks as especially important:
• expanding systems of vocational training and aiming at new combinations of 
theory and practice in the overall education systems;
• developing active labour market policies and institutions that support flexicurity;
• reducing inequality in income and in access to learning.
Such a programme would increase ‘social cohesion’ both at the level of the single 
nation and for Europe as a whole since it would help reducing the big gaps in income 
between the different parts of Europe. And it would certainly strengthen the 
‘competitiveness’ of the region as a whole. It is of course a problem that education, 
labour market and social policy remain the responsibility of national governments 
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and seem therefore to be outside the reach of the European Commission.
Therefore, it might be considered to combine the efforts towards acceptance of the 
Lisbon Treaty with a redefinition of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) so 
that it gives a ‘social dimension’; transforming it into an Economic and Social Union 
(ESU). This is not very realistic however and therefore more limited efforts need to 
be considered. A strengthening and redefinition of the role of the regional funds that 
links economic contributions to institutional reforms in the South and East of 
Europe seems to be a possible way ahead. 
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Towards Social Investment? 
Patterns of Public Policy  
in the OECD World
Rita Nikolai 
I Introduction
The sort of welfare state thinking has changed. Mounting demands on the traditional 
welfare state – such as shifts in the world of employment, demographic change, the 
increasing internationalisation of markets for commodities and markets for services 
as well as processes of societal changes – challenge welfare policy. Action is compelled 
by ideas for a “Third Way”– a social investment state – first broached by Giddens (1998) 
and quickly embraced by the policy­ and decision­making community. That kind of 
state is not remedial. It moves away from classic compensatory social benefits, which 
come into play only after the damage has already occurred. It changes the system to 
favour family and active labour market policy as also education and training as 
preventive social investments. For comparative public policy research such a change in 
paradigm necessarily means to discuss, how we can identify social investment states 
and which states has already implemented a social investment strategy?
The contribution traces the development of welfare­state change in the established1 
OECD member states, which for the most part of the states offer more than a  
100­year old tradition of welfare policy. By using disaggregated programme 
expenditure, this chapter will identify diverse spending priorities and will relate 
expenditures for investment measures and compensation expenditures on the basis 
of the OECD Social Expenditure Database and the Education Spending Database. By 
doing this, we can distinct between investment and compensatory social spending as 
a tool to identify social investment states and to compare the diversity of countries 
approach. We are also asking to what extent we can observe a convergence of welfare 
policy. The analysis will take into account expenditures for families, active labour 
market policies, education, old­age and passive labour market policies. The data 
embrace 21 OECD member states beginning with the midst of the 1980s up to the 
1.  Comparable data for the 30 OECD states are only available since the beginning of the 1990s, so the data availability limits the 
investigation period and the selection of cases. The “established” OECD states are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
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year 2005.2 The contribution analyse, in how far the OECD­member states pursue a 
social investment policy. Do the welfare states follow the paradigm of activation in 
the same way and is there a convergence of welfare­state development? Due to the 
increasing international interdependence of states and their societies, one might 
argue for an increasing convergence of national policies, institutions and cultures. 
So the question is, whether the welfare policies in the OECD world are becoming 
more similar over the years and to what extent the paradigm of the social investment 
state finds expression in the social expenditure profile?
Due to their strong orientation on investments in human capital and provision for 
the future, policy fields like education policy, family policy and active labour market 
policy are understood as action fields of the social investment state, (Allmendinger 
and Leibfried, 2003, Nikolai, 2007). In contrast the policy fields of old age insurance 
and passive labour market policies are understood as the classic fields of a 
compensatory welfare state, which is characterised by a generous compensation of 
social risk such as unemployment and ageing. The focus lies rather on the outcomes 
and less on the processes and causes underlying the results. The approach of this 
chapter can help us to understand how different types of social programmes 
contribute to the attainment of particular welfare state goals and to gain a more 
differentiated picture of the factors shaping national welfare state spending profiles 
than has been previously possible on the basis of aggregate spending data alone. 
With disaggregated programme expenditure data we are able to figure out which 
welfare states focus more on prevention and social investment than on 
compensating for immediate problems. The chapter begins with a short overview of 
the discussion of welfare state change towards the social investment state and the 
role of different social policies. In the section following we analyse to what extent 
convergent developments in the social expenditures can be observed and in how far 
the welfare states follow up the paradigm of social investment state in their spending 
profile. The last section summarises the findings.
II Identification of Social Investment States
Since the year 2000, a new agenda has been defined for the European welfare state 
under the now common title Social Investment State (SIS). The SIS displays a 
revamped view on social policies. It promotes 3 main mechanisms to address new 
social risks: Activation, individualisation and human capital investment over the life 
course. The SIS has been promoted by the EU and has fostered a rescaling process of 
welfare states. The Social Investment Strategy is based on the idea that social policy 
has to become a productive factor which enhances growth and employment. In brief, 
the state has to enable citizens to care for themselves rather than caring for them 
(Häusermann and Palier, 2008). Since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU has 
officially adopted this policy orientation (Jenson and Saint­Martin, 2006). The 
Lisbon strategy is aimed at boosting growth and jobs, notably through the measures 
which invest in people’s capacities and provide equal opportunities. 
Discourse on the welfare state has changed gradually since the late 1990s. Due to 
changing economic and social contexts as well as tight financing constraints: A more 
active social policy has developed based on a social investment strategy. The idea of 
2.  For education up to the year 2006.
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the active social state is rooted in the neo­liberal critique of the welfare state that the 
latter is cumbersome, badly designed and incorporates false incentive structures. 
This critique was taken up by the OECD in its influential report of 1994 (OECD, 1994) 
which stressed the opposition between passive and active social expenses. The new 
paradigm was further supported by three other ideas: “Making work pay”, a new role 
for the individual, and a mix between rights and duties (Dean et al., 2005). In his 
book “The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy”, Anthony Giddens 
introduced the notion of social investment as a normative concept (Giddens, 1998). 
He called for a “new partnership” in the assignment of the welfare function to 
families, markets and states and challenged the state to develop an entrepreneurial 
culture. The goal was to “shift the responsibility between risks and security involved 
in the welfare state, to develop a society of responsible risks takers” (Giddens, 1998: 
100). This approach implies several changes: firstly, the shift of focus on the main 
risks the welfare state has to deal with, secondly, more emphasis on the individual 
responsibility at stake, thirdly, a new kind of wealth redistribution as well as a 
renewed role for social policy, and lastly a rethinking of the aims, instruments and 
main fields of welfare policies (see Jenson chapter 1 this volume). 
Deindustrialization and the tertiarisation of employment, massive entry of women 
into the labour force, increased instability of family structures, destandardization of 
employment form in the words of Giuliano Bonoli in new social risks (Bonoli, 2007). 
In response to new risks, the social investment strategy (SIS) aims at facilitating the 
integration of people into the labour market. The need for old forms of social 
protection is of course not eliminated; pensions are still important to protect against 
income insecurity in old age; health services are needed, and so on. But for the 
promoters of the SIS, new risks must also be taken in hand. The aim is to produce an 
adaptable, skilled and educated workforce through welfare policies encouraging 
active participation (primarily in the labour market) and equipping people to face 
these new risks. Citizens should be empowered through public policies to be flexible 
to changing demands of knowledge­based (labour­) markets and to organise their 
integration into society. In contrast to the redistributive welfare state paradigm, the 
social investment state aims at redeploying public spending from passive social 
transfers to investments in education and training, labour market activation 
measures, promotion of lifelong learning and other measures to reconcile work and 
family. But how can we identify social investment states? Alternatively to Jenson’s 
social rights of citizenship approach (see Jenson chapter 1 this volume), we compare 
the welfare states by using disaggregated programme expenditure. We could also 
identify diverse spending priorities by relating expenditures for investment 
measures and compensation expenditures on the basis of the OECD Social 
Expenditure Database and the Education Spending Database.
In welfare politics we can differentiate between investment­related and 
compensatory welfare policies (Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003, Nikolai, 2007). 
Compensatory social policies set against on the generous compensation of social 
risks such as unemployment and age. These policies are mainly based on a 
contribution­financed social security with supplementing systems on supply and 
welfare service basis, and with the goal of maintaining in the old­age pension the 
status differences of the insurants. As compensatory social policies we understand 
passive labour market policies and old age insurance. 
Spending on old age insurance aim to prevent poverty in the sense of basic security 
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in old age, to secure the continuity of living standards and reduce income 
inequalities. Expenditures for this field include spending on old­age and survivors’ 
pension. Passive labour market policy regulates the compensatory allowances for the 
loss of income due to unemployment. Expenditures for this field include expenditure 
on unemployment benefits for unemployment and early retirement funds. 
Investment­related social policies align their expenditure fields more strongly to 
provision for the future and needs of the younger generations. We understand active 
labour market policy, family policy and education and training as fields of social 
investment. 
Family policies have several objectives: It aims (1) to keep the birth rate, at least at a 
level that ensures the reproduction of the population, (2) to ensure that more women 
can reconcile work and family, (3) to reduce child poverty, (4) to promote the 
development of children by providing support services (see Morgan chapter 2 this 
volume) and (5) to bridge the gap between the incomes of men and women. The 
commitment of a country’s family policy can be described with the level of public 
expenditure in this area.
Active labour market policy aims to promote labour mobility and the adaptation of 
citizens to changing labour markets (Armingeon, 2007, Bonoli chapter 3 this 
volume). By means of active labour market policies people should quickly be 
reintegrated into the labour market and the economic loss due to repeated 
unemployment should be minimized. The expenditures for this field include 
expenditure on active labour market programs, training, training for young people, 
employment services, career guidance as well programmes for long­term 
unemployed, low skilled and disabled persons. 
Education enjoys a pivotal role in the Social Investment Strategy (Giddens, 2000, 
Lewis and Surrender, 2004, Nelson and Stephens chapter 4 this volume). “The key 
force in human capital development obviously has to be education. It is the main 
public investment that can foster both economic and civic cohesion” (Giddens, 2000: 
73). The changes in society over the previous century are testing all welfare states, 
albeit to different extents. Profound processes of deindustrialization have subjected 
the labour markets of developed societies to lasting change. Labour based on 
materials and physical work is no longer the determining variable in value creation. 
The distinguishing features of the present knowledge society are skills in dealing 
with information and communications technologies and meta­knowledge for 
acquiring, using, and producing information (Rohrbach, 2007). The education level 
of the broad population is thus a crucial competitive factor – all the more so because 
demographic developments in many countries are leading to population decreases 
that cannot sustain the absolute number of well­educated people unless the size of 
that group expands proportionately. Moreover, today’s longer life expectancy and 
the ever­shorter half­life of knowledge mean that one phase of education early in life 
no longer suffices and that phases of additional education and training are more 
necessary than ever. Spending for education covers expenditures on schools, 
universities and other public involved in delivering or supporting educational 
services from primary to tertiary education.
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III Analysis
3.1. The Development of Total Social Expenditures
We will first look at the development of social expenditures since 1960 (table 1). On 
average, in 2005 the OECD states spent 22 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product 
for welfare policies. The spending levels in Sweden, France, Denmark and Germany 
are higher than the OECD­average whereas Japan, the Anglo­Saxon states and also 
economically less developed countries are characterized by social expenditures 
rates below average. Altogether the welfare state is not on the retreat and there does 
not seem to be a “race to the bottom“ (Pierson, 2001) scenario. In almost all OECD 
states (with exception of the Netherlands and Ireland) the level of public social 
expenditures as a percentage of the GDP increased between 1960 and 2005. The 
social expenditure rate increased particularly in the 1960s and 1970s and also at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The salience of the welfare state has also increased relative 
to other state functions (Obinger and Starke, 2008). The majority of the OECD­states 
spend more than half of total government outlays (not reported here) for social 
policy. In regard to social expenditure as a percentage of total government outlays, 
the welfare state has crowded out public expenditures devoted to other purposes 
over the years (Castles, 2007). The statistic measures of dispersion in the lower part 
of table 1 inform to what extent the social expenditure rates converge over the years 
since 1980. Measures such as the range, the standard deviation and the coefficient of 
variation are denoted as σ­convergence (sigma­convergence). Sigma­convergence is 
understood as the increase of similarity between countries over the years. The rise 
in public social expenditure goes hand in hand with a strong convergence as 
indicated by the declining measures of dispersion. There is also evidence for 
β­convergence. The concept of β­convergence is understood as a catching­up by 
policy laggards. In the last row we report the correlation (Pearson’s r) between the 
starting value 1980 and the annual growth rate (1980–2005). The correlation is 
negative and statistically significant, so the cross­national variation in social 
spending growth is driven by catch­up process by welfare policy laggards.
The one­sided view of the public social expenditures covers the division of labour 
between state, market and family. That’s why we also report the private social 
expenditures in table 1. We find high private expenditures in the USA, Switzerland and 
in the Netherlands, due to their high private expenditures for old­age insurance (and 
not least health expenditures). But also in countries such as Belgium, Japan or France 
the welfare production is not any longer based solely on public income transfers and 
social safety nets, but also on privately generated social security benefits.
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Table 1. Public and Private Social Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1960–2005.
Public Social Expenditures Private 
(mandatory and 
voluntary) Social 
Expenditures
Public and 
Private Social 
Expenditures
1960 1970 1980 1990 2005 1980 1990 2005 1980 1990 2005
Australia 10,6 11,5 10,9 13,6 17,1 1 0,9 2,6 11,6 14,5 20,8
Austria 22,5 21,6 22,6 23,9 27,2 1,1 1,1 1 25,0 26,1 29,1
Belgium 23,5 25,3 23,5 24,9 26,4 0,9 1,6 4,5 24,5 26,5 30,9
Canada 13,7 18,7 14,1 18,1 16,5 1,6 3,3 5,5 15,3 21,4 22,0
Denmark 24,8 26,2 25,2 25,1 26,9 1,4 1,6 2,4 26,2 27,2 29,5
Finland 18 19,9 18,4 24,2 26,1 0,9 1,1 1,1 18,9 25,3 27,2
France 20,8 m 20,8 25,1 29,2 0,6 1,7 2,6 21,4 27,0 32,1
Germany 22,7 23,5 23,0 22,3 26,7 1,1 1,5 1,9 25,8 25,4 29,8
Greece 10,2 10,9 11,5 16,5 20,5 m 2,1 1,7 10,2 18,6 22,2
Ireland 16,7 17,1 16,8 14,9 16,7 1,3 1,4 1,3 18,0 16,3 18,0
Italy 18 21,4 18,0 19,9 25,0 m 0,5 0,6 18,8 23,9 27,1
Japan 10,6 9,3 10,3 11,4 18,6 m m 3,3 10,9 11,8 22,4
Netherlands 24,8 29,1 24,1 25,6 20,9 3,6 5,6 7,6 28,8 31,6 29,2
New Zealand 17,2 12,7 17,1 21,8 18,5 0,1 0,2 0,4 17,3 22,0 18,9
Norway 16,9 22,5 16,9 22,3 21,6 0,6 0,7 0,8 17,7 24,1 23,7
Portugal 10,2 m 10,8 12,9 23,11 0,4 0,7 1,51 10,9 13,8 25,01
Spain 15,5 m 15,5 19,9 21,2 0,2 0,2 0,5 15,7 20,1 21,7
Sweden 27,1 23,0 28,6 30,2 29,4 1,1 1,2 2,4 28,2 31,4 32,2
Switzerland 13,5 12,6 13,9 13,4 20,3 m 1 1,1 15,4 18,7 28,7
United Kingdom 16,7 18,5 16,6 17,0 21,3 3,4 4,8 6,3 20,3 22,1 28,4
United States 13,1 15,7 13,3 13,4 15,9 4,2 7,1 9,8 17,7 21,0 26,1
Mean (OECD-21) 17,5 18,9 17,7 19,8 22,3 1,6 2,5 3,6 19,2 22,3 26,0
Range 16,9 19,8 18,3 18,8 13,5 4,5 7,4 9,7 19,1 19,9 14,2
Standard 
Deviation 5,3 5,8 5,3 5,3 4,3 1,3 2,0 2,8 5,7 5,4 4,3
Variation 
Coefficient 0,30 0,31 0,30 0,27 0,18 0,83 0,82 0,77 0,3 0,24 0,17
Catch-Up 
(1980–2005) r = 0.578** r = 0.482** r = ­0.653**
Source: for the years 1960 and 1970 OECD (1985) Social Expenditure 1960–1990. Problems of Growth and Control, 
Paris, OECD; for the years 1980–2005 retrieved April 2, 2009, from OECD, Social Expenditure Database. 
Annotation: *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01; Portugal 2005 = 2004.
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3.2. Programme­related Spending Categories
We get a more nuanced picture of welfare state spending when we break down the 
total social expenditure into programme­related spending. Table 2 shows in how far 
the dynamic of social expenditures is driven by the restructuring of social spending 
patterns and not just simply by retrenchment.3 For contrasting redistributive and 
investment­related expenditures we refer to the spending categories of active labour 
market policies, families, education, old age insurance and passive labour market 
policies. The breakdown by programme­related spending categories points out 
different developments in the single spending programmes and uncovers substantial 
asymmetries between the countries. 
Since the 1980s mainly the expenditures for old­age insurance increased. Austria, 
Greece, Germany, Poland and Italy spend a bulk of their financial resources for 
old­age insurances. In the Anglo­Saxon states and in the economically less 
developed countries the expenditures are relatively low in this program area. We can 
also observe increased levels of spending for families. In contrast, the expenditures 
for active and passive labour market policies remain stable. In the majority of the 
countries the weights between the spending categories changed in favour of the 
expenditures for transfer­intensive social politics. Thus the Continental and 
Southern European countries’ expenditures for old­age insurance and passive 
labour market policy are much higher than those of – for instance – the 
Scandinavian welfare states, and much higher than the expenditures for active 
labour market policies, families and educational policy. High expenditures for 
families we find in the Scandinavian states and in some Anglo­Saxon States as in 
Australia and the United Kingdom, but also in France. A similar expenditure pattern 
as in family policy we find in the field of active labour market policy: here the 
Scandinavian States are also taking over top positions. However the expenditures 
are also very high in this field in the Netherlands, France, Germany and Belgium.
We find evidence for σ­convergence for the fields of active and passive labour market 
policies, family policy and education policy, as the measures of dispersion are decreasing 
between 1980 and 2005. But there is no evidence for catch­up­process in these fields.  
The spending pattern for old­age insurance is quite different. The indicators for 
σ­convergence are increasing, so the expenditure levels between the countries are not 
converging and the difference between the countries are still significant.
3.  Here only data since 1980 are reported, because data are not available for all spending categories before 1980.
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Table 2. Public Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP for different fields of social policy, 
1980–2005.
Active Labour 
Market Policy
Family Education Passive 
Labour 
Market Policy
Old Age 
(including 
Expenditures 
for Survivers
1985 2005 1980 2005 1980 2006 1980 2005 1980 2005
Australia 0,4 0,4 1,0 2,8 5,6 4,1 0,7 0,5 3,8 4,6
Austria 0,3 0,6 3,2 2,8 5,6 5,2 0,4 1,1 10,7 13,0
Belgium 1,2 1,1 3,0 2,6 5,7 5,9 2,4 3,3 8,9 9,2
Canada 0,6 0,3 0,7 1,0 7,7 4,8 1,2 0,6 3,0 4,1
Denmark 0,8 1,7 2,8 3,2  m 6,7 4,8 2,8 7,1 7,2
Finland 0,7 0,9 1,8 3,0 5,8 5,7 0,6 2,0 5,9 9,4
France 0,6 0,9 2,4 3,0 5,1 5,5 2,31 1,7 9,5 12,7
Germany 0,5 1,0 2,1 2,2 4,6 4,1 0,5 1,7 10,9 11,6
Greece 0,2 0,1 0,3 1,1 3,2 4,0 0,2 0,4 5,4 11,6
Ireland 1,1 0,6 1,1 2,5 6,4 4,4 3,31 0,9 5,7 3,7
Italy 0,6 1,1 1,3 4,5 4,6 0,6 0,5 8,9 14,1
Japan 0,3 0,5 0,8 5,9 3,3 0,5 0,3 4,1 9,9
Netherlands 1,3 1,3 2,5 1,6 7,1 4,8 1,6 1,5 6,9 5,8
New Zealand 0,9 0,4 2,2 2,6 6,7 5,0 0,5 0,4 7,2 4,3
Norway 0,6 0,7 1,8 2,8 5,8 5,4 0,4 0,5 5,7 6,6
Portugal 0,2 0,7 0,7 1,2 3,7 5,1 0,3 1,2 3,9 10,3
Spain 0,3 0,8 0,5 1,1  m 4,2 2,0 2,2 6,3 8,4
Sweden 2,1 1,3 3,9 3,2 8,5 6,2 0,4 1,2 8,3 10,2
Switzerland 0,2 0,7 1,0 1,3 5,2 5,4 0,1 0,9 5,8 7,0
UK 0,7 0,5 2,3 3,2 5,7 5,2 1,2 0,3 5,9 6,3
United States 0,3 0,1 0,8 0,6 4,9 5,0 0,7 0,3 6,3 6,1
Mean 0,7 0,7 1,7 2,1 5,7 5,0 1,2 1,2 6,7 8,4
Range 1,9 1,6 3,6 2,6 5,3 3,4 4,7 3,0 7,9 10,4
Standard 
Deviation 0,48 0,41 1,03 0,92 1,28 0,81 1,19 0,86 2,2 3,1
Variation 
Coefficient 0,7 0,59 0,61 0,44 0,22 0,16 0,99 0,72 0,31 0,37
Catch­Up 
(1980–2005) r = 0.355 r = 0.192 r = ­ 0.837 r = 0.147 r = 0.721**
Source: data for active labour market policies, passive labour market policies, families and old age are retrieved 
April 2, 2009, from OECD, Social Expenditure Database; data for education from OECD (1992), Public Educational 
Expenditure, Costs and Financing: An Analysis of Trends 1970–1988, Paris, OECD, and OECD (2009), Education 
at a Glance, Paris: OECD. ** p< 0,01 ; Portugal 2005 = 2004. 1 = 1985.
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3.3. Spending for Education and Training
In table 3, data on private and public education spending (as percentages of GDP) are 
presented.4 Several things can be seen from this table: first, there is substantial 
variation in spending among OECD countries and on average the OECD states spent 
less public resources as a percentage of GDP for education in 2006 than in 1980.5 As 
indicated in table 3, a weak state, as we find in the Anglo­Saxon countries, and public 
expenditures for education are not contradictory. In 2006 Denmark and the United 
States were taking over the top positions for public and private expenditures in 
education. At the end of the spectrum we find Greece. Germany’s public and private 
investment in educational institutions amounts to 4.8 percent of the GDP – a share 
far from the OECD­average of 5.7 percent. The percentage of public investment in 
education is particularly high in Denmark and Sweden, amounting to over 6 percent, 
whereas private expenditure constitutes a relatively small share of the GDP in these 
countries. Denmark’s leading position in regard to overall educational expenditure 
rates can be attributed to a comparatively high share of public investment. The 
United States devote 5.0 percent of their GDP to public educational expenditure  
– a share in line with the OECD­average of 5.0 percent. However, private educational 
expenditure is comparatively high, so that the United States unlike other Anglo­
Saxon countries belongs to the top flight of overall educational expenditure rates 
along with Denmark. High private educational expenditure rates are also displayed 
by Australia, Canada and Japan. Concerning the public­private mix in education 
funding we find evidence for a growing weight of private financial contributions 
(Wolf, 2009). The continental European countries are quite heterogeneous in regard 
to their educational spending: France and Switzerland show high rates of public 
educational investment by international comparison. In contrast, in Germany the 
public educational expenditure as a share of the GDP is below average and in the 
Netherlands it is barely average. In the southern European countries (with the 
exception of Portugal) public educational expenditure is below OECD­average. The 
contrast between public and private educational spending shows that in the sphere 
of education some of the welfare states put more emphasis on private funding and 
less on public spending, whereas in other welfare states public finance still plays an 
essential role for the education sector. All in all the examination of individual 
welfare state programs shows that an analysis based on overall social spending tends 
to overestimate the coherence of welfare state regimes (Kasza, 2002) and that the 
architecture of individual welfare states is much more complex.
4.  Comparable data for the 21 OECD states for private education expenditures are only available since the beginning of 2000. 
That’s why we skip in this section the discussion of measures of convergence for public and private education expenditures.
5.  This might be influenced by demographic shifts, which resulted in declining share of pupils.
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Table 3. Public and Private Expenditures for Education in per cent of GDP 1980–2006.
 
 
Public Expenditures Private Expenditures
Public and Private 
Expenditures
1980 1991 2000 2006 1991 1995 2000 2006 1991 1995 2000 2006
Australia 5,6 4,7 4,4 4,1 0,8 1,0 1,4 1,6 5,5 5,5 5,8 5,7
Austria 5,6 5,4 5,3 5,2  0,3 0,3 0,4  6,1 5,6 5,5
Belgium 5,7 5,4 0,7 5,9    0,2    6,1
Canada 7,7 6,7 5,1 4,8 0,7 0,8 1,2 1,7 7,4 7,0 6,4 6,5
Denmark  m 6,1 6,4 6,7  0,2 0,3 0,6 6,1 6,2 6,6 7,3
Finland 5,8 6,1 5,6 5,7 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 6,6 6,3 5,7 5,8
France 5,1 5,4  5,7 5,5 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,4 6,0 6,2 6,1 5,9
Germany 4,6 4,0 4,2 4,1 1,5 0,9 1,0 0,7 5,4 5,4 5,2 4,8
Greece 3,2  5,4 3,7 4,0   0,2 0,3  3,0 4,0 4,3
Ireland 6,4 5,5 4,1 4,4 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,3 5,9 5,2 4,5 4,7
Italy 4,5 5,0 4,5 4,6   0,4 0,3   4,9 4,9
Japan 5,9 3,7 3,5 3,3 1,3 1,1 1,2 1,7 5 4,7 4,7 5,0
Netherlands 7,1 5,6 4,2 4,8 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,8 5,8 4,7 4,5 5,6
New Zealand 6,7 5,6 5,6 5,0    1,3    6,3
Norway 5,8 6,8 6,5 5,4  0,4  m m  7,1  m m
Portugal 3,7 5,5 5,6 5,1   0,1 0,4  5,3 5,7 5,6
Spain  m 4,4 4,2 4,2 1,1 0,8 0,6 0,5 5,6 5,3 4,8 4,7
Sweden 8,5 6,5 6,2 6,2   0,2 0,2 6,5 6,2 6,4 6,3
Switzerland 5,2 5,4 5,2 5,4   0,4 0,7   5,6 m
UK 5,7 5,3 4,5 5,2  0,7 0,7 0,7  5,5 5,2 5,9
US 4,9 5,5 4,8 5,0 1,5 2,2 2,2 2,4 7,0 7,2 7,0 7,4
Mean 5,7 5,4 4,8 5,0 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,8 6,1 5,7 5,5 5,7
Source: OECD (1992), Public Educational Expenditure, Costs and Financing: An Analysis of Trends 1970–1988, 
Paris, OECD; OECD, Education at a Glance, Paris: OECD, different volumes. ** p< 0,01 ; Greece 2006 = 2005.
3.4. Compensatory and Investment Related Policies
In regard of their public performance structure and spending profiles, the different 
welfare states are usually differentiated in social democratic, liberal and 
conservative welfares states (Esping­Andersen, 1990). Usually, the main distinction 
emphasised is that between the generous and universal social democratic welfare 
states and the weakly developed social security systems of the liberal states. As 
measured by the social expenditure rate the conservative continental European 
welfare states stand between. The contribution choose however another perspective. 
The welfare states are in such a way regarded, to what extent they practice an 
investment­related welfare politics, which are of crucial importance for the 
sustainability of welfare states. 
The predominating priorities of countries in their social and education politics are 
also reflected in their expenditure pattern. Therefore figure 1 compares investment­
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related and compensatory social politics in the OECD countries for 2005. The nexus 
between for investment­related and compensatory social policies is not a strong one, 
but the regression line in figure 1 is to be understood as a helpful tool for inter­
pretation. However, by looking at the distance of countries or country groups from 
the regression line, we gain insights about the relative importance of investment­
related vs. compensatory social spending. We can identify three groups of countries: 
1.  Within the Northern European grouping, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have 
a quite distinct profile. These countries are characterised by high spending 
for investment­related and compensatory social policies. In the Scandinavian 
countries the welfare state secures on a high level against existential life risks 
such as age or unemployment, but without neglecting however the investment­
related policies. 
2. The Anglo­Saxon countries, Switzerland and Norway form the second group. 
These countries are characterised by low spending for age and unemployment 
and low spending for investment­related social policies. With the exception of 
Switzerland and the United States all countries in this group spend more for 
investment­related compared to spending for compensatory social policies.
3. The third group is formed by the continental countries, Japan and the southern 
countries. These countries spend higher levels for compensatory social policies 
by neglecting investment­related social polices. For instance, Germany, Greece, 
Japan, Spain and Italy exhibit far lower levels of education spending than one 
might expect on the basis of their levels of social spending. 
Countries which spend more for investment­related social politics are the 
Scandinavian and at a lower spending level some Anglo­Saxon countries such New 
Zealand or the United Kingdom. In the Scandinavian countries education is, as 
similarly to Anglo­Saxon countries, regarded as part of welfare politics. In the 
Scandinavian countries the welfare state secures on a high level against existential 
life risks such as age or unemployment, but without neglecting however the 
investment­related policies.
The Anglo­Saxon and Scandinavian countries, which understand education as an 
integral component of the welfare politics, set more strongly on investment­related 
social politics, while the Continental European countries pursue more strongly 
compensatory social politics. In the sense of path dependence Heidenheimer argues 
(Heidenheimer, 1981: 269–271) that in the Anglo­Saxon countries the development of 
the education services was advanced in place of the development of the social security 
systems. Thus educational policy is seen as a “kind welfare state replacement” 
(Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003). As a consequence the constraint in welfare 
politics is compensated by the expansion of educational facilities. The welfare state  
in the Scandinavian countries in combination with broad learning opportunities is 
traced back by Jens Alber (1986: 6) to demands by the working class, which did not 
neglect the need of education contrary to their Continental European colleagues. 
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Figure 1. The nexus between the public expenditures for investment-related and compensatory 
social policies as a percentage of GDP 2005.
Source: retrieved April 2, 2009, from OECD, Social Expenditure Database and OECD (2009), Education at a 
Glance, Paris: OECD.
3.5. Social Expenditures in cash and in kind
For the expenditure profile of the welfare states the distinction between cash benefits 
(as for example via income transfers) and benefits in kind (as for example in the form 
of services) is crucial (Castles, 1998, Kohl, 1980: 313). In the welfare state literature 
the continental European welfare states are characterised as transfer­heavy and the 
Scandinavian countries as service­oriented. The role of services is often emphasised 
in the literature of the social investment state and of welfare reforms (Kautto, 2002, 
Daly and Lewis, 2000, Castles, 1998). A developed service infrastructure could better 
deal with the “new” challenges (Bonoli, 2007) such as new forms of employment and 
family structures, declining birth rates and long­term care. 
Table 4 informs to what extent the expenditures for cash and benefits in kind developed 
since the 1980s and whether catch­up processes for policy laggards can be identified. 
For investigating the public role in providing services to the elderly, the disabled and 
families, we exclude the expenditures for health, because health expenditure accounts 
for a large share of service investments (Kautto, 2002, OECD, 2007: 20).6
6.  The expenditures for cash benefits and benefits in kind include to the following categories: old age, survivors, incapacity 
related, family, active labour market programmes, unemployment, housing and other social policy areas.
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Table 4. Public Social Expenditures as cash and as kind benefits (without health)  
in per cent of GDP, 1980–2005.
Public Expenditures as Cash 
Benefits
Public Expenditures as 
Benefits in Kind
1980 2005 1980 2005
Australia 6,2 8,1 0,5 2,8
Austria 16,4 18,4 0,9 1,4
Belgium 18,0 16,2 0,3 1,8
Canada 5,7 6,8 2,9 2,6
Denmark 14,5 13,6 4,8 5,7
Finland 10,4 15,3 1,9 3,7
France 13,8 17,5 1,3 3,0
Germany 15,2 15,9 0,8 2,2
Greece 6,9 13,4 0,1 1,5
Ireland 8,6 8,4 1,2 1,2
Italy 12,2 16,7 0,3 0,9
Japan 5,5 10,2 0,5 1,8
Netherlands 17,8 11,1 1,4 2,5
New Zealand 11,3 9,7 0,1 1,5
Norway 9,6 10,9 2,4 4,3
Portugal 6,8 14,6 ,0 0,6
Spain 11,0 13,1 0,2 1,6
Sweden 13,9 14,5 5,0 6,8
Switzerland 9,5 11,8 0,5 1,7
United Kingdom 10,0 10,3 1,2 3,5
United States 8,5 8,0 0,9 0,8
Mean 11,04 12,6 1,3 2,47
Range 12,5 11,6 5,0 6,2
Standard Deviation 3,91 3,41 1,42 1,60
Variation Coefficient 0,35 0,27 1,09 0,65V
Catch­Up 
(1980–2005)
r = ­0.554** r = 0.001
Source: Retrieved April 2, 2009, from OECD, Social Expenditure Database. 
On average the levels of income transfers and as benefits in kind have increased since 
1980s – by 1.6 (cash benefits) and 1.2 (benefits in kind) percentage point of GDP. The 
average service/cash ratio (not shown in the table) increased from 0.11 to 0.2 and so 
the ratio shifted slightly towards services. 
First of all, there is no evidence for a “race to the bottom”. Only the Netherlands,  
New Zealand, Belgium, Denmark and the United States have reduced marginally 
their expenditures for cash benefits. In some countries the cash benefits have 
increased more than five percentage point as in Finland, France, Greece, Italy or 
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Japan. The last row in table 4 indicates a strong β­convergence. The correlation is 
negative and statistically significant, so the cross­national variation in spending 
growth for cash benefits is driven by catch­up process. The indicators for 
σ­convergence (range, standard deviation, variation coefficient) diminished for cash 
expenditures, but not for the benefits in kind. In the case of cash benefits the 
spending levels of the OECD countries have converged over the years, but for benefits 
in kind we have to consider a divergence of spending patterns. 
Compared to the OECD countries the traditional service oriented Scandinavian 
countries still spend the most for benefits in kind in 2005. But also the transfer­
heavy Continental and the Southern European States expanded their expenditures 
for benefits in kind. With the exception of Canada and the United States, in some of 
the Anglo­Saxon States such as Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom the 
expenditures for in­kind expenditures have increased since 1980. The finding by 
Kautto, who state “that with few exceptions relative service investments increased 
in Western Europe in the 1990s, contrary to the talk of welfare state retrenchment” 
(Kautto, 2002: 63) holds true for the whole period of 1980 to 2005.
In contrast to cash benefits, there is no evidence for a β­convergence for the benefits 
in kind. The correlation in the last row is positive and statistically insignificant, so 
the cross­national variation in spending growth for benefits in kind is not driven by 
catch­up process by policy laggards in services. Service laggards as in Continental 
and Southern Europe have expanded their spending for benefits in kind, but couldn’t 
close the gap to the Service oriented Scandinavian countries. 
In sum, the levels of income transfers increased since 1980. Only a few countries 
have frozen or reduced their transfer expenditure. But an ageing population, an 
emphasis on active rather than passive measures, increased labour­force 
participation among women and calls for gender equality have also resulted in more 
investment in services in the majority of the OECD member states.
IV Conclusion
For answering the question to what extent the welfare states in the OECD world have 
actually implement the social agenda of a “Social Investment State“, the chapter 
analysed in how far the paradigm of the social investment state find its expression in 
the social expenditure profile. Our findings are ambiguous. We find evidence for 
increasing levels for the public social expenditure rate and convergence processes.  
A “race to the bottom” in social expenditures cannot be confirmed. This holds also 
true for some of the various indicators of social expenditure. Since the 1980s mainly 
the expenditures for old­age insurances increased. On a lower initial spending level, 
the welfare states also expanded their public resources for families. In contrast to 
old­age insurance and families, the expenditures for active and passive labour 
market policies remain stable.
The results for education spending are puzzling. Although education plays in the 
debate of the Social Investment State an important role, on average public 
expenditures for education decreased since 1980. The perspective, that social 
policies should focus more on prevention and social investment than on 
compensating for social risks, find not its expression in increasing levels of education 
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spending. But here the division of labour between the state and the private sector  
in education funding is crucial. We have to consider a growing weight of private 
financial contributions. As the cases of Denmark, Sweden and Norway in 
comparisons with New Zealand and the United States demonstrate, a high level of 
total investment in education is not only possible with almost complete public 
education funding, but also under condition of substantial private engagement.
We also identify diverse spending priorities of different types of welfare states. The 
differences between the transfer­heavy Continental European welfare states and  
the service­oriented Scandinavian countries still holds true. But in sum, an ageing 
population, an emphasis on active rather than passive measures, increased labour­
force participation among women and calls for gender equality have resulted in more 
investment in services in the majority of the OECD member states since the 1980s. 
And here the traditional service­oriented Scandinavian countries are still the 
countries which spent most for benefits in kind. But Continental and Southern 
European countries have slightly catched up. There are still existence and continuity 
of qualitative differences between the OECD member states in their compensatory 
strategies and social investment strategies during the 1980s and 1990s, when 
comparing investment­related and compensatory social policies. We find mixed 
evidence to support claims, that welfare states are moving away from compensatory 
social policies towards a “rechannel of social expenditures toward social 
investment” (Palier, 2006: 114). Countries which spend more for investment­related 
social politics are the Scandinavian and at a lower spending level most of the Anglo­
Saxon countries. The Continental and Southern European Countries are still 
characterized by spending more for compensatory and less for investment­related 
social politics especially for the sphere of education.
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Part II. 
The Future of the Social Investment 
Strategy. Challenges for Europe in 
the Context of the Current Crisis
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Achievements and  
Non­achievements of the  
European Employment Strategy 
Kerstin Jacobsson 
The Lisbon Strategy as a Social Investment Strategy
The last decade has seen a new approach to social policy making in the EU. It has 
been novel both in its content and methodology. Arguably, we have seen the rise of  
a social investment perspective in EU social policy. 
The challenge for EU social policy has been, all along to try to ‘call the tune without 
paying the piper’ (Laura Cram). In addition to having very limited resources to spend 
on social initiatives, the EU has to respect the member state competence in the social 
field. The EU has only had the competence to make binding legislation in areas 
directly related to the market­making project, such as labour mobility, health and 
safety, and gender equality (non­discrimination). In other areas, the EU has been 
confined to soft policy instruments.
The Lisbon strategy from 2000 (and its predecessor the European Employment 
Strategy from 1997) includes a continuity that builds on soft policy instruments but 
change in that it attempts a ‘positive’ social agenda (not only as a side­effect of the 
market­building project) and a central guidance through the setting of EU objectives 
in a wide range of areas. The methodology is called open coordination, the main 
policy instruments being: setting of common objectives, national target­setting, 
progress reports, and country­specific recommendations in cyclical processes, 
sometimes coupled with financial incentive through the use of EU funds.
The Lisbon strategy aims to achieve the three objectives concurrently: growth, 
employment and social cohesion. A key notion has been the need to defend but renew 
the ‘European social model’ by investing in people and activating social policies. 
Another key idea has been to integrate social, employment and economic policy to  
be mutually reinforcing. Social policy is here seen as potentially ‘productive’ and 
positive synergies are emphasised. Social reforms can improve the dynamics of the 
economy by assisting in managing change while minimising negative social 
consequences. Investments in education and lifelong learning increase labour 
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mobility and thus flexibility. Active inclusion can reduce poverty as well as improve 
labour supply. Good healthcare systems are not only good for individuals’ well­being 
but can also improve labour supply and productivity etc. The role of labour market 
policy is to equip the labour force to face change, which requires active measures 
rather than passive maintenance support. The role of the state is to support the 
adjustment process (the enabling state). In its view on positive synergies and the 
need for investment in people, the Lisbon strategy qualifies as a social investment 
strategy (see Jenson chapter 1 this volume), although it also encompasses a 
deregulation agenda in its economic pillar.
The relaunch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 explicitly gave primacy to job creation 
and growth while talking less of combating social exclusion. It also placed emphasis 
on knowledge, innovation, optimisation of human capital, and enhanced skills of the 
labour force. The rationale seems again to have been a traditional trickle­down 
perspective, i.e. that growth will solve poverty and social exclusion. However, since 
the European Spring Council 2007, the social objectives have come to the front again 
and European Commission has launched a new social agenda (CEC 2008b). The 
Commission admitted that ‘Higher growth and more jobs have in themselves not 
been sufficient to achieve the hoped­for results in terms of poverty­reduction and 
improvement of the circumstances of the most vulnerable’(CEC 2008a: 4). 
In order to discuss the future of a social investment strategy in Europe, it is 
necessary to take stock of what has been achieved so far. This paper assesses the 
achievements and non­achievements of the European Employment Strategy (EES), 
with a particular focus on active labour market policy and ‘social investment’. Hence, 
it is necessary not only to look at the main policy ideas of Europe’s social investment 
strategy but also to assess its feasibility by looking at the concrete implementation in 
diverse country contexts (see also other chapters in this volume).
Towards a Policy Consensus …
There is an increasing consensus in research literature that the impact of the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC)/EES on concrete policy reforms is limited. The type 
of impact the OMC/EES has had is of a rather discursive or cognitive kind, shifting 
policy discourse and policy thinking, i.e. affecting problem perceptions, policy 
orientations and attention given to certain problems. The EES has helped to 
establish a wider notion of employment policy in member states with other policy 
traditions. Employment, after all, is not the sole concern of the labour market or 
even social ministry. Notably, the EES has contributed to shifts in policy orientation 
from a curative to an active and preventive approach, emphasising the need for active 
labour market measures, giving increased attention to female labour force 
participation as well as that of other groups who are not well­integrated into the 
labour market (young people, disabled, immigrants). The increased attention to 
employment rates, rather than levels of unemployment, has helped to widen the 
policy agenda in order to achieve higher levels of labour market participation, to 
include measures to reconcile work life and family life, such as improved childcare 
facilities. It has also placed other key issues on the agenda at EU level as well as in all 
member states: the need for pension reform and avoiding early retirement (active 
aging), tax reform to strengthen work incentives, measures to reconcile work and 
family life, lifelong learning, improved integration of education and employment 
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policy, gender mainstreaming, flexicurity (combining and balancing flexibility with 
security). The social OMC has helped to establish social exclusion as a multi­
dimensional concept (not just a matter of income poverty), emphasised ‘active 
inclusion’ and helped to place child poverty as an issue on the agenda in all member 
states. These changes are well in line with a social investment strategy (see Jenson 
chapter 1 this volume).
… Including also the OECD …
There is now a broad policy consensus around these concepts and policy 
orientations, even if there are differences in the way they are operationalised. Also, 
the OECD has increasingly embraced a social investment perspective in its social 
policy, family policy (see Jenson chapter 1 this volume; Deacon and Kaasch 2008, 
Mahon 2008) and most recently, labour market policy. In its restated Jobs Strategy 
of 2006 (OECD 2006a, 2006b), the OECD has moved along way from deregulation 
towards flexicurity, as compared to the initial Jobs Strategy based on the Jobs Study 
of 1994 (Jacobsson and Noaksson 2009). The OECD has reconsidered the role of 
active labour market policies (ALMP), claiming that properly designed policies can 
reduce unemployment, that ALMP cushions the income losses from unemployment 
and facilitates efficient job matching. Previously, ALMP was often seen as a waste of 
resources. (Put in OECD wording, the 1994 Jobs Study ‘de­emphasised resource 
shifts from passive to active measures as an indicator of reform’.) The OECD now 
says that relatively high employment benefits can work if the obligations for active 
job search for the unemployed also increase. ALMP is said to provide work 
experience and enhance the skills of the participants and trained workers benefit 
from more secure employment prospects. The OECD has also made a u­turn 
concerning its views on collective bargaining and minimum wages. Moreover, the 
OECD notes that the effect of Employment Protection Legislation on overall 
unemployment is probably small. In the Jobs Study of 1994, EPL was supposed to be 
a source of unemployment. Moreover, the OECD now wishes to see flexible and 
family­friendly working time arrangements, acknowledging evidence that there is 
significantly less conflict between work and family life if workers have some control 
over their working hours. The Jobs Study of 1994 promoted flexible working time 
arrangements adapted primarily to the needs of companies. (The ambition to find 
ways to promote a reconciliation of work and family life is even more explicit in 
OECD’s Babies and Bosses project, see Mahon 2008). The real continuity between 
the Jobs Study of 1994 and the restated strategy of 2006 is on labour taxation. The 
discourse change on labour market policy can be explained by the larger role played 
by DELSA (Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs) and not the 
Economics Department at OECD as compared to the Jobs Study of 1994, but also by 
the fact that the review of existing research did not support the deregulation agenda 
that the OECD had pursued for decades. The OECD has explicitly abandoned the one 
size fits all approach and argues that any reform strategy must depart from the 
institutional context in the country as well as the predominant social and political 
values there.
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… While not a Total Consensus …
The restated OECD Jobs Strategy even makes references to demand­side aspects, 
such as noting that relatively high levels of benefits help maintaining consumer 
demand. But basically, it is a supply­side perspective, albeit one that is broader than 
the traditional ‘make work pay’ logic. There are many factors that can improve 
labour supply, such as good family policies. In the research literature, this 
perspective is sometimes called ‘inclusive liberalism’ (Craig and Porter 2004; Mahon 
2008) a perspective coming close to what is here called a social investment agenda. 
‘Inclusive liberalism’ aims at equality of opportunity over a life­course cycle, and 
optimisation of individual capacities. It differs from traditional Social Democratic 
politics, which stress equality of income, redistribution policies, and places less 
responsibility on the individual for her unemployment. ‘Inclusive liberalism’ sees 
public spending as acceptable but it should be designed as to ‘pay off’ later on. It is 
usually not connected to an increase in public spending, but rather redirection and 
increased efficiency.
The EU discourse has arguably also entailed redefinitions of key concepts, such  
as security, flexibility, employability. Shifts in problem understandings have been 
noted ‘from lack of employment to lack of employability’, ‘from job security to 
employability security’, ‘security through skills’ rather than security from job 
protection legislation, a redefinition of equality into ‘dynamic equality’ or ‘equality 
through mobility’, etc. (Jacobsson 2004). How the balance between flexibility and 
security should be struck is open for contestation. Different member governments 
may place themselves differently on the scale social democracy – ‘inclusive 
liberalism’. With the emphasis in the relaunched Lisbon strategy of 2005 on 
‘national ownership’ and given that the national context should be taken into 
account and a one size fits all approach avoided, it is clear that the EES/Lisbon 
strategy is not one reform agenda but many.
Impact on Governance and Policymaking Arrangements
Apart from placing issues on the agenda, the EES has institutionalised a reflective 
element in employment policy, as well as added a European dimension to the 
previously national policymaking. Member governments continuously have to 
reflect on their policies in the light of the common framework. Shortcomings in 
current policy are collectively identified and awareness of policy options increased. 
At a minimum, governments must be prepared to argue for, and try to explain to 
others, their own policy line. 
The impact of the EES in the member states is most obvious on governance and 
policymaking arrangements:
• The EES has generally improved inter­ministerial coordination and facilitated links 
between related policy areas at both European and national level. 
• The EES has fostered vertical coordination, even if the integration of lower levels of 
governance still can be improved in many countries. This is particularly important in 
systems with a considerable autonomy for lower levels. Lack of systematic integration of 
lower levels is a severe limitation, since municipalities and/or local state agencies often 
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are instrumental in labour market policy implementation, which is decentralized in many 
countries. The same is true for social inclusion policies.
• The EES has largely developed as a trans­governmental process, sometimes ‘insulated’ 
and detached from the day to day domestic labour market policymaking. Transnational 
exchanges between national administrations have intensified and are reported to be 
valuable. However, this network­building is mostly limited to small sections of national 
ministries and governmental agencies. Knowledge about the EES is not always well 
diffused in the national or sub­national labour market administration. There are not 
effective mechanisms for spreading learning within expert networks to the domestic 
policymaking and implementation. 
• There have been calls for better involvement of national parliaments in the EES/Lisbon 
strategy, but so far the role of national parliaments is formal and passive. The reform 
programs need to be coordinated with the budgetary processes, and national target­
setting needs to be combined with budgetary allocations.
• The action plans or strategy reports seldom play an operational and guiding role in 
domestic policymaking but are governments’ reports for an international audience.
• The low policy relevance of these documents has also reduced the interest of the social 
partners in continuing to participate actively in their production. Often understaffed, 
they have to economize their resources and may choose to give priority to national policy 
initiatives, which are perceived to be more important. Nevertheless, the EES has helped 
to encourage social partnership in countries where this tradition was not so strong. 
Moreover, the OMC on social inclusion has provided avenues of access to policymaking 
and voice for social NGOs.
• The EES has contributed to the professionalisation of labour market administration, 
by initiating reform of Public Employment Services as well as emphasising the need 
for performance indicators and improved statistics. There is an increased emphasis on 
monitoring and evaluation of policies. 
The EES Has not (Yet) Achieved its Goals
While there are examples of policy change (equal gender opportunities, 
abandonment of early retirement schemes, prevention and activation policies,  
a better work/family balance, employment­friendly taxation, more child care 
facilities), few scholars would claim that the EES/OMC has been very effective in 
driving policy reform. It has encouraged reforms that were already under way or well 
in line with present policy rather than led to reforms that would break with the 
policy past.
As to outcomes, the EES/Lisbon strategy has not achieved its goals. There has been 
an increase in the overall employment rate, from 63.4 per cent in 2000 to 67 per cent 
in 2007, and a decline in unemployment rate (from 3.4 per cent in 2000 to 2.8 per 
cent in 2007). However, the higher employment rates have not had a significant 
impact on poverty. There has been no significant decline in people living at risk of 
poverty in the Union since 2000. There has been an increase in income inequality in 
many countries. In 2005, 16 per cent of the EU–25 citizens lived under the poverty 
line threshold defined as 60 per cent of their country’s median income. For children, 
the rate living under the risk of poverty is 19 per cent. In 2007, 9.3 per cent of the 
EU–27 working age adults (aged 18–59, not students) lived in jobless households.  
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The rate has not improved since 2000, despite the general increase in employment 
rate. Moreover, in­work poverty has increased over the last ten years, as a result of 
factors such as an increase in precarious employment, low wages and low work 
intensity of families (8 per cent of those working count as working poor). In many 
countries, the general increase in employment rates has not benefitted those families 
furthest away from the labour market. Inequalities in health also persist as do 
regional disparities (EAPN 2007; CEC 2008c).
Some observers, like the European Anti Poverty Network (2007), conclude that 
governments still see spending on social protection as ‘unproductive’, while seeing 
spending on R&D, physical infrastructure, environmentally friendly technologies, 
human capital and technologies as ‘productive’. While both the EU and the OECD 
nowadays acknowledge that providing decent incomes for people outside of work 
enables them to participate as consumers as well as active citizens, this is not how 
governments prioritize. 
Moreover, the discourse of activation is not reflected in the actual expenditure 
patterns. Active labour market policy spending has decreased since 2000 in many 
countries, like France, Sweden and Britain, and in others there has not been a 
substantive increase in active spending. There has been a general increase in 
employment rates but seemingly mostly due to other factors than activation policies 
(in some countries, i.e. Southern Europe, enhanced labour market flexibility through 
increase in precarious contracts). There has, however, been a general increase in 
adults participating in lifelong learning since 2000.
In a recent review of the implementation of the EES, Caroline de la Porte (2008) 
concluded that domestic policy processes, based on past legacies, is what determine 
policy decisions. The OMC by itself is too weak an instrument to have a real impact. 
Even if the OMC has been used to extend key notions of employment and anti­
poverty policy, it has not induced major reform programmes. Reform agendas are 
more likely to have a substantial impact when they are designed to respond to major 
problems or crises (e.g. economic recessions: Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, and 
Spain). It seems that reform and learning tend to be driven by policy failure and 
encompassing reforms tend to be easier to implement in times of crisis. (Maybe even 
the current economic crisis will be such a ‘window of opportunity’?) It is probably 
also true that we can expect incremental change from the EES as a consequence of 
the impact on policy perceptions and discourses above. 
EES and Enlargement
With the EU now consisting of 27 member states, it is also necessary to look at the 
feasibility of a social investment strategy in the new member states. So far, this has 
been given little scholarly attention. I will assess here the implementation of the EES 
in new member states.1
With regard to content the EES is highly appropriate also for the newcomers, as 
many of the labour market challenges there are the same as in EU–15, such as the 
need to increase activity rates, deal with ageing populations (and low birth rates), 
1.  I draw here mainly on my own research on the Baltics States and a colleague’s work on Poland (see our chapters in Heidenreich 
and Zeitlin 2009). 
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integrate ethnic minorities, and to foster lifelong learning. In addition, worker skills 
are often outdated, resulting in a mismatch between labour supply and demand. The 
low level of entrepreneurship and individual initiative, particularly among older 
workers, is also a problem. The problem is sometimes compounded by the fact that 
the vocational education systems are in need of reform. 
In the new member states the EES has to be implemented in a very different context 
than in the EU–15:
•  A general problem is the weakness of industrial relations: While the legislative framework 
and tripartite structures for social dialogue are in place, the social partners’ weak 
organizational capabilities are a factor constraining the development of real social 
dialogue. In particular, bipartite dialogue is very weak. (Social dialogue is particularly 
weak on sectoral and workplace levels.) The trade unions lack the ability to actively 
negotiate, both due to lack of resources and to the fact that they represent a minority of 
workers, partly due to the illegitimacy of the trade unions from the state socialist time. 
(For instance, the level of trade union membership in the Baltic States is 10–15 per cent 
of workers.) Also the employers’ organisations suffer from low membership. Coverage of 
collective agreements is low in many countries. (For instance, some years ago less than 
20 per cent of workers in Latvia and Lithuania were covered by collective agreements. 
In Estonia, such agreements were almost nonexistent.) The social partners in the new 
member states are not ‘fit’ or likely to play an active role in implementing the EES agenda, 
for instance concerning lifelong learning/vocational training (Woolfson 2008). The 
general imbalance of power between trade unions and employers in the new member 
states just adds to this.
• The social partners have other priorities than being engaged in the EES. The trade unions 
are mainly concerned with salaries. The employers tend to have a short­term perspective 
or feel that their interests are already taken care of by the governments. Contrary to the 
EU–15, the social partners in the new member states have mostly not used the EES as a 
bargaining chip to gain more say in labour market affairs. 
 
• In some of the new member states, such as the Baltic States, there has been little domestic 
pressure for active labour market policy and social policy in general. An individualised 
problem perception has been prevalent saying basically that individuals should be 
able to solve their own problems. ‘The general conception was that there are enough 
job vacancies, everyone should be able to fill the vacancies or get the job without any 
mediation. So it was more like one has to survive on one’s own’ (interview, Estonian 
Labour Market Board, 2004). An interviewed official at the Office of the Prime Minister 
in Lithuania wondered whether or not ‘we have enough national capacity to [make 
additional reforms] without pressure from Brussels … and whether or not social policy 
can be reformed without additional external pressure’ (interview, 2004). Possibly the 
current economic crisis has changed that, with more public pressure for improved life­
conditions for those worst­off. However, in order to transform social concerns of people 
into policy decisions, political parties are needed, which are responsive to such issues. 
Political parties in many of the new member states represent a different cleavage structure 
than parties in Western Europe, and are not as likely to actively pursue the social 
investment agenda (i.e. are organised around other dimensions than class and the left/­
right distinction, such as rural/urban, religious/secular, nationalism/internationalism, 
the ethnic cleavage, etc.) It is hard to fulfil European objectives if domestic actors are not 
prepared to make active use of the European strategy in the national context. Woolfson 
(2006) points to a lack of policy ‘reform fit’ between a ‘European social model’ and the 
domestic agendas dominated by ‘business friendly’ free market considerations in many 
of the new member states. He draws the conclusion that even the support for health and 
safety and a good working environment among political elites is limited.
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• The levels of social and unemployment benefits are extremely low in many countries.  
For example, Estonia’s main unemployment benefit is the state unemployment allowance, 
which is available to all registered unemployed people.2 In 2004, the allowance was only 
approximately 16 per cent of the minimum wage (EEK 400/EUR 26), actually lower than 
the state subsistence benefit of EEK 500/EUR 32. Because the allowance is so small, most 
recipients must also apply for the state subsistence benefit. Extremely low benefit levels 
discourage individuals from registering at public employment offices, contributing to the 
persistence of a shadow economy, which in turn reduces state revenues.
• The new member states suffer from poor working conditions, low wages, regional 
disparities (between urban and rural areas) and income inequalities.
• While the new member states still were candidate countries there was a chronic 
underfunding of labour market programmes, which was a priority of policymakers. Public 
resources to spend have been, and still are, limited. Access to the ESF and other EU funds 
has been a watershed for the new member states, and has increased the amount spent on 
active labour market policy. A civil servant in the Estonian Labour Market Board stated 
that they meet whatever regulations they have to ‘because we desperately need the money’ 
(interview, 2004). The ESF has also increased the interest of the ministries of finance. 
Nevertheless, the active spending is still very low in many countries for instance in 
Estonia (0.05 per cent of GDP as compared to the EU–27 average of 0.51 per cent in 2006).
• My study of the Baltic States showed that soft governance mechanisms, such as advice and 
monitoring, are most effective when systematically coupled with harder incentives. The 
prospect of full membership combined with the opportunity of funding through the ESF 
provided the motivation to build up the institutional capacity necessary to implement 
the EES (forthcoming, Jacobsson and West 2010). Economic dependence increases the 
likelihood of impact from the EES, as is clear also from Spain and Portugal. More resources 
from EU funds are needed for the new member states, coupled with co­funding requirement. 
• The impact of the EES in the new member states is visible at the level of public 
administration. For many of the post­socialist countries labour market policy was an 
entirely new field at the beginning of the 1990s, since unemployment did not officially 
exist under the former regime and the state guaranteed all citizens a job. When the post­
independence social security systems were built, employment policy was often placed 
under large social ministries, responsible for everything from welfare to health. Health and 
pensions generally received priority, while employment policy was often the last item on the 
social ‘to do’ list. Gradually, labour market policy has gained more autonomy as a policy field. 
Although struggling with lack of experience in the policy field, understaffing, staff retention 
etc, administrative competence has gradually been built up (thanks to EU support). 
• Although there have been programs against unemployment since mid­1990s in, for 
instance, the Baltic States and Poland, these were mostly declarations of intent, with 
measures poorly developed and underfinanced. Decisions were often based on political 
priorities, with little focus on implementation and follow­up. There is, as a consequence of 
the EES, an increased emphasis on monitoring, evaluation, and implementation, including 
the use of indicators and targets. The EU has also helped to modernise the public 
employment services. Moreover, the EES has led to an increased focus on active labour 
market policies and reform of vocational education and systems of lifelong learning; as 
well as moves to decentralise at least some elements of employment policy making. 
• Municipalities and local authorities, which are strategic actors in the work against 
unemployment and social exclusion, are little involved and are not well equipped for the 
task. (The build up of administrative competence has been done mainly at the central 
level although there have also been initiatives to increase local administrative capacity 
2.  The state unemployment allowance was introduced in 1999. A second, contribution­based, unemployment insurance was 
introduced in 2003, but many of the unemployed lack the necessary insurance eligibility period for that benefit.
127
to prepare local agencies for ESF funding.) In general, local authorities lack time and 
necessary resources to participate actively in the EES. Most efforts are focused on day 
to day tasks (including basic education, social services, primary health care, housing, 
utilities such as water supply and sewage, public transport and road maintenance). There 
are examples though, of the production of local and regional employment plans.
In summary the model inherent in the EES, where social partners and also local 
authorities are expected to play an important role in implementation, does not fit well 
with the situation in the new member states, due to the weakness of the social partners 
and the lack of resources at a local level. Add to this political elites that do not prioritise 
‘social investments’ nor feel the need to handle short­term issues rather than making 
long­term investments. For candidate countries the membership conditionality 
guaranteed giving some attention towards implementing the social acquis. This 
pressure is no longer there … given the low political support and the weakness of 
industrial relations, pressure from the EU, coupled with financial incentives, is 
probably necessary for any substantive change to come about. With the financial crisis 
of 2008­9, there are reverse tendencies with cuts in social spending, for instance in the 
Baltic States. (This has even been encouraged by IMF and foreign governments.)
An Implementation Deficit …
The EES suffers from an implementation deficit as do other organisations working 
with soft governance instruments. The OECD Jobs Strategy has been even less 
effective when it comes to inducing concrete policy reform even if the OECD has no 
doubt been an important developer and diffuser of policy discourse. Compared to  
the OECD Jobs Strategy the EES/Lisbon strategy has some important advantages:  
1) it encompasses a strategy for implementation while the OECD leaves ‘politics’/
implementation to the member states and 2) involvement of, and negotiation with, 
stakeholders. The EU should use its ‘comparative advantage’ and improve 
integration of the EU processes in the member states (in relation to parliaments, 
political parties, social partners, local authorities etc). Since governments can take 
the role as ‘gatekeepers’ playing a two­level game (one in relation to Brussels, one in 
relation to the domestic audience), it is essential that the EU strategies reach out to 
domestic actors and publics. Contrary to the OECD, the EU also has financial 
incentives in its arsenal of policy instrument, although its resources are limited.
Tensions in the OMC Approach
Soft governance methods presume a ‘community of the willing’. Arguably, the 
Lisbon approach and its belief in positive synergies underestimates the conflicts of 
interests involved: short­term vs. long­term interests, finance vs. social ministries, 
employers vs. employees, etc. Moreover, investment requires money. Who is to pay? 
For the individual company it may seem more rational to improve competitiveness 
by dismissals than by investments in the labour force. Pressure on the unemployed 
to accept unskilled and unrewarding jobs in the short term may be detrimental to 
productivity in the longer run. Should resources and efforts go equally to achieving 
economic dynamisms and social justice, or does one achieve the other? Harmonious 
relationships between macro­economic, fiscal and social policy are postulated. 
Arguably, the Lisbon strategy seeks to formulate a social policy vision, which does 
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not compete with economic policy aims. But do current macro­economic and fiscal 
policy frameworks sufficiently allow for productive spending? The current crisis may 
also cast doubt that governments really see social spending as productive, relative to 
other investments.
Moreover, there are a number of inherent tensions and ambiguities in the OMC 
approach. 1) A tension between the OMC as a transgovernmental process, with 
governments as the relevant actors and gatekeepers in relation to other interests, 
and the OMC as a wider mobilisation process. 2) A tension between employment and 
social policy as a matter of national concern and the perceived need to develop a joint 
and coordinated strategy. 3) A tension between market making (deregulation) vs. 
social investment and between competition enhancing actions vs. social rights. 
(While the market can provide chances it does not guarantee effective opportunities 
or rights.) 4) A tension between a top­down type of learning and a voluntary lesson­
drawing type of learning plus the related tension between the striving for 
convergence vs. acknowledgement of diversity and an acceptance of national 
differences and priorities (this is sometimes framed as decontextualised vs. 
contextualised learning). 5) A tension between the OMC as a technocratic top­down 
strategy, where policy is made at European level and supposed to be implemented by 
actors in the member states and the OMC as a process of political opinion­formation, 
where support must be built up from within the member states. Related to this is the 
role of other actors: constructive contributors to, or mere implementers of, EU 
policy? National competence as well as the autonomy of the social partners and 
sometimes autonomy of local and regional levels of governance set limits for a 
top­down strategy. The OMC cannot force but have to mobilise domestic actors.
How to Improve Implementation of the EES?
• Allocate more funding from the EU structural funds, for instance to innovative ALMP.  
Use the EU programs strategically to reach the Lisbon goals.
• Reallocate funding from the structural funds to member states that comply with
 country­specific recommendations.
• Require participants in learning networks to present strategies for diffusion of acquired 
knowledge and experiences to the regular work at agencies, municipalities, PES etc. EU­
funded projects risk being ‘islands’ in relation to the regular work.
• Improve mobilisation and integration of domestic actors, not least municipalities and local 
authorities. Strengthen incentives for them to participate in the EES. In the new member 
states, make resources available for their participation. Provide financial support for local 
networks and exchanges.
• Improve consultation with social partners and other stakeholders. Increase incentives for 
social partners in countries where social partnership is weak.
• Involve national parliaments actively and encourage coordination of budgetary processes 
and EU processes.
• Encourage national target­setting and specification of budgetary allocations for 
implementation.
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For the EES/OMC to have any impact it must be actively used by domestic actors.
In the relaunched Lisbon strategy, the different national contexts are emphasised 
and national target­setting is encouraged. The idea is also presented that national 
targets can be part of a differentiation along pathways, making its possible for groups 
of countries with a similar situation and problems, to work together. That might be a 
good idea given the differences in context, not only between different welfare models 
but also between Eastern and Western Europe.
References
CEC [Commission of the European Communities] (2008a) ‘A renewed commitment to social 
Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion’, COM2008: 418 final.
CEC [Commission of the European Communities] (2008b) ‘Renewed social agenda: 
Opportunities, access and solidarity in 21st century Europe’, COM2008: 412 final.
CEC [Commission of the European Communities] 2008c ‘Commission staff working document. 
Impact assessment’, SEC(2008)2169.
Craig, David and Doug Porter (2004) ‘The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty reduction and 
social inclusion strategies in the rise of ’inclusive liberalism’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 11(2): 387–423.
Deacon, B. and A. Kaasch (2008) ‘Social and Health Policy: Neo­liberal stalking horse or balancer 
of social and economic objectives’, in Rianne Mahon and Stephen McBride (eds.) The OECD and 
Transnational Governance, Vancouver; UBC Press.
De la Porte, Caroline (2008) ‘The European Level Development and National Level Influence  
of the Open Method of Coordination: The Cases of Employment and Social Inclusion’, Florence; 
European University Institute, doctoral dissertation.
EAPN (2007) ‘Strengthening the social dimension of the Lisbon strategy. Proposals from the 
European Anti­Poverty Network’.
Heidenreich, Martin and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.) (2009) Changing European Employment and 
Welfare Regimes: The Influence of the Open Method of Coordination on National Reforms, London; 
Routledge.
Jacobsson, Kerstin (2004) ‘A European Politics for Employability. The Political Discourse on 
Employability of the EU and the OECD’, in: Christina Garsten and Kerstin Jacobsson (eds.) 
Learning to be Employable: New Agendas on Work, Responsibility and Learning in a Globalizing 
World, Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan: 42–62.
Jacobsson, Kerstin and Niklas Noaksson (2009) ‘From deregulation to flexicurity. The makeover 
of the OECD Jobs Strategy’, in: Martens, Kerstin and Anja Jakobi (eds.) Mechanisms of OECD 
Governance. International Incentives for National Policy Making?, book manuscript.
Jacobsson, Kerstin and Åsa Vifell (2007) ‘New Governance Structures in Employment Policy 
Making? Loose Co­ordination in Action’, in: Ingo Linsenmann, Christoph Meyer and Wolfgang 
Wessels (eds.) Economic Government of the EU: A balance sheet of new modes of policy coordination, 
Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan.
Jacobsson, Kerstin and Charlotte West (2010) ‘Europeanization of labour policy making in the 
Baltic States’, in: Bengt Jacobsson (ed.) The European Union and the Baltic States: Changing 
Forms of Governance, London; Routledge.
130
Mahon, Rianne (2008) ‘Babies and Bosses: Gendering the OECD’s social policy discourse’, in: 
Rianne Mahon and Stephen McBride (eds.) The OECD and Transnational Governance, Vancouver; 
UBC Press.
OECD (2006a) Employment Outlook: Boosting Jobs and Incomes, Paris; OECD.
OECD (2006b) Boosting Jobs and Incomes: Policy Lessons from Reassessing the OECD Jobs 
Strategy, Paris; OECD.
Palpant, Catherine (2006) European Employment Strategy. An Instrument of Convergence for 
the New Member States?, Policy Paper no. 18, Paris: Notre Europe.
Zeitlin, Jonathan and Philippe Pochet, with Lars Magnusson (eds.) (2005) The Open Method of 
Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels; PIE 
Peter Lang.
Woolfson, Charles (2006) ‘Working environment and “soft law” in the post­communist 
countries’, Journal of Common Market Studies: 44(1): 195–215.
Woolfson, Charles (2008) ‘Social dialogue and lifelong learning in new EU member states: 
“reform fit” in Latvia’, Journal of European Social Policy: 18(1): 79–87.
131
The Future Needs for Social 
Investment in Ageing Populations: 
Sweden as a Pilot Case
Thomas Lindh
‘There is a time to sow and there is a time to reap. There is a time to store and there is  
a time to eat the stores. Now is the time to sow and eat.’
European Diversity and Opportunities for Social Investment
Ageing European populations have raised concerns about the sustainability  
of current welfare systems. While the concern is well motivated, the doomsday 
prophecies predicting an end to social welfare as we know it are vastly exaggerated. 
True enough, economic growth will wane and the support ratio for elderly care and 
welfare will diminish. But most of the pressure from an elderly population will not 
come within the next decade and for most European countries not until well into 
the 2030s or even the 2040s. There is plenty of time to prepare for a rational 
adaptation to the situation. Some adaptations require very long run investments, 
however, that have to be financed right now. But even with growth rates of the real 
economy of a paltry one percent per capita this means an increase of more than 22 
per cent in an already comfortable standard of living after 20 years. To make such a 
figure comprehensible, consider that such an increase in GDP/capita in, for example, 
Germany represents more than the total GDP/capita of Albania 2008 or of West 
Germany and Finland in 1950. It is a quite substantial increase in resources per 
capita and far from any catastrophe scenario. Starting from a rather comfortable 
level of income per capita today the problem of ageing is not the average level of 
income. Nor is it a problem of lack of resources, but of the fact that there will be 
fewer active income earners relative to the non­active population, hence a need  
for increased redistribution of resources across generations. This will be further 
discussed in the first section below.
The current crisis tends to make policy makers even more myopic than they 
normally are and may very well lead to short­sighted decisions that undermine the 
opportunities to safeguard the welfare systems by a well informed productive social 
policy. As underlined by Joakim Palme in the last chapter, massive investment in the 
future tax base of the European Union is needed and the financial crisis risk to divert 
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substantial resources to emergency support for banks and automobile industries. 
Sweden has operated a pilot case of policy around ageing resulting in, for example, 
the early pension reform in 1994, although not because the baby boomers of the 
1940s have retired. In fact, many of them are still working and labour force 
participation between 60–65 years old is among the highest in the world. But the 
boomers came onto the labour market as the large cohorts born before World War  
I were retiring. That made Sweden the country with the largest proportion of 65+  
in the world for much of the 1960s up to the 1980s. The boomers helped not only to 
support this ageing population but to substantially increase the welfare for it by 
contributing to the then new ATP system both for themselves and their parents. 
Extensive labour immigration in the 1950s and 1960s with labour force participation 
rates that exceeded even those of the native population added to the tax base, making 
it possible to substantially increase social welfare in many different dimensions in 
the 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, education was reformed and made 
accessible to many more people than before. 
Later in the 1970s and 1980s a vast expansion of health care and elderly care also 
became possible within the tax revenue generated by the much better educated 
cohorts which were born in the 1940s and greatly aided by a quick expansion of 
female labour supply. Without the expansion of the education system to harbour the 
boomers the tax revenue would have been substantially less. Thus the investment in 
the boomers was crucial to the welfare enhancement for the elderly. This view of the 
historical experience will be elaborated in section two.
As the boomers now retire, Sweden and its social policy must again adapt to a similar 
situation as in the early 1970s. Although the concept of social investment, as 
elaborated by Jane Jensen in the first chapter, was not defined in the 1970s many of 
the aims and actions of that time were in the same vein. After the deregulation of the 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s, it is now up to our Swedish politicians whether we 
act as warning beacon for other European countries or serve as an example. Will 
Sweden be an example of how a productive social policy can not only avoid future 
problems but at the same time solve a number of current social problems like the 
integration of immigrants, gender discrimination and youth unemployment? 
The celebrated pension reform, seen as a model for many other countries, is now 
facing its first serious crisis by releasing the ‘brake’, i.e. the financial solvency rule 
guaranteeing the financial integrity of the system. The buffer funds in the system 
have suffered depletion in the financial crisis such that lowering pensions has 
become necessary to preserve long­run financial sustainability. Next year, 2010, is 
election year and there is now frantic activity to redesign the system in order to avoid 
a cut in pension benefits of around 4–5 per cent. As the brake was introduced 
everybody was assured that the likelihood of such an event was so highly improbable 
as to be negligible. But financial crises occur now and then within the lifespan of a 
generation and serve as a warning on relying too heavily on capital markets to 
transfer resources across the life cycle.
At the same time the young boomers born around 1990 are starting to fill up a higher 
education system that has been shrinking and where large amounts of staff are on 
the verge of retirement. Other boomers try to become established in a labour market 
where both public and private employers are cutting back and are unlikely to be 
recruiting again any time soon. The age at which 75 per cent of a cohort has become 
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established in the labour market increased over the 1990s from 23 years to 28 or 29. 
This was partly due to higher enrolment in higher education, an investment for the 
future, but also partly due to a swelling of the ranks of long­term unemployed 
youngsters, undermining the future impact of the investment by marginalising  
large groups early in life, especially second generation immigrants.
A new baby boom has been taking place since 2000 and now fills the day­care centres 
and will soon require expansion of the school system again. The strain on the 
government budget would be hard even within normal economic activity. Starting 
from budget deficits in the wake of the financial crisis there is clearly a danger that 
short­sightedness will drain the resources needed for aiding young people’s 
education, labour market experience and most likely also loom large over their 
housing prospects and family formation ambitions. The retirement of the baby 
boomers is at the same time slowly draining the tax base for state income taxes and 
capital taxes. The current demographic situation and its likely repercussions on the 
economy will be the subject of the third section.
Further on the horizon looms the need for elderly care and health care for the 
now­retiring boomers some time in the 2020s. The intergenerational transfer and 
care systems for the elderly are in Sweden almost exclusively administered through 
the public welfare institutions. It is of paramount importance for the future welfare 
state in Sweden that the social investment is not forgetting the generation who is 
expected to finance the elderly care and the pay­as­you­go pension system in the 
2020s and onwards. In other European systems the strain of elderly will also 
increase but depending on the design the pressure may be hidden. In family reliance 
systems it is often assumed that one child can take care of elderly parents as well as 
two or more could in the old days, but the resource base for family care has eroded 
heavily in almost all countries. The repercussions on the female labour supply, 
because it will be females mainly who provide family care, will then further 
undermine the tax base for other social policies. In funded systems long­run returns 
within the country will wither as the labour force shrinks and domestic asset 
demand falters with diminishing aggregate saving. Only risky investment in 
developing countries provides a vent for these systems.
Sweden has now, somewhat ahead of other European nations, come to a critical 
juncture where competing resource demands must reach a new balance in the midst 
of crisis. The current government has learned from the crisis in the 1990s and their 
Social Democrat predecessor to be cautious with the public budget. Former Prime 
Minister Göran Persson’s dictum ‘Whoever is in debt is not free’ has become the 
creed of the new right­wing government also.
Unfortunately that is exactly the wrong lesson for the current crisis. The crisis in the 
beginning of the 1990s was a home brewed crisis in a more favourable demographic 
situation. Yet it turned out that the burden of establishing a working balance again 
was borne mainly by young adults, low­skilled labour, immigrants and families with 
children. In a situation where a baby boom is entering the labour market and another 
is withdrawing tight fiscal policies is a recipe that jeopardises our welfare for decades 
to come; increasing inequality, decreasing potential future growth and undermining 
the sustainability of both the pension system and the public budget by shrinking the 
future tax base. In the fourth and concluding section some of the crucial policy 
choices to be made will be discussed.
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European Ageing and Prospects
There is a general awareness now, both within the EU Commission and most of its 
member states as well as in the Russian Federation and other countries outside the 
Union, that Europe is ageing and that this will put pressure on pension systems, 
elderly care, and in general the social welfare system. In the media this is frequently 
turned into a major catastrophe that makes the dismantling of the welfare state a 
historic necessity, a conclusion that for ideological reasons sounds quite sympathetic 
to the ears of some people. In evaluating these claims we should first of all recall that 
‘crying wolf’ in order to obtain a short­run benefit before the wolf has actually shown 
up is in general a very dangerous strategy. In this particular case it is important to 
make three observations: 
(1) In fact, ageing is a slow inertial process which we can predict much better than we can 
predict, for example, climate change. It does not require hasty panic measures but 
well debated, deliberated and contemplated long­run reforms of social policies. At the 
same time some windows of opportunity have already opened and others will open in 
the future while others have already closed. So focus must be on the windows that are 
currently open.
(2) While all of Europe is ageing, it is ageing at different rates. This is due partly to different 
institutions and partly to demographic path dependence. Maximum pressures as well as 
windows of opportunity will come at different times for the European countries and the 
mix of measures required to adapt will be institution­specific and thus must necessarily 
differ across countries.
(3) Any ageing country will need to adapt its transfer system no matter whether this 
today relies on public intergenerational transfers, private family transfers or transfers 
mediated by the capital markets. The set of adaptations that is appropriate and 
permissible will differ but keeping status quo is in no case an option that is available.
In Figure 1 below, the ageing of Europe is illustrated in some EU countries by the 
development since 1980 of the population share above 64. This is commonly taken  
as the definition of how old a country is. According to this definition Sweden ranked 
oldest in the late part of the past century but has been replaced by Italy which is 
currently being caught up by Germany. According to the UN forecasts Italy will, 
however, take the lead again until caught up by Germany again in the late 2030s. 
Most other countries are projected to converge to a share of 65+ between 20 and 25 
per cent of the population around 2030, except Ireland who is way behind in its 
ageing process. It is easy to see that although all countries are ageing, the speed and 
variation in the process is quite considerable, suggesting that different countries will 
tend to feel the need for action at rather different points in time. Their fiscal 
resources will also vary in an uncoordinated way.
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Figure 1. Estimates and projections of the population share 65 years old and above. 
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While 65 and above is a conventional marker of retirement ages, the average age  
of retirement in fact varies quite a lot, being in general lower in the countries of 
Southern Europe. In an international project to map the intergenerational transfer 
flows (National Transfer Accounts, see www.ntaccounts.org to get more 
information) it is measured whether the average individual in an age class is 
receiving or giving net transfers to other age groups. The project is still developing 
but comparisons across countries show considerable differences in the crossover 
ages. For example the crossover from young receiver takes place somewhere between 
20 and 30 while the crossover to elderly recipient varies between 55 and 65.
We know that statistically morbidity and mortality accelerates somewhere around 
80 and that much of the total care expenditure during life is concentrated into the 
last few years of life. Often these groups are referred to as the ‘oldest old’. Here the 
per capita transfers often reach very high amounts.
In Figure 2 the 80 and above population is depicted for the same EU countries as 
above. In this sense Sweden is still the oldest European country with Italy just 
catching up. According to the UN projections Germany will be catching up with  
Italy around 2020 but then Italy takes the lead again. For this oldest old we see no 
tendency to convergence around 2030 but rather increased dispersion.
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Figure 2. Estimates and projections of the population share 80 years old and above. 
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While increasing life expectancy plays a role in this ageing process, it is not at all the 
main factor shaping the ups and downs that we see in the ageing trends. In Table 1 
current life expectancy for both sexes (2000–2005) in the countries in the graphs is 
listed and it is quite clear that current accelerations in the age share measures has 
little or nothing to do with life expectancy. It is differences in the fertility rates both 
currently and historically that provide the main explanation of these patterns.
Table 1. Life expectancy in 2005.
Sweden 80.09
Spain 79.99
Italy 79.93
France 79.60
Germany 78.73
United Kingdom 78.47
Greece 78.26
Ireland 77.78
Source: UN World Population Projections 2007.
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Figure 3. Estimates and projections of the dependency rate: population 0–14 and 65+ divided 
with the population 15–64. 
Source: UN World Population Projections 2007.
In spite of small cohorts of children, the predicted total dependency rates of our 
country sample rises much more steeply in low­fertility countries as Germany, Italy, 
Spain than in countries with more moderate fertility trends like France, Sweden and 
United Kingdom. For these countries fertility is a problem they will have to deal 
with. While Sweden, and maybe France, need to focus on young people in their 20s 
for investment in education and labour market entry, the low­fertility countries need 
to consider their family policies as a main priority. 
At this point it is prudent to note that there is a tendency to take demographic 
projections far too seriously, and the development may look very different than these 
graphs suggest. Although the general age structure projections are highly reliable for 
a decade or two and for the older population for many more years, the uncertainty 
surrounding the projections for the young population increases strongly as time goes 
by. It is the inertia of demographic change that makes projections reliable and not any 
deep knowledge about what drives demographic change. Inflows and outflows into the 
population are very hard to predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy, and the 
smaller the country the harder it gets. The more borders are open for migration the 
more difficult it becomes, and so forth. Having pointed this out it is obvious that 
demographic change, at least in part, is susceptible to policy interventions both in 
terms of actions to make it easier for people to achieve their desired fertility and in 
terms of migration policies. In an ageing Europe it is, of course, the question of 
immigrant integration into the labour force that must be in focus.
The ageing problem is neither new (in Sweden the main thrust actually came in the 
1960s and 1970s) nor unavoidable in the very long run. Demography is not fate 
incarnate but a reaction, a kind of memory resulting from social and economic 
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dynamics. An unfavourable ageing trend often has its roots in baby busts generations 
ago. Such a trend and its economic consequences may not be entirely avoidable but it 
can be substantially ameliorated by political action. Immigration and fertility can be 
affected by political measures and current status of these variables is, among other 
things, also a result of the current social policy regime. Labour force participation 
and education can, at different time horizons, economically shore up shortages of 
people in active ages. Even the age boundaries themselves can be changed.
Policies that make society a nicer place to have babies in will decelerate the ageing 
trends in the long run. In the short run, integration of immigrants also helps. 
In either case it is no universal panacea to rejuvenate the population. Sooner 
(immigrants) or later (babies) the groups who make up the ‘solution’ also grow old. 
There are other adaptations that will help to sustain social welfare. We can work 
longer, a reasonable proposition if we live longer and healthier lives. Current 
workplaces and work life demands may not today be consistent with that but this can 
change too. In Sweden the prime factor at this time may be to speed up education in 
order to prolong work life by starting it earlier. In Austria it may be more important to 
offer more higher education and instead improve incentives to work longer. Although a 
common EU policy against this background seems rather unrealistic there is clearly 
scope for learning between the EU countries about how to deal with ageing problems. 
Policies have to be adapted to the specific timing of demographic change and the 
institutional setup in different countries because transition problems will arise in the 
adaptations that are idiosyncratic to each country. Nevertheless it is clear that youth 
unemployment and difficulties in integrating immigrants on the labour market are 
common stumbling blocks in preparing for the ageing society.
That does not in any way prevent the European community from learning from each 
other the adaptations that are successful and under what conditions they are so. 
Simple best­practice reasoning should, however, be avoided with great emphasis.  
The ageing challenge is common to all industrialised societies. It is a challenge with 
no simple solutions but there is a wealth of adaptations available with the common 
denominator that a society has to reproduce itself in order not to encounter 
increasing needs for intergenerational redistribution. Whether through native 
fertility or foreign immigration is not the crucial issue but different strategies in 
social policy will tend to force either the one or the other to dominate.
Swedish Post­War Social Investment in Human Capital
Sweden was ageing faster than other countries in the post­war period mainly 
because of the very low fertility experienced in the 1930s. The ‘Swedish model’ is a 
somewhat amorphous concept that is differently defined in different contexts and 
has evolved quite a lot over time, but however defined much of its Swedish character 
derives from compromises made in the 1930s against the background of the Great 
Depression and the perceived fertility crisis most famously described in Alva and 
Gunnar Myrdal’s book ‘Kris i befolkningsfrågan’ (1934).1 This provided a platform 
for agreeing on social policy as a matter of investing in the productivity of the 
population not as an alternative but as a complement to a social rights perspective.
1.  Kris i befolkningsfrågan (Crisis in the Population Question) (1934) by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. The book discussed the 
declining birthrate in Sweden and proposed possible solutions.
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Without a healthy and educated population that also reproduced itself, the 
protection of social rights as well as the productivity of the economy could not be 
sustained. Providing good health care, healthy housing and expanding the 
investment in education of children were important parts in this endeavour that 
have survived as mainstays in Swedish political debate notwithstanding that a more 
individualistic policy perspective has become dominant. It should, perhaps, not be 
forgotten that there were also some very dubious policies inspired by these goals 
such as sterilisation campaigns ‘to keep the gene pool healthy’ and other similar 
trends that have been abandoned. 
Fertility had already started to rise in Sweden by the end of the 1930s and in the 
midst of World War II a baby boom occurred that peaked in 1945. This is due, in no 
small part, to the fact that Sweden kept out of the war. This baby boom substantially 
increased the demand for welfare services and family transfers. As the large cohorts 
born in the beginning of the twentieth century started ageing towards retirement, 
demands for pension reform grew and were satisfied at the end of the 1950s by a 
prosperous economy.
When the large cohorts born in the 1940s started to enter the labour market in the 
1960s and onwards, the education system was expanded in several dimensions. The 
consequence of this was that the Swedish boomers (unlike American baby boomers), 
were not at all or to a much smaller extent victims of cohort­crowding due to explicit 
education policies as emphasised by Nelson and Stephens in chapter 4. Expansion of 
the care and education systems in turn provided females with labour market 
opportunities. This set off a demand for childcare facilities that was met with a 
heavily subsidised public system of high quality day care much along the lines 
advocated by Kimberly Morgan in the second chapter of this volume. 
As fertility then again fell to low levels towards the end of the 1970s due to factors 
such as increased higher education for females, higher female labour force 
participation and economic crisis, the parental leave system was reformed and 
extended. In 1980 parental leave was further extended to nine months with income 
replacement at 90 per cent and three months at a flat rate. At the same time a speed 
premium on having the next child within 24 months was introduced together with 
two months of paid leave to attend to sick children and some other minor changes. In 
the mid 1980s a new baby boom wave started and peaked in 1990 (TFR 2.1). After the 
1993 collapse of the Swedish economy, benefit levels were first limited to 80 percent 
of income in 1995 and 1996 to 75 per cent. TFR fell dramatically over the 1990s and 
although the 80 percent level was restored in 1998 fertility hit an all time low (TFR 
1.5) in 1999 when recruiting to the public sector had almost ground to a halt. Then 
came a resurgence in birth rates concurrent with further improvements in family 
policy. In 2002 two months were reserved for each parent, paid leave was extended 
to 13 months and a special child allowance for parents in higher education was added 
to the system. In the childcare sector unemployed parents in 2001 achieved the right 
to have children in day care. In 2002 parents on parental leave were also awarded 
that right, and a ceiling on day care fees (previously income related) was introduced. 
In 2003 a universal preschool from four years was introduced. The levels now, in 
2008, are almost the same as in 1990 (TFR 1.9).
This short story of the Swedish fertility ‘roller­coaster’ omits a lot of details (e.g. 
housing subsidies) but illustrates my argument that fertility in Sweden has been 
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shaped by a number of social policy responses to circumstances making it harder  
to achieve the desired norm of at least two children per woman. Desired fertility in 
Sweden has been firmly anchored around two children for a very long time (and 
cohort fertility actually close to two for all cohorts born since 1900). 
It is, however, easy to understand why a forward­looking government wanting to 
preserve welfare for the elderly would also like to keep fertility not too far from the 
reproduction rate. I will not argue that the policies I describe were fully 
premeditated and implemented for rational reasons of slowing down ageing. That 
was certainly not the case, and the roller­coaster variation is per se not a very 
rational response because it causes excessive variation in public budgets as well as 
public employment. I do believe that it was a long­term ingrained political tradition 
in Sweden to see fertility falling below reproduction rates as a symptom of social 
problems, and not without good reasons.
It is now the case that although Sweden still has a very old population compared to 
most other countries and in spite of massive immigration (13 per cent of the 
population is currently foreign­born). Nevertheless, our demographic projections 
look much less dramatic and much less worrisome than those of countries that have 
viewed fertility as a completely private issue.
Deliberate or not, the policy reactions to Swedish ageing in the past has been to 
invest in the young. That does not involve only fertility, of course, it was also a matter 
of expanding health care and education for the young, allowing labour immigration 
in the 1950s and 1960s, and in the 1960s and 1970s providing good housing 
opportunities, study loans, pensions etc. Sometimes this was carried out at 
ridiculously high costs that could not be sustained in the long run. Many policies 
were later abolished such as most of the housing subsidies but many are still very 
much with us like the child care system and the parental leave transfers. 
Although these investments in both the human and social capital of the young baby 
boomers from the 1940s caused temporary costs in terms of the GDP level – as the 
ageing burden increased in the 1970s – they are also a very important factor behind 
the recovery of the economy in the late 1990s. I suggest that this is a much more 
important lesson to learn than budgetary caution in the present situation.
Most of these investments in the young generation are not generally recognised since 
they go under the headings of public consumption or government transfers. This 
terminology is grossly misleading. No farmer would fail to differentiate what he can 
eat from the harvest from that which he must sow in the spring. Such mistakes would 
put his survival at stake.
Where Does Sweden Stand Today?
Sweden is now in the middle of a generational shift. A large chunk of the working 
population is retiring from work life while another large chunk of the population is 
entering adulthood. If the entrants could simply enter into the vacancies created by 
retirement there would not be much of a problem to discuss. In reality this will, 
however, set in motion a very complex chain of promotions, new vacancies and 
closing of some of the old job slots. Not least will it deepen the regional disparities 
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discussed by Erik Westholm in chapter 9. Thus, in Sweden today demography will 
further contribute to the factors, mentioned by Bengt­Åke Lundvall and Edward 
Lorenz in chapter 5, which speed up the rate of change in different social and 
economic dimensions.
From a long­term perspective we know that an older population will require more 
services and less goods production. Globalisation implies the same pattern of replacing 
labour­intensive low skilled non­place­dependent jobs through import substitution 
and replacing the lost jobs with specialised services and skill­intensive production to 
pay for the imports. For example the Swedish private (although publicly financed) 
schools are now following the banks into the international market. Structural change 
is therefore implied both by domestic demographic change and global competition. 
The re­matching of the labour force needed in order to implement this change could be 
favoured by the generational shift providing lots of mobile and well educated labour to 
help it along. In chapter 3 Giuliano Bonoli gives reason to question much of the 
traditional thinking regarding labour market policies in this new situation, in 
particular the failure to integrate immigrants should lead to deep reflection. 
In Figure 4 below the annual changes in the number of people in age group 15–29 
and 65+ are displayed. As in 1970 there is now a group of young adults that has been 
increasing in numbers and at the same time strongly increasing numbers of retirees. 
This was not the case in the 1990s. Although there was an increase in young adults it 
was not as strong and the increase in the 65+ group was slow and even decreased 
towards the end of the decade.
Figure 4. Changes in the number share of young adults (15–29) and in the elderly (65+).
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An opportunity to renew and prepare the care and education sector for the future 
has now opened. The return from investments in human capital is likely to be vast, 
borrowing is cheap, and a less painful structural adjustment of the economy than in 
the 1990s is possible.
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Conclusion
I have argued that the investment in future human capital is crucial for the 
sustainability of elderly welfare. I have also argued that the European welfare states 
are at very different stages in their cycles for human capital investment. The human 
capital life cycle do look different in the European countries. Rational strategies 
must be formed according to these differences and must be formed with respect for 
different histories, preferences and institutions.
Productive social policies have to be designed to fit current demographic structures, 
taking into account their consequences for future demographics and the 
repercussions the population structure has on both economics and the sustainability 
of social welfare. This requires long­term perspectives as well as an integrated view 
of the policy system. Rita Nikolai’s and Kerstin Jacobson’s chapters (see chapter 6 
and 7) imply that the European Union has a long way to go before achieving such an 
integrated view on social investment. 
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A Territorial Approach to the 
Politics of Climate Change
Erik Westholm
Introduction
This chapter raises some questions about the future role of politics in Europe at a 
national level. What future do nation states have if (when) the politics of climate 
change become the dominating project? The answer requires a territorial 
perspective on the changing welfare states. The development of the various welfare 
models in Europe has shaped the political organisation and established powerful 
municipalities and regional authorities able to secure the interests of the state. 
 
From the 1980s the idea of distributing prosperity to all localities and regions has 
been gradually replaced by an awareness of the increasing global competition, 
calling for efforts to develop the most competitive regions in a knowledge­based 
economy. In order to defend the national territory, the welfare states had to adapt to 
the varying specific local and regional contexts. National policies also became 
increasingly linked to supra­national institutions such as the EU and institutions for 
global agreements on trade, carbon emissions, migration regulations etc. The nation 
states developed a diverse and spatially flexible political organisation. 
The chapter addresses a possible third era of spatial politics within the welfare model. 
It is based on: 1) an anticipated deepening of economic and political globalisation and 
2) an increasingly urgent need to address issues related to land use/climate change. 
The two processes are already transforming the agenda for the EU and the Member 
States. In this chapter it is argued that territorial control will be increasingly 
important and that the nation states are likely to continue to be the key institutions in 
an era marked by increased needs for cross­border collaboration in order to 
dramatically reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. In these efforts the nation states 
will have to strengthen international institutions and collaborations while at the 
same time using the specific capabilites of the regions and local communities. 
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Spatial Implications of Welfare Policies 
Basically, the establishment of the welfare model was a modernisation project linked 
to the transformation from the primary sector to industry from the 1930s and 
onwards. As the industry expanded and demanded labour in certain regions, others 
experienced increasing unemployment and declining populations. The primary role 
for the welfare institutions was to make the economic restructuring possible while 
securing welfare with social insurance programmes, other cash benefits and welfare 
services at household level. This is an early ‘social investment strategy’. One 
ambition was to provide more equal conditions to all households in terms of inco me, 
access to the labour market, access to education, health care, communications, etc. 
This redistribution of income had a strong spatial implication with a number of 
political means to reduce uneven spatial development.  
 
In the Nordic countries, a specific regional policy framework was established during 
the 1950s and 1960s. Resources were, basically, re­allocated from urban centres to 
the rural periphery. The arguments were both social and economical. They were also 
related to defence interests. The nation state project, as such, also required a 
dispersed population and equal conditions in all parts of the country. The economic 
aim was to diffuse industrialisation so that labour leaving the primary sector in 
rural regions could enter industrial jobs locally, adding to the national growth. The 
social aim for spatial redistributional policies was based on the universal concept of 
welfare provision: equal conditions could only be achieved if they reached all of the 
country. A universal welfare model should also increase the economic demand of 
households and thus be a driver for economic growth (Andersson, 2003).
A relatively uniform, standardised administrative structure was used to implement 
and supervise these spatial policies throughout the territory. 
The Recognition of Uneven Development
During the 1980s, the importance of international competitiveness became an issue 
in spatial planning across Europe. It had been increasingly recognised that the 
policies for spatial redistribution were insufficient for preventing an uneven 
development. The idea of a balanced regional development gave way to politics for 
intensified modernisation and economic competitiveness. Similar efforts to extend 
urban industrial growth into underdeveloped peripheral regions have been used in 
most western economies. During the 1990s, a comprehensive framework (structural 
funds) was implemented in the EU and gradually developed in the direction of 
competition policies. 
As competition policies and politics are strongly connected to urban space and to the 
knowledge­based economy developed in and around universities, these changes 
produced both political asymmetry and spatially uneven economic and social 
development. Regions and localities were increasingly found to have their own 
specific problems and relative advantages. The competitiveness of cities and regions 
was also dependent on regional competencies, social capital and trust in addition to 
distinctive and attractive local amenities and culture. The promotion by the state of 
technological change, innovations and entrepreneurship must be executed on a 
sub­national level. Therefore, a decentralisation of regional/industrial policy was a 
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key element of this emerging competition policy. The discourse of the importance  
of the regions, the idea of the Europe of Regions was coinciding with the increasing 
aims of integration within the EU framework. The regions became an object of 
governance for the EU, creating links to regions and localities, so by­passing the 
nation states. 
The Changing Geography of State Activity 
The two ideas of increased competition as the main task and the regions as the main 
agents formed the basis for an institutional reform of the regional level in Sweden. 
Increased independence for the regions resulted in the fragmentation of political 
institutions. Since 1995, the relatively standardised spatial organisation has been 
replaced by a situation with various solutions in various parts of the country. The 
specific local and regional contexts are strongly affecting the role of local authorities, 
county councils and regions. While, for instance, some regions have directly elected 
assemblies responsible for the development of the region, other regions are based on 
the traditional regional authority, legitimated by the national parliament. The 
development towards a more asymmetric political organisation should not be seen 
as a withdrawal of the state but rather as a response by the state to increasingly 
uneven regional development. 
Another form of spatial transformation of the state is the changing regionalisation  
of state authorities. There are more than 300 authorities for the implementation of 
sector policies (such as Forestry Commission, National Agency for the Environment 
etc.). Many of these have regional and/or local representation. For instance the 
national Employment Agency has representation in all 290 local authorities and also 
a regional organisation. During the last decade there has been a fast spatial 
reorganisation within the state apparatus. Local offices are closing down or are 
merged with others to cover larger areas and there is a rapid process of enlargement  
of the regions by the authorities. This process follows the internal rationality of each 
authority and is not co­ordinated by the state. There is also a merging of the levels 
within the various authorities so that the local service centre is connected with all the 
functions via the internet. The geography of state authorities has been developed 
through a mix of everyday decisions and strategic action to optimise efficiency within 
each authority. The total picture of the state geography has been described as based 
on the ‘logic of a drunken spider who has been drawing the borders on the map’. 
A Landscape of ‘thin regions’
At a municipal level the standardised political organisation is also challenged. In 
Sweden, the 290 local authorities have wide ranging self­governance based on local 
tax raising and responsibilities covering the school system, child and elderly care, 
spatial planning, local culture etc. The political mandate of the local authorities is 
territorially fixed and based on direct elections. 
The local authorities have played a major role in the expansion of welfare services 
during the post ­ war era. The local authorities are powerful in an international 
comparison and their activity corresponds to a substantial share of the GDP. The 
relatively strong position of local authorities as political and administrative units  
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is a result of their importance for the welfare project. The expansion of social policy 
demanded strength, especially at a local level and the system of local authorities was 
reformed 1952 and 1970 in order to fulfil the ambitions of the welfare state. 
In order to increase cost efficiency and economies of scale and also to boost their 
developmental efforts through participation in regional development projects, in 
EU­programmes, in lobbying towards other levels in the political system etc, the 
local authorities are increasingly involved in a complex pattern of intra­local co­
operations covering all fields of local politics and planning. We can imagine a 
landscape of numerous, overlapping regions each based on a single project or 
collaboration. This project­based landscape of ‘thin regions’ (Westholm 2001)  
is continuously changing. 
At a quick glance it seems as if the state has withdrawn from governing at a local level 
by increasing the freedom for local authorities to self organise local politics. 
However, the territorial flux can also be described as a state­led reform in which the 
state chose to reorganise the local level into a more flexible politics of networking. 
Alongside these changes in the form of political organisation there is also a 
decentralisation of the traditional welfare functions. In the light of New Public 
Management, welfare states have adopted values such as user’s choice, quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency (Giddens 2003).
A ‘Relativisation’ of State Spaces
Altogether these changes describe the development of a more diverse and spatially 
flexible political organisation at regional and local levels. Demographic changes, 
economic restructuring and increased international competition has forced the 
state to engage in competition politics, to accept and handle an increasingly uneven 
development within the national territory. The states had to respond in different 
ways at different levels, from the local to the global, in order to achieve both 
economic growth and a distributed welfare. These changes have been described by 
the political scientist, Bob Jessop, as a ‘relativisation’ of the national territory as the 
basis for state activity. It is a process of both increased involvement in international 
relations and a decentralisation of the functions of regions and localities that has 
traditionally been executed on the national level (Jessop 2002).
In a broader sense, the redistribution of state power to diverse arenas should be seen 
as a reflection of the complex mix of interests that modern politics at the national 
level has to accommodate. In order to sustain itself as the primary institution for 
organising economic growth and welfare distribution, the state must operate in 
various ways and at various levels, from local to global. 
Jessop describes the state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders 
and to secure competitive advantages for nationally based capital. Empirical studies 
indicate that a development towards a competition state has taken place in many 
European countries. In small economies this means an orientation towards the 
supply­side of the economy, in order to identify the knowledge­based niches in 
expanding sectors of the economy. 
What has been described is a transformation from the national focus of the 
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traditional welfare model towards the international awareness reflected in the 
succeeding competition regimes. In the following section, I shall discuss a possible 
third major era of challenges for the welfare states. My argument is based on both an 
anticipated continuing globalisation and an increasingly urgent need to address 
issues related to natural resources shortages/climate change. These two processes 
are already at work and have altered the agenda for the EU as well as its member 
states. I will conclude that territorial control will be increasingly important and that 
the nation state will continue to be the key institution in a possible era of continued 
political globalisation marked by increased needs for cross­border collaboration. 
New Spaces – Still Based on Nation States
The Common Agricultural Policy (the CAP) of the EU provides a good example of the 
importance of national politics. This is often considered to be the most integrated 
policy field and has been spending more than 2/3 of the total EU budget, yet it is 
based on the territorial control of the member states and the regulations are 
continually adapted to national contexts. In fact, it has often been questioned 
whether there is a common agricultural policy at all since it is adapted, in detail, to 
the specific needs of the various states. 
The implementation of the CAP provides an example of the diverse arenas that the 
state must explore in order to implement the policies. The CAP still dominates the 
EU budget and affects the structure of agriculture, living environments, biological 
diversity, etc. The CAP is gradually transformed towards a rural policy, something 
which has contributed to renewed interest in local development (Ray 2000; Brouwer 
& Straaten 2002; Shucksmith et al. 2005). Partnership, approaches across sectors 
and administrative borders as well as technical and institutional renewal are 
examples of phenomena which often are described as results of endogenous 
processes, even though there are clear political/ideological intentions and concrete 
development programmes that have been launched at the national or EU level to 
enhance them. The change from productivist subsidies towards rural development  
is a response to both needs in the member states and demands from the WTO. 
Territorial policy strategies for rural development are implemented, on the initiative 
of the EU. The European cohesion policy has put a new emphasis on the 
characteristics of the different rural areas. Social relations, local culture and 
corporate climate may vary widely between localities and regions. In a territorially 
oriented policy, the unique set of assets, problems and potentials are at the core of 
rural policy. On that basis, attempts are made to support general processes that 
contribute to better conditions for regional development and to liberate and develop 
local resources characteristic for the area. Policy is used to strengthen social 
processes and relations that may create synergies and economic growth in the 
territory. Cross­sectoral partnerships, networks and joint projects are 
recommended as policy instruments and there are expectations that partnerships 
and networks will lead to development, synergies and learning (Moseley 2003). 
Territorial initiatives are ideally based on the assumption that local contexts can be 
linked up with regional, national and global levels. Thus, both sectorial initiatives 
that increase regional unevenness and territorial initiatives are handled within the 
framework of the EU regional development policy. 
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These efforts are heavily dependent on nation state institutions and policies. At least 
in Sweden, the local authorities play a key role in implementing planning that 
reflects politics on the national level. One success story relating to both the 
utilisation of natural resources and climate change is the establishment of district 
heating and combined district heating in Swedish towns and cities. Within a period 
of 15–20 years the Swedish local authorities reduced carbon emissions from heating 
by 60% in the municipalities. This success can be explained by a mix of access to 
biological resources, mainly forest residues, traditions of using bio­energy and 
developed planning procedures linking local action to the aims of national politics. 
Climate Change and Natural Resource Shortages 
Existing forecasts for demographic change and economic growth in regions of the 
world until 2050 foresee a critical demand for growth in biological resources such  
as food, bio­energy, fresh water and forest products. Such a Natural Resource Turn 
(NRT) including increased competition over land will intensify the need for political 
intervention (Waldenström and Westholm 2009). Public choice issues, issues of 
property rights and problems connected to externalisation of costs in relation to 
biological resources are likely to grow in importance. 
Perhaps the most pressing issue related to the future of the nation states is the 
emerging politics for climate change. Climate change is one of the most significant 
challenges of our time and is now reaching the top of the political agenda. It is 
increasingly recognised that climate change affects nearly every sector of the world’s 
economy and is intricately intertwined with other major environmental threats such 
as population growth, desertification and land degradation, air and water pollution, 
loss of biodiversity and deforestation (Streck et al. 2008). 
Climate change provides a fundamental contest for the democracies of the nation 
states. Costly actions must be taken at the present time to prevent a problem in the 
remote future – beyond the time horizon that citizens normally overlook. The spatial 
dimension may be even more problematic from a nation state perspective. 
Arguments for free riding, for not taking further action on a national basis, are 
frequently employed by governments. The free riding argument varies from the 
claim of the European countries that they have already taken their share of the 
burden, to the claims of the BRIC countries and countries in the south that they 
must be given a chance to develop their economies. Although international 
agreements are an essential ingredient of an effective global response to climate 
change, there is a need to focus on urgent national action (Giddens 2009).
The complexities of time and space are driving politics to the supra­national level. 
The agreement that is now being prepared to succeed the Kyoto protocol after its 
first commitment period expires in 2012 can only be successful if it is ratified by the 
major economies in the world. However, the key institutions to make sure the 
agreement is transformed into actual carbon reductions are the nation states: 
• the arrangements are set up in negotiations between nation states;
• the commitments are highly based on national contexts and national data;
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• the implementation of the measures is heavily dependent on the national governments’ 
and parliaments’ ability to transfer them into laws and regulations; 
• national institutions play a key role in the monitoring and supervising of the agreements.
The territoriality of a low­carbon transtion 
Any attempt to achieve an effective post­Kyoto agreement must include a 
comprehensive system of incentives directed towards land­use and spatial planning. 
Not only the nation states, but also the regions and communities will have vital roles 
in a low carbon transition. Three main types of policy transformations can be 
identified: 
• ‘Greening’ of the economy: This refers to a necessary redirection of competition policy 
towards low­energy technologies. The competition regions developed during the last 
decades must now take into account increasing energy costs as a starting point, offering a 
number of threats and opportunities. The regions, in the broad sense of territories as well 
as part of the political structure, are vital in this transformation. 
 
•  Implementation/adaptation to structural changes imposed by distant markets and 
international/national policies: Regions and localities must prepare to adapt to 
international agreements, conventions as well as changing taxation in a low carbon 
direction. 
 
•  Protection measures for the effects of climate change: Whether it is measures to prevent 
flooding in the cities or long term planning for the built­up infrastructure this is already 
becoming central issues for spatial planning ar regional and local levels. 
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed, from a spatial perspective, the transformation over 
time of the major agenda for the European welfare states. During many decades, the 
dominating project was to institutionalise the welfare state itself. Politically, most 
countries established symmetric organisations of local authorities and regions/
counties in order to safeguard equal conditions in all of the country. The focus was 
clearly national. State intervention increased gradually and issues of the spatial 
distribution of welfare and economic growth was dominating the agenda. The 
process of shaping the welfare states dominated the twentieth century until around 
the 1970s, when direct state intervention was peaking in a number of political fields. 
The political priorities started to change from the national focus of the traditional 
welfare model towards the international awareness reflected in the succeeding 
competition regime. The states responded to a perceived international competition 
which appeared to threaten the welfare. Competitiveness became the driving 
principle of political fields such as education, labour market, regional development 
and R&D. 
These changes did not only involve politics at a national level. The Lisbon Strategy is 
a manifestation of these changes at the European level. A general observation on the 
development of welfare states in Western economies has been that there is no longer 
a single privileged scale for economic and political organisation around which other 
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scales are being organised (Jessop 2002, Brenner 2004). Local and regional 
administrations are designed to meet problems and opportunities as they appear in 
the various regions and national policies are linked to supra­national institutions 
such as the EU and institutions for global agreements on trade, carbon emissions, 
migration regulations etc. Thus, the nation states in Europe are already prepared for 
an era of politics of co­operation on global issues. 
The competition­orientation of the last decades has equipped European welfare 
states with the dynamics necessary to handle the complexities of climate politics.  
The EU itself provides an example on how states are becoming increasingly 
integrated and able to formulate political frameworks. The nation states have also 
developed a diverse and spatially­flexible, political organisation at regional and local 
levels. Demographic changes, economic restructuring and increased international 
competition have forced the states to engage in competition politics and to both 
accept and counteract increasingly uneven development within the national territory. 
The modern state has to respond in different ways at different levels, from the local to 
the global, in order to achieve both economic growth and a distributed welfare. 
I have anticipated a third major era of challenges for the welfare states. It is based on 
1) an anticipated deepening of the economic and political globalisation and 2) an 
increasingly urgent need for a low carbon transition. These two processes are 
already at work and have altered the agenda for the EU as well as its Member States. 
In the light of these changes, territorial control will be increasingly important and 
the nation state will continue to be the key institution, also in an era marked by 
increased needs for cross­border collaboration in order to dramatically reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
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The European Employment 
Strategy in the Tempest:
Restoring a Long­Term Perspective
Bernard Gazier
Introduction
In the domain of employment and social policies, important changes have appeared 
since the turn of the century: Europe is exploring a new paradigm, ‘Social Investment’ 
(SI), putting emphasis of the ability of everybody to accumulate skills and to find one’s 
way on the labour market. In her contribution, Jane Jenson (chapter 1 this volume) 
insists on the still controversial and quite diverse aspects of SI, and she worries about 
possible detrimental consequences of the present crisis on social spending, even the 
fraction of it considered as an investment. Similarly, Giuliano Bonoli (chapter 3 this 
volume) distinguishes various versions of social investment in the domain of Labour 
Market Policies (LMP): centered on protection (where the investment protects the 
work capacity), on investment strictly speaking (through training and placement 
policies), or on re­commodification (strengthening of work incentives). He too, 
wonders about the possible business cycle dimension of such spending.
In this chapter, we shall focus on a domain intermediary between Jenson’s wide 
‘citizenship’ approach and Bonoli’s more specific analysis of LMP: the domain of 
labour market reforms. It obviously includes LMP, but also wages differentiation, 
employment norms … This includes the European Employment Strategy; in the 
forefront the ‘Flexicurity’ policies proposed by the EU since 2006, together with the 
evolution of labour market institutions. We shall try to restore some long term 
perspective, using the SI point of view.
We shall proceed in three steps. First, relying on a previous work (Auer and Gazier 
2008), we shall propose a framework situating the ‘Flexicurity’ prescriptions within a 
wider set of policy agendas currently explored or implemented regarding the dynamic 
adaptation of labour markets to the globalized world. The second step will consist of 
using this framework for understanding the present and possible position of 
‘Flexicurity’ in our world to cope with the crisis. In our third step, we shall try to 
sketch what could be a renewed agenda for the EES and a new component of the wider 
Lisbon Strategy. We shall propose a collective and structured version of the ‘social 
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investment’ paradigm, connected to the ‘Transitional Labour Market’ approach, 
which aims at developing a ‘re­embedded’ version of the European labour markets.
Labour Market Reforms: Four Agendas Compared
Our starting point is quite close to Bonoli’s analysis. As argued in Auer and Gazier 
(2008), it is interesting to situate the EES and the Lisbon Strategy as a specific 
agenda in the field of labour market reforms and social policies, between two 
extreme options: ‘Flexibility’ (close to Bonoli’s ‘De­commodification’) and 
‘Capabilities’ (close to Bonoli’s ‘Protection’). However a fourth agenda may be 
considered: ‘Transitional Labour Markets’.
‘Flexibility’
‘Flexibility’ remained the dominating reform agenda until the crisis. Since the 
eighties, the claim is that, in a period where all other markets (goods, services and 
financial) are increasingly liberalized, the labour markets cannot remain regulated 
as changes in the other three spill over to them. For this reform stream and notably 
for the OECD and the World Bank, markets (workers) have to adapt and the preferred 
adaptation channel, in the absence of total wage flexibility, is (external) mobility of 
workers and smooth worker’s reallocation preferably unhindered by government 
intervention. 
In 2009, the OECD kept this view, although albeit more moderately. For example, in 
its 2009 review of France getting to grips with the present crisis (OECD 2009), it 
admits that re­launching measures and budget deficit may constitute an appropriate 
answer but maintains that in the middle term, ‘structural reforms’ should be 
pursued in favour of less regulation. 
The ‘Flexibility’ reform agenda is treating the goods exchanged on the labour market 
just as any other good. Therefore, this agenda is not concerned about workers’ 
employment security or any (wage) distribution policies as they would distort the 
market. The proponents of the ‘flexibility’ agenda might not be particularly anti­
workers (but anti­union, certainly) as in their equations more flexibility equals 
increased welfare for workers: benefits will simply trickle down from improved 
economic and labour market performance due to enhanced adjustment capacities of 
labour markets. A short formula is ‘Easier firing brings about easier hiring’. The 
market will bring the best of all worlds, whereas interventions to correct market 
failures will not work and thus there is little space for polity, policy and ethics. Surely 
this picture is a caricature of the complexities of thoughts and methods that this 
stream has developed, but at the core, such thinking prevails.
‘Capabilities’
The ‘Flexibility’ agenda ignores the particular ‘good or service’ that is exchanged on 
labour markets, which cannot be isolated from the individuals that offer their services 
for money on which their livelihood and more generally their psychological, social and 
economic well being is depending. This leads us to the second reform agenda: 
‘Capabilities’ which appears as very different and quite the opposite. It has a developing 
country focus, although the concept claims universal application as can be seen in 
155
Human Development Indicators that are also relevant for developed countries.  
It appears less anchored in labour market studies, and much more in ethics.
It sets a list of priorities established independently from the labour market 
functioning: health (life expectancy), wealth (per capita income in PPPs), education 
(enrolment and literacy rates) but also others like housing, literacy, access to water and 
schooling, active participation in political and social life, taking gender into account … 
All these dimensions may be seen as preconditions for a sustainable social and 
economic life. In every country, these priorities are of course separately developed by 
specialised agencies and government departments, and appear as the objectives of 
actors such as social workers. One can speak of an agenda, when these elements are 
combined in an integrated way. While being much more centred on the world of work, 
the ‘decent work’ agenda of the ILO (ILO 1999) often refers to this approach.
The theoretical reference is the ‘basic need’ concept originated from the ILO, which 
has given way to a ‘Capabilities’ theory. At the centre lies a specific kind of which 
includes using both resources and capacities according to physical and cultural 
conditions. Capacities using substantive freedom for achieving welfare states (status) 
are at the core of this doctrine (Sen 1985). The human development indicators that 
have been developed following the ideas of Armatya Sen are based on the three main 
areas evoked above: health, wealth and wisdom: wealth, health and education. 
‘Flexicurity’
‘Flexicurity’ was originally developed in the EU countries as an alternative concept 
to the ‘flexibility only’ mantra of many stakeholders, in parallel with other concepts 
such as Transitional Labour Markets. Dating back to Dutch debates about temporary 
work (1997), it starts from a concern that flexibility could undermine security if 
institutions are not made compatible with changes in the labour market. Changes 
towards more flexibility, which are either deliberately sought or already existing, 
should be compensated or accompanied by better (new or reformed) security devices 
inside and outside firms. The concrete forms of the institutions outside firm’s 
internal labour markets are subject to debate, but there is a certain agreement that 
unemployment benefit schemes, education and training, work and training schemes, 
job counselling and worker’s accompaniment and placement, workers reallocation in 
restructuring situations, etc. are the core providers of this external form of security. 
The concept gives also a large place to negotiations between the social partners as 
the main avenue to manage change.
There are more or less encompassing concepts of ‘Flexicurity’ (Gazier 2008). 
Sometimes the concept is of ‘reduced form’ comprising a ‘golden triangle’ of external 
adjustment between (lose) employment protection, generous unemployment 
benefits and active labour market policies, whose congruence is negotiated by the 
social partners (e.g. the Danish model). Sometimes it includes a whole array of 
institutions and social rights (EU Commission 2007). The common principles 
comprise new contractual arrangements, active labour market policies, lifelong 
learning and a modern social protection system (which in itself is composed of an 
array of policies) and the preferred way to arrive at positive and congruent policy 
combinations and outcomes is the social dialogue between the social partners. It 
includes internal and external flexibility; it concerns workers inside firms as well as 
the unemployed, and should be gender sensitive and cost effective.
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Economically and ethically, allowing for adjustment, while giving security to 
workers, is interpreted as a win­win game. Another important ethical dimension 
consists of rights and duties and therefore individual responsibility. Economics 
needs politics for equitable outcomes and there is a belief in correcting or at least 
accompanying the market. 
‘Transitional Labour Markets’
First formulated in 1995, ‘Transitional Labour Markets’ (TLM) propose to develop  
a systematic and negotiated management of ‘transitions’ in and around the labour 
market. ‘Transitions’ are understood as sequences of changes in a personal and 
professional career (Schmid and Gazier 2002). The perception of ‘transitions’ in  
and around the labour market as a system, typical of TLM, implies insisting on the 
interdependency between broad activity spheres such as education, job search, 
domestic and benevolent tasks and retirement. The perspective has recently been 
grounded on a more micro approach: social risk management (Schmid 2006), 
focusing on the different ‘framing’ of risks’ perception by actors. The macro 
counterpart is the quest for a balanced power in the economy and especially in the 
labour market, as it can be derived from the first management principle of TLM: 
‘empowerment’ of people, i.e. enabling them to take long­term decisions. Such an 
emphasis may constitute the key difference between ‘Flexicurity’ and TLM. Both 
agendas share the idea of negotiating changes and shifting from job protection to 
employment and employability security, but TLM crucially insist on the need for 
deliberately restoring a right balance between stakeholders and shareholders while 
‘Flexicurity’ prescriptions seem to take the market conditions as given.
It leads to put a specific emphasis on two aspects: the TLM approach takes into 
account the domestic sphere as a major component of the system of interdependent 
transitions. Hence the stronger emphasis put on equality, and on gender equality,  
as a central goal and on the long­term consequences of transitions. The relevant 
indicators include many of the preceding indicators assessing workers’ security  
as well as the labour market adaptability, but also transition indicators such as 
transition matrixes, showing whether individuals are trapped into dominated and 
precarious positions, or benefit from opportunities to reach better jobs and to 
perform chosen activities.
Two main policy consequences stem from this approach. First, the TLM suggest 
substituting the motto ‘Making Transitions Pay’ to the motto ‘Making Work Pay’, 
which has been developed first by the OECD and second by the EES in a rather 
apparent convergence (Gazier 2007). ‘Making Work Pay’ allows quite different ways 
of pushing people into jobs, one being the lowering of social benefits; while ‘Making 
Transitions Pay’ excludes this outcome and suggests a long­term commitment in 
favour of the development of autonomy and employability. The second consequence 
lies in another policy motto: combining ‘equipping people for the market’ with 
‘equipping markets for the people’. The first principle, which focuses on the supply­
side policy and the individual adaptation, is of course of paramount importance; but 
it should be completed by other interventions which avoid putting excessive weight 
on the shoulders of individuals and consider the organisation and proper functioning 
of markets as an equal priority. To summarise, one may conclude that TLM are 
somehow intermediate between ‘Flexicurity’ and ‘Capabilities’, trying to develop 
what could be termed ‘labour market capabilities’. 
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‘Flexicurity’ and the Swing of the Pendulum
Of course, these agendas have been elaborated before the crisis opened in the 
autumn 2008, and the common perception has clearly changed since (see Palme 
chapter 12 this volume). ‘Flexicurity’ is now superseded by macro­economic policies 
(re­launching budgets) and financial reforms (restoring trust and creating new rules 
for the financial markets). But regarding labour market reforms themselves, the 
main change is more profound than a simple pause due to shifts in concerns and lack 
of means, or than a cyclical setback; it entails a rapid and radical swing of pendulum 
in the hierarchy of agendas. 
The ‘Flexibility’ agenda was the dominating one, this position coming either from 
genuine conviction of dominant actors based on principles or from adaptation 
behaviour of less convinced but realistic policymakers. Taking the development  
of the interaction of markets as a matter of fact, this agenda was also shared by an 
influent social group: the more skilled workers, confident in the positive outcomes of 
globalisation. Symmetrically, at the other end of the span, ‘Capabilities’ was mainly 
perceived as a protest agenda. Some political groups (mainly from the left, but also 
from the traditional right), wary from globalisation and also often opposed to the 
European construction (as driven by market integration), could find in it a source for 
systematising policy claims. An influent social group potentially interested by the 
agenda is social workers and all persons dealing on a daily basis with the social 
problems stemming from unemployment and poverty.
The intermediate position of ‘Flexicurity’ as a compromise in favour of a negotiated 
and compensated management of globalisation and the integration of labour 
markets, probably played a major role in its success in Europe before the crisis.  
The equilibrium between market development and social protection was explicitly 
presented as an objective, this fostered political compromises in the line of the 
European ‘social’ tradition. Another strength of this agenda stems from its explicit 
bargaining and operational stance: there is something to exchange, with the hope of 
a positive­sum outcome. However, it should also be observed that this priori­
seducing agenda is not grounded in social forces as deeply as the two preceding ones. 
If we look at social groups supporting this approach, we only find a small group of 
policy makers and of social partners’ leaders. Unions and employers’ representatives 
could find food for thought and action here; the rank and file remained most often 
hostile to this perspective. 
Lastly, TLM as an agenda has often been confused with ‘Flexicurity’ and remained 
more discrete, at the rear of the scene, although it has directly inspired a new 
language for policymakers and social actors. It is now common to speak of 
‘transitions’, for measuring and organising them. From a sociological point of view, 
the main social group interested by this specific agenda is again a rather small one, 
mainly composed of union leaders and Human Resources managers. For good 
reasons as well as for bad, these managers are often happy to speak of ‘organising 
transitions’ rather than of ‘firing’ workers. Sometimes it could be lip service or even  
a cynical reference, but such an attitude is made possible precisely because other 
managers really do organise transitions. Regarding politicians, the very term seems 
too abstract and with little appeal, except those involved in ‘local’ responsibilities, 
e.g. a municipality or a region.
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Things are, however, changing. Since the beginning of the present crisis, ‘Flexicurity’ 
has been perceived as undue concessions made to the flexibility agenda, which 
dramatically demonstrated its failure. The dominant agenda is now preserving 
‘Capabilities’, perceived as commonsense in a troubled period. However, this state of 
affairs may not be durable. This agenda says nothing, or very little, about the way one 
should immediately manage existing markets, except that their detrimental 
consequences should be avoided. Furthermore, one may wonder what will happen 
when the economy starts anew. We should expect the pendulum to swing back, 
towards giving more importance to the functioning of interrelated markets. 
Will the pendulum return to the ‘Flexicurity’ compromise? It seems likely that things 
will move in this direction, but a deepening is obviously in order, for two main 
reasons. The first is that we obviously need at least to ‘revitalise’ the Lisbon strategy 
and the EES, which have not proved successful enough. The second is because some 
versions of ‘Flexicurity’ have revealed important and probably durable difficulties in 
the crisis. This is, in particular, the case of the often praised ‘Anglo­Saxon’ versions of 
‘Flexicurity’. A clear assessment from inside is made by Roger Liddle (see chapter 11 
this volume). Remarking first that the economic crisis has exposed significant 
structural weaknesses in the UK’s ‘Anglo­social’ model, the author discusses what 
remains relevant in the New Labour/Lisbon paradigm and what needs to be 
rethought. According to Liddle, the main successes of this version have been the high 
activity rates and a bettering in schooling and health expenditures and performances. 
But the ‘work first’ strategy as developed has many drawbacks. He mentions first the 
inadequate childcare support for dual earners and a school system that leaves many 
young people without skills or employment prospects. Another key limit is the 
existence of low quality and low­paid jobs which are unable to lift poor families out of 
poverty and unattractive in the care domain. Finally, despite the apparent priority 
given to training, a skills gap persists and hinders the competitiveness of the country. 
All in all, Liddle suggests that the EU should ensure better regulation of markets, 
develop tax co­ordination and even harmonisation. This should be accompanied by 
new forms of ‘Flexicurity’ but which ones?
Collective Social Investment, Job Quality and  
Transitional Labour Markets
The Lisbon Strategy has been submitted to intensive scrutiny and many proposals 
have been made for ‘revitalising’ it (for example, Rodrigues 2009, or Lundvall and 
Lorenz chapter 5 this volume). Our perspective will take stock of these contributions 
and with their help, we will try to go ‘beyond Flexicurity’ (Gazier 2007). We observe 
that the SI commitment is at the roots of the ‘European social model’, stating that 
social expenditures should be not only compatible with growth but should 
contribute to it. We shall advocate a convergence between a renewed, collective 
version of this SI perspective and TLM.
The ambiguity of SI has already been analysed, and Jane Jenson provides a very 
useful synthesis on this point. Some versions, as developed by Giddens (1998) are 
restrictive and centered on individual responsibility, while other versions such as 
Esping­Andersen (Esping­Andersen et al. 2002) insist more on collective 
commitments regarding child­centered social expenditures, gender equality and 
social inclusion. Both versions were present in the EU preparations for the renewal 
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of the Lisbon strategy between 2006 and 2008, and Jenson wonders which 
combination of both will emerge.
From our point of view, several arguments lead to favouring the second version. 
First, one needs to take seriously the implications of the ‘Capability’ agenda and to 
extend its consequences to labour market organisation. One way of doing so is to 
explore what could be the policy meaning of developing ‘labour market capabilities’. 
This is precisely one point made by TLM authors, which have made, since their first 
works, multiple references to A. Sen on the topic of employability. Many versions of 
employability have been developed (Gazier 1999), some of them individualistic and 
other involving collective responsibilities. With regard to policy outcomes, a useful 
opposition can be drawn between ‘access – employability’, stemming from policies 
lowering barriers to work and pushing people into jobs whatever their quality, and 
‘performance – employability’, sometimes differing the access to work and looking 
for long­term development of skills and personal autonomy. This converges with 
Bonoli’s distinction between human capital centered SI versus re­commodification.
The connection is straightforward with an important and still under­exploited field 
of policy objectives, statistics and indicators, developed by the EU over ten years, 
sometimes put forward, and sometimes left aside: work and employment quality 
(Davoine et al. 2008: Employment in Europe 2008). This constitutes a second reason 
justifying the priority given to the second version of social investment. The ‘Laeken 
indicators’ include flexibility and security, but together with many other aspects 
contributing to what is to become ‘sustainable’ work and employment.1 They remain 
incomplete (for example there is, up to now, nothing on wage level and wage 
inequality) and sometimes deserve improvement and complementary indicators 
(especially in training and working conditions). They do, however, illustrate the 
multi­dimensional aspect of job quality and their analysis shows that there is no 
necessary dilemma between job quantity and job quality, rather the contrary – even 
for UK – whose place is rather favourable in the international rankings. As Davoine, 
Erhel and Guergoat (2008) show, developing job quality appears as a good policy goal. 
First, theoretical literature suggests that there is a positive relationship between job 
quality and economic growth/ employment growth, and their results tend to validate 
this positive view of the link between job quality and quantity.2 There is no apparent 
trade­off between work quality and a dynamic labour market; Second, job quality 
matters for workers’ satisfaction and citizens’ well being; Third, a good job quality 
may be achieved through different pathways and is consistent with the existence of 
heterogeneous institutions and policy models in Europe and in the OECD; Fourth, 
existing differences between EU 27 (and OECD) countries are important and so 
there is wide room for policy initiatives.
It means that Europe, when emphasising the importance of job quality, has already 
developed an important and future­oriented perspective, much in line with the 
extended version of SI. Of course, one needs an integrating perspective in order to 
use them as policy guides. Here TLM, together with a collective social investment 
perspective, may help. We can start from a long­term attempt at illustrating what 
could become a full­employment norm for the 21th century, as opposed to the 
1.  They include the following fields: 1. Intrinsic quality of job ; 2. Education, training, career development; 3. Gender equality; 
4. Health and security at work; 5. Flexibility and security; 6. Inclusion and access to labour markets; 7. Work organisation and 
work/family conciliation; 8. Social dialogue and works participation; 9. Diversity and non­discrimination; 10. Work global 
performance.
2.  They find a correlation rate between their job quality index and employment rates = 0.74 (LFS database, 138 observations).
160
traditional norm. A norm can be understood as a set of interrelated principles 
indicating what should be considered as ‘normal’, that is desirable and possible for  
all in a given domain. As regards full employment, it is useful to combine the point  
of view of the worker with the point of view of society and to deal with the central 
content before looking at its possible evolution as times passes and the society 
develops. Last we may connect this norm to other related social fields, here the 
unpaid work, either domestic, or benevolent / militant.
The contrast is great between Tables 1 and 2. The first norm, as a retrospective 
construction, appears to be gender – biased and at best indifferent to environmental 
stakes. However its collective dimension should be stressed: first, qualification 
appears to increase mainly through collective work experience, and second there is  
a conspicuous responsibility of the (Keynesian) state as regards employment matters.
Table 1. The traditional full employment norm.
Point of view
Content of the norm
Worker as family member Society and natural 
environment
Central norm Stabilised full time job, with 
a guaranteed minimum 
wage, for the (male) 
breadwinner
Integration of the working class 
through the access to market 
production and to the progress 
of national growth
Dynamic content Collective skills acquisition 
through a stable working 
group
National growth ensured 
through state – Keynesian 
policies
Connection with other 
useful activities and 
other social systems
Division of work inside the 
family, limiting women’s role 
to domestic work
No environmental concerns
No consideration of militant / 
benevolent activities
Table 2. A provisional norm of sustainable full employment, according to  
‘Transitional Labour Markets’.
Point of view
Content of the norm
Worker as individual Society and natural 
environment
Central norm Individual financial autonomy, mid­
term period, gained either through 
paid employment, or through 
participation to social useful 
activities. Weekly hours modulated 
according to age. Retraining and 
leaves
National / regional 
autonomy, gained in the 
International Division of 
Labour
Dynamic content Maintenance and accumulation of 
competences through networks
Collective employability 
inside the International 
Division of Labour
Connection with 
other useful 
activities and other 
social systems
Lifecycle compatibility of family 
life, personal and professional life; 
Gender equality; Crossable and 
negotiated borderline between 
different forms of activities
Sustainable development, 
from a social and 
environmental point of view
The possible emerging norm is quite different: no more family­centered (which does 
not mean that the family constraints are not taken into account, rather the contrary) 
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but organised around the individual and based upon collective employability. 
Three traits seem characteristic of this norm. First, it could be termed a 
Schumpeterian one, putting the emphasis on competences accumulation through 
networks, innovation and risk taking. Second, the gender and care concerns are now 
put to the forefront, because there is no more unequal and gender­biased division of 
domestic labour. Third, as a consequence, the norm becomes sequential and does not 
contain the same rights and duties set for all ages. An important application is the 
number of hours to be normally worked during one week. As G. Schmid (2006) 
remarks, a young woman (or a young man) has at least five key choices to make 
within a short time span at the beginning of her career: an occupation, a job, a home, 
a mate and lastly, to have children. Accordingly, he proposes that during such a 
critical period of the life the social institutions governing employment norms leave 
some room for making these choices. It may seem odd, because the idea that young 
people start working intensively full time for gaining their autonomy is dominant. 
However, in a perspective of long­term equilibrium between professional and 
personal life, shorter workweeks at the beginning of a career may constitute a useful 
social investment. The same reasoning holds for ‘senior’ workers, often confronted 
to the problem of very old and dependent parents and looking for a better 
compatibility between their work and their family duties. This leads to the proposal 
that the typical 35­hour work week applies mainly for workers between 30 and 50.
The priority given to learning, of course well inline with the ‘knowledge based 
society’ as emphasised by the Lisbon Strategy, illustrates quite well how the Social 
Investment and the TLM perspective may be complementary and can enrich each 
other in the present context. As it has been observed, training and life­long learning 
seem a consensual objective. As a matter of fact, they are often a conflict or 
indifference­reluctance area. This is so firstly because it is often unclear who (the 
firm, the worker, the state) has to pay, and sometimes clear that nobody wants to pay. 
Secondly, the gains from training are often ill identified; and thirdly, the people more 
in need for training, the less skilled workers, are discouraged to say the least. They 
face high opportunity costs and do not see what could be gained from their 
participating in a training program. The TLM perspective, together with other 
analyses aiming at identifying a more realistic process (see Lundvall and Lorenz 
chapter 5), help to overcome these major obstacles. They do so by connecting 
training programmes to wider ‘transition’ sets, and by showing how training should 
be combined to other securing measures in order to overcome the so­called 
‘Matthew effect’.3 
A concrete illustration of this type of concern in our present crisis phase is the 
generalisation in the EU of measures combining short­term working and intensive 
re­training, either by law or by collective agreement. The underlying idea is first that 
people should be kept into jobs each time it is possible, and second that we should 
prepare workers for the new challenges ahead. The ageing process opens here a 
window of opportunity in many countries: retiring workers will leave jobs to younger 
ones, but the new jobs will be more qualified. Of course, this emergency answer, even  
if it is future­oriented, will not suffice, especially if the EU stays too long in depression. 
However, it shows how some ideas mixing collective guarantees and collective efforts 
are now spreading and becoming evidences. Collective Social Investment, with Job 
Quality and TLM simply systematise and further this commitment.
3.  Adapted from the Gospel dictum ‘The one who has nothing will lose even what he has, while the other who has already all will 
be given even more’. 
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Conclusion
There is no space in this short contribution for exposing in detail the differences and 
commonalities of the ‘Flexicurity’ and the TLM agendas, nor for connecting a labour 
market and social policy agenda to wider policy agendas (cf Boyer’s contribution in 
Rodrigues 2009). We have simply tried to show that ‘Flexicurity’ will probably 
remain a focal point in the (incomplete) European construction, whatever the much 
needed speeding up of European integration brings with it; but this focal point will 
probably become less and less satisfying. We also hope to have suggested some of the 
ways that may help to revitalise the Lisbon Strategy and to go ‘beyond Flexicurity’. 
Of course, the question of the political acceptance of these new orientations is not yet 
solved. In our tempest, one priority is to show to everybody, especially the less 
favoured, that nobody will be left without protection and a future­oriented 
perspective. This could foster a wide support to a structured and collective version of 
social investment and career management. 
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Social Investment after the Crisis: 
Political Choices for Britain  
and their Implications for  
the European Union
Roger Liddle
Introduction
This chapter is about the broad choices of socio­economic governing strategy that 
will confront the EU and its Member States in the period of recovery from the 
current global recession and the prospects for the ‘social investment’ model.1 It 
focuses on Britain but attempts to draw lessons of wider application to the whole  
EU. Will the ‘reform’ consensus about labour markets and welfare states that many 
experts, like Anton Hemerijck (2006) agree has grown among national policymakers 
in the last decade and a half be sustained, re­cast or break apart? And to the 
(limited) extent that the EU has developed common policies in these areas, what will 
the impact of the crisis be on UK attitudes, given that Britain is perceived by many as 
one the most critical brakes on the pace and content of European integration? 
The 1990s saw a period of ‘reform convergence’ in the old EU 15 based around the 
twin (and complementary) ideas that labour market policy should be focused on  
the promotion of high employment participation and public expenditure oriented 
towards a broad concept of social investment. This new EU consensus was 
encapsulated in the Lisbon Strategy promulgated by the European Council in March 
2000: a new synthesis of competitive markets, knowledge based investment and 
strategies for social inclusion (Rodrigues 2009). This new concept of the European 
social dimension was further developed in a landmark Belgian Presidency in the 
second half of 2001 over which the ideas of social scientists such as Gøsta Esping­
Andersen (2002) had a considerable intellectual influence. 
In 2010, the EU will fall short of its ambitious targets for the decade, but the global 
financial crisis and recession adds a new urgency to the debate about its future: 
whereas before it, most discussion centred on implementation, and whether the 
1.  I would like to thank Simon Latham, my Principal Adviser at Policy Network, for his excellent assistance with this paper. 
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Lisbon strategy was effective in promoting reform at Member State level, the issue 
now is whether strategy itself remains right for a new age. 
The UK government has been a great enthusiast of the Lisbon strategy, having 
played an active role with the Portuguese Presidency of the time of its conception. 
Although this did not translate to any meaningful degree into a framing of socio­
economic choices for Britain in a specifically Lisbon or EU context, that has been the 
position in most big Member States. To the extent that the Lisbon Strategy has been 
an effective influencer of policy change and reform, it has been as a result of a subtle 
impact on the policy and intellectual consensus. In the UK, the New Labour 
government imagined that it had ‘got to Lisbon’ well in advance of many Member 
States. In Downing St, Lisbon was seen as the rest of the EU ‘buying in’ to the ‘third 
way’ ideas that the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, espoused.2 
In this context, this chapter is about the politics of social investment strategies in  
the aftermath of the most serious global recession since the 1930s and the wider 
implications of the supposed collapse of the ‘third way’ model. The first section of the 
chapter discusses the UK’s claim to see itself as a successful exemplar of the social 
investment model in the past decade. The second section considers the impact of the 
global financial crisis and recession on the UK, and argues that we are at a critical 
juncture for social investment strategies. The long­term consequences of the global 
financial crisis are such that they will impose severe constraints on both the scope 
and volume of public expenditure over the next decade. In an environment of ‘tough 
choices’ and spending discipline, the future of the third way social investment model 
depends not only on whether and how public investment is targeted and maximised 
within the overall resources available, but also on the success of more activist 
policies to promote a return to sustainable economic growth. The final section of the 
chapter reviews the implications for the EU and the future of the Lisbon strategy or 
whatever replaces it. 
New Labour, New Dawn: The Third Way Social Investment Model
Before the outbreak of the ‘credit crunch’ in the autumn of 2007, New Labour 
genuinely believed it had conceived and entrenched a new, successful, and progressive 
social investment model. From 1997 to 2007, UK public spending grew by 42 per cent in 
real terms; this was in stark contrast to a meagre 15 per cent growth in the preceding 
decade (1987–1997) and despite a real­terms freeze in spending in Labour’s initial 
couple of years in office. In particular, spending on the NHS more than doubled in real 
terms from £35 billion to £89 billion; the transport budget increased by over 70 per 
cent in real terms, from £8.7 billion to £20.7 billion; and public spending on education 
as a proportion of GDP rose from 4.8 per cent to 5.5 per cent, with support for schools 
increasing in real terms by 60 per cent (Emmerson 2009).
The political logic of these massive increases in spending was in New Labour eyes,  
a necessary ‘catch­up’ after a generation of chronic neglect of the public services by 
two decades of Conservatism – though this period of ‘public’ austerity had, to be fair, 
started under the previous Labour government with the ‘IMF cuts’ forced on Britain 
in 1976 in the wake of the oil crisis. However, this catch­up appeared less of a 
2.  It was preceded by the controversial Blair Schroeder Declaration in June 1999 and a UK­ Spanish Declaration on Economic 
Reform in April 1999. 
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dramatic break with the past as it was complemented by an acceptance of neoliberal 
tenets that had been ingrained in public policy by the Thatcher and Major 
governments. The main characteristics of Britain’s third way model was an attempt 
to embed macro stability both through Bank of England independence over 
monetary policy, as well as the proclamation of new fiscal rules that applied the 
‘golden rule’ to public borrowing ‘over the economic cycle’ and limited the stock of 
public debt to 40 per cent of GDP. A clear motive here was one of credibility, not just 
in the financial markets but politically too. New Labour was anxious not to repeat 
the mistakes of previous Labour governments which had collapsed variously under 
the weight of overambitious spending plans, out of control public sector deficits, 
sterling crises and spending cuts (Mandelson and Liddle 1996). 
Labour’s assertion of macro­economic discipline went along with the promotion of 
open markets to induce innovation, growth and efficiency; but with market flexibility 
supplemented by higher public investment in infrastructure, skills and research  
– addressing the perceived principal shortcomings of the Thatcher model. At the 
same time New Labour’s social policies emphasised the critical role of active labour 
market policy (‘welfare to work’) and a range of government initiatives to tackle 
social exclusion and child poverty, rather than the traditional social democratic  
goal of reducing inequality. Crucial to New Labour’s initial framing of its governing 
strategy was the proposition that the fruits of growth were to be redistributed to  
the bottom without damaging incentives at the top. The essence of the New Labour 
model, therefore, was one of market flexibility combined with social investment,  
not blanket social spending. 
The framing of Labour’s fiscal rules, given the decline in public sector debt as a 
proportion of GDP which Labour inherited and then initially built upon, allowed for 
spectacular growth in public sector net investment, in contrast to the less flexible 3 
per cent deficit limits of the Maastricht criteria and Stability Pact. As a share of GDP, 
public investment grew from 0.6 per cent in 1997–98 to 2.1 per cent in 2007–08, and 
is forecast to rise to a peak of 3.1 per cent in 2009–10. Capital spending rose 
dramatically from 1998–99 onwards so that by 2007–08, the NHS had enjoyed an 
annual average real growth rate of 10 per cent; education 14 per cent; transport 13  
per cent; and local authorities 8 per cent. This wholesale renewal of the public realm 
is visible to the eye in most British cities. 
However because of the scale of increased public spending, physical capital did not 
crowd out social investment. The government framed its increases in current 
spending under the all­embracing mantra of ‘investment and reform’. This approach 
was applied across a wide field: the extension of active labour market policies and 
work­first welfare reforms; new initiatives in early years provision, for instance 
widening access to childcare provision and building basic skill­sets for the socially 
disadvantaged through SureStart; targeted, not universal benefits to attack child and 
old­age poverty; and in public services, investment was concomitantly accompanied 
by a plethora of ‘reform’ initiatives. These were not always coherent and well thought 
through, for example a greater emphasis on national targets was combined with 
attempts to promote quasi markets, diversity of provision, and increased consumer 
choice. However the totality of this activism led to social advances over an 
impressive range: 
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• progress towards universal nursery provision and early years’ Surestart and children’s centres;
• active labour market policy: Job Centre Plus integrating unemployment benefits and job 
search with a mix of ‘carrot and stick’ approaches;
• welfare to work: success in increasing employment participation among lone parents and 
latterly older workers;
• education policy: more money for schools leading to better exam and test results at all 
levels and a big expansion of higher education;
• NHS: better health outcomes with mortality rates for patients under 75 reduced by 20 per 
cent for cancer and by 40 per cent for heart disease and with waiting times for treatment 
greatly reduced; 
• tax credits: successful in focusing limited resources on making significant reductions 
in child and pensioner poverty, rather than relying on more thinly spread increases in 
universal benefit. 
Such was the success and entrenchment of the New Labour model that, prior to the 
‘credit crunch’, an embryonic political consensus had been conceived behind its 
volume of investments and social priorities. Though politicians in all parties rarely 
spelled it out it seemed that the ‘Anglo­ Saxon’ model of neo­liberal Thatcherism had 
been significantly Europeanised in the decade from 1997 to 2007.
In retrospect the New Labour decade is bound to be seen as an exceptional period of 
plenty for the public realm. The public finances benefited from a one­off bounty of a 
fall in interest rates on government debt and steadily increasing employment. At the 
same time the apparent success of the City of London’s ‘masters of the universe’ and 
a debt­financed explosion in property prices, filled the public sector coffers with tax 
revenues. For a time it almost seemed that the New Labour model could make 
significant progress towards building a Nordic social model in the UK without the 
handicap of Nordic tax rates (though the government did modestly increase taxes in 
2002 to pay for increased spending on the NHS). Whether it was sensible to increase 
spending as fast as New Labour did, many will now doubt – though at the time the 
public pressure to ‘transform’ public services was felt to be intense. 
Broken Britain: Third Way Model at a Dead End?
The global crisis has exposed significant structural weaknesses in the UK’s ‘Anglo­
Social’ model, outlined by Nick Pearce (Dixon and Pearce 2005). The gloomy outlook 
for the public finances is breaking what had been an emerging, albeit embryonic, 
political consensus behind social investment and will severely limit the public 
spending ambitions of any British government for the next 5–10 years. As a result of 
the fiscal cost of rescuing the UK’s large (and, in the words of the UK Financial 
Services Authority chairman, Adair Turner, ‘overblown’3) financial sector and the 
dramatic collapse of tax revenues from financial services, housing and commercial 
property sectors, the impact of recession has been and will continue to be bigger on 
British public finances than in most of rest of EU. 
3.  ‘How to tame global finance’, Prospect, 27 August 2009, Issue 162.
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While there has been palpable sense of rejoicing in some quarters at the nemesis  
of the City of London and the collapse of the Anglo­Saxon model which it supposedly 
represents, the UK government response to the financial crisis has been bold and 
strong. Gordon Brown must be commended for his rapid response to the crisis. By 
prioritising and promoting bank recapitalisation and rescue, leading efforts to 
galvanise international financial coordination through the G20 and implementing  
a modest domestic fiscal stimulus, Brown appears to have ensured that the global 
recession has not tuned into a 1930s style Depression. At same time the British 
government has announced new but limited public interventions to cope with the 
consequences of the crisis: an employment ‘guarantee’ for young people; greater 
‘industrial activism’ to create new sources of UK competitive strength; and 
measures to speed low­carbon transition. As a result, public spending is still growing 
rapidly – at a forecast of 4.7 per cent real from 2008/9 to 2010/11, a short term speed 
up from the 4 per cent real growth before the economic crisis hit. By contrast the 
Conservatives now say that they would start to cut public spending and debt from 
their first day in office, regardless of the economic circumstances. 
However, the fiscal consequences of the global economic shock are dire. The UK’s 
2009 Budget debt is now rising at a faster rate than in many other countries, though 
the total stock of debt as a proportion of GDP is not forecast to be out of line with the 
United States, Germany and France since the UK started from a low­debt base. 
Meanwhile the public sector deficit (on a Maastricht basis) is forecast by the UK 
Treasury to rise from 2.8 per cent in 07/08, to 7.1 per cent in 08/09, and to a peak of 
12.6 per cent in 09/10. On the Treasury’s forecasts, the debt to GDP ratio will escalate 
from 43.2 per cent in 07/08 to 82.1 per cent in 10/11, including a (possibly too low) 
estimate of a 3.5 per cent GDP one off cost of bank rescues. 
To restore fiscal prudence, Gordon Brown’s government has announced plans to 
halve the public sector deficit by 2013/14. These plans have been criticised for both 
lack of ambition – in 2013/14 the deficit would still be over 5.5 per cent of GDP – as 
well as over­optimism in assuming three good years of buoyant recovery. Much press 
and public attention has focused on the government’s increase in the top income tax 
rate from 40 per cent to 50 per cent for those earning over £150k p.a., combined with 
a sharp cut back in tax incentives for pension savings by the better off – in breach of 
New Labour’s longstanding commitment not to raise the top tax rate. But in terms of 
revenue raising, this measure is more about symbolism than substance. At present 
the government’s plans assume that most of the discretionary fiscal adjustment will 
result from a fierce squeeze on public spending in about a 4 to 1 ratio. Consequently, 
growth in current public expenditure from 2010/11, will be constrained to an annual 
0.7 per cent in real terms. Total spending is forecast to remain broadly static in real 
terms when one allows for the sharp contraction that is planned in public sector 
capital investment from nearly 3 per cent to 1.1 per cent of GDP. 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) argues that after allowances for rising debt 
interest, higher social security payments and other spending increases caused by the 
recession and higher unemployment, mainstream programme expenditure could 
need to be cut significantly in real terms: they argue by an annual average of 2.3 per 
cent. More challenging still, the process of fiscal adjustment will need to continue 
beyond 2013/14 with a Treasury forecast of a need for a further 3.2 per cent fiscal 
tightening from 2014/15 to 2017/18.
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On HMT published assumptions, therefore, UK public spending is likely to 
experience seven years of historically unprecedented dearth. At the time of writing 
there has so far been little clarity from both the Labour and Conservative parties 
about how in practice they will address this looming public spending squeeze. At 
present, government policy has yet to move from saving money through ‘efficiencies’ 
(which are being sought in education and health as well as other programmes) to a 
serious examination of ‘priorities’ in an environment where sizeable cuts will be 
required in some government programmes. The Conservatives have pledged to 
exempt the NHS and international development from real cuts in their first term, 
without being at all specific about where cuts would fall. 
This absence of clarity on all sides is perhaps understandable in advance of a General 
Election, but there is a need for sensible debate about the available options, not least 
if an attempt is to be made to sustain a genuine ‘social investment’ governing 
strategy. In the past sharp squeezes on public spending have been achievable in 
periods of economic recovery – most recently, for instance, in the mid to late 1990s – 
but they have proved to be sustainable politically for no more than 3­4 years. One 
reason is that if economic growth resumes on previous trends, the growth in private 
sector earnings will tend to match it. It is implausible that public sector pay could be 
frozen for long in real terms while private sector earnings race ahead. Yet the public 
sector wage bill tends to account for at least half of public service costs. Certainly 
there is scope for significant increases in public sector productivity, especially after 
such a big growth in spending in recent years. But is it realistic to think that 
productivity could rise so fast as to both achieve the efficiencies that the government 
is currently now seeking and meet, in some years hence, the additional costs of a 
rising public sector pay bill? 
There are also considerable pressures for increased spending that will not go away. 
Demographic pressures are already causing strains in NHS and social care.  
And somewhere in the government’s view, new resources need to be identified for 
industrial policies to rebuild the competitive strength of the British economy and 
invest in low carbon transition. As its over­heated debt­financed financial and 
housing sectors contract, the UK economy is increasingly dependent on building  
new sources of competitive strength: hence the present government’s move towards 
a more assertive ‘industrial activism’.4 For this to materialise, at the very least 
spending on research and innovation will need to be maintained, as will investment 
in skills, the lack thereof being a major impediment to the development of new 
sectors of competitive strength such as life sciences, nuclear power and renewable 
energy. There are also new labour market challenges emerging, particularly the 
sharp rise in youth unemployment and the lack of job opportunities for young people 
including recent graduates. 
Where then does this leave the prospects for social investment? Outside a narrow 
circle of academic and policy experts, the notion of a ‘social investment strategy’ has 
not entered the bloodstream of political debate. The tendency for all public spending to 
be loosely described as ‘investment’ by those favourable to it induces lack of necessary 
rigour. Indeed, over the past decade debate has largely revolved more around questions 
of how public services should be delivered (i.e. the merits of increased patient and 
parental choice; quasi­markets; diversity of providers) rather than which programmes 
4.  HM Government, ‘New Industry, New Jobs: Building Britain’s Future’, April 2009. 
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should receive the fastest rate of increase. Many Labour spending ‘flagships’ draw 
heavily from the experiences and innovations of the Nordic model which, interestingly 
for a Conservative Leader, David Cameron has associated himself with. His critique of 
the government has rested more on a questioning of effectiveness of particular 
interventions rather than a disagreement with their aims. For example the 
Conservatives express commitment to tackling inter­generational poverty and the 
problems of ‘Broken Britain’ (for a more comprehensive discussion of this concept and 
usage by the Conservative Party see Liddle and Latham 2009), putting the emphasis 
on less centralist and top down and more ‘voluntarist’ driven initiatives. 
Britain needs a much deeper debate about the choices ahead. One key issue is whether, 
when the government is forced to make tough choices, this leads to a policy of 
retrenchment of what might now be seen as ‘marginal’ social investment programmes 
– tackling child poverty; investing in early years provision; pursuing activation 
strategies in labour markets – in order to protect what is perceived to be the welfare 
state’s mainstream: ‘core’ public services such as the National Health Service and 
schools. Also there is a key strategic choice about how far to maintain transfer payments 
to the electorally significant elderly or invest in future­oriented programmes. 
How can social investment strategies be maintained and developed against this 
dismal background, – and what political choices might this involve? First it is 
necessary to draw attention to the scale of unsolved challenges and unmet needs: 
• the UK is still a long way from the Nordic model of social sustainability in terms of 
childcare support for dual earner couple;
• the school system is still suffering from a large tail of underperformance: inadequate 
vocational options at secondary level and stubbornly high number of 16/17 year old leavers 
not in education, employment or training (NEETS);
• the existing strategy for tackling child poverty based on incentivising households to get  
a job is constrained by the return of high unemployment and the increasing evidence that 
for many families as a result of low pay, work is not the route out of poverty;
• active labour market policy has so far made little impression in denting the numbers of 
workless households; 
• a social care crisis for the elderly is looming as demands grow on an existing system that  
at present offers poorly paid, badly regulated job opportunities mainly for women;
• housing has re­emerged as a social issue given the likelihood in the medium term of 
reduced access for the less well off to a ready supply of cheap mortgage finance.
The limits to date of the policy successes of the New Labour model demonstrate that 
Britain needs more of a ‘social investment’ strategy not less. Tough choices will now 
need to be made if ‘social investment’ programmes are to grow over the coming 
decade. No single approach will be sufficient. An incoming government is likely to 
consider a combination of the following policy options: 
• sharper targeting of the present wide array of universal benefits; 
• expansion of co­payment frameworks such as university tuition fees and some NHS 
charges as well as road tolls and congestion charging;
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• a further raising of the retirement age: this can be objectively justified in terms of 
expectancy of ‘healthy life years’ by comparison with the time of the Beveridge report 
in the 1940s but could be seen as unfair by manual workers as class inequalities of life 
expectancy have widened.
Debate about how public services are managed is likely to revolve around four 
principal issues: 
• first, whether a sharp reduction in the number of centrally driven targets can significantly 
reduce bureaucracy; 
• second, whether new freedoms should be devolved to public sector managers to determine 
pay locally, manage assets, enter into commercial arrangements with the private sector, 
contract­out services and take over failing public sector institutions; 
• third, whether ‘freeing­up’ quasi­markets in public service provision will increase costs or 
reduce them;
• fourth, whether more localised planning of public services on an across the board basis 
can deliver better designed services at lower cost.
It is far better to consider such radical options than simply ‘cash limit’ existing 
programmes. Cash limits may be effective in the short term but lead to 
demoralisation in the medium term as ‘vacancy freezes’ lead to gaps in staffing and 
inadequate service cover; essential planned maintenance is cut; and delivery 
structures remain frozen because no money is freed up to finance innovation and 
policy change.
The great unmentionable in British politics is of course the possibility of 
discretionary tax increases beyond those already announced. The government’s 
published plans presently assume a policy choice that tax as a proportion of GDP 
stabilises around 35 per cent (up from 33 per cent in the current year but below the  
36 per cent plus raised from 2004–7). It is worth remembering that at the height of 
Thatcherism in the first half of the 1980s the tax/GDP ratio was regularly above 38 
per cent. There is a therefore significant possibility that taxes will rise further 
whichever party is in power after the next UK general election. But this would be 
unlikely to avert the need for a determined public expenditure squeeze and a much 
clearer focus on social and economic priorities. In the UK, governments will have to 
rediscover the political toughness that enabled Labour successfully to freeze public 
spending from 1997–2000. 
In Sickness and in Health: 
Choices and Implications for UK and her European Partners
This final section considers the implications of what is happening in the UK for the 
rest of the EU and particularly the framing of the next stage Lisbon strategy or its 
successor. Other commentators have noted that the global crisis has both 
emphasised the degree of interdependence between the Member States of the EU, yet 
underlined the incompleteness and fragility of the European integration’s capacities 
to manage that interdependence successfully. The latter is demonstrated in the 
imperfections of cross­border financial regulation, the inability of the EU 
institutions to resolve the economic crises facing some of its newer Member States 
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and consequent reliance on the IMF, and the limitations of policy coordination both 
in terms of the EU’s internal response to the crisis and its ability to get its act 
together to exert effective global influence. 
The crisis has not fundamentally altered the big long­term challenges facing the 
Union and its Member States which the European Commission in 2005 defined as 
globalisation and demography.5 The crisis has not swept away the need to build 
competitive knowledge economies as the response to the economic challenges of 
globalisation, to tackle climate change, to make welfare states more sustainable in 
the light of demographic change and to manage more successfully migration and 
integration. It is on these long­term issues that public policy should focus: the crisis 
should be seized as the opportunity to do this better, rather than this necessary 
future orientation get lost in short term crisis management. It is in this context that 
the need to sustain a ‘social investment strategy’ in tough times for public 
expenditure is a real concern. 
Two observations are however extremely pertinent: first the need to develop more 
robust criteria for reconciling vital social investment with necessary fiscal 
consolidation in order to better define and as a result protect what counts as social 
investment ‘goods’ as against other public spending (if not ‘bads’, at least lower 
priority): second, a recognition that the faster the rate of recovery across the EU 
economy as a whole, the less of a problem sustaining social investment and future­
oriented expenditures will be. 
The EU needs to establish a new consensus on what should be the sound principles  
of public finance for the period ahead. To say that there is no need for fundamental 
change in the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact is to argue that the EU should take no 
effective position at all. The key requirement is to agree on rules whereby an 
adequate portion of the proceeds of growth is steadily devoted to reducing national 
debt, without attempting a fiscal consolidation at such speed that growth itself is 
stifled. The position of Germany is crucial. With its strong balance of payments and 
dominant position as the motor of the European economy, Germany needs to be 
persuaded that a prudent decision to expand its own economy without significant 
inflationary risk will not lead to profligacy elsewhere or increase the chances that the 
German taxpayer will be expected to bail out others’ mistakes. 
Berating the Germans about their failure to take the expansionary steps that they 
could afford is unlikely to yield much success. However a grand bargain at EU level  
is possible whereby other Member States agree reforms that Germany is arguing for. 
This package would certainly include tougher common rules for financial regulation. 
It might also include greater tax coordination, if not harmonisation in certain 
exceptional circumstances. In order to bring down fiscal deficits and public debt, 
Member States need to protect and restore their tax base. In a situation where public 
finances are generally weak, it does not make sense to allow business to play off one 
Member State against another or allow blatant tax competition. It may also be 
necessary to implement an EU­wide carbon tax to supplement the operation of the 
European emissions trading in order to ensure that the correct market signals are in 
place to promote a new wave of low carbon investment. 
5.  European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/competitiveness/global_europe_en.htm
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Another possible reform is to make payments under the EU Budget conditional on 
benchmarks of progress that would need to be agreed individually with Member 
States: these benchmarks could include quality of governance as well as progress 
towards Lisbon­type reforms. Germany as the largest contributor to the EU budget 
stands to gain from such an approach. 
In judging progress towards Member State compliance with a revised set of fiscal 
rules, the question of the quality as well as the quantum of public expenditure needs 
to become a guiding principle. This raises the issue of whether it would be possible to 
arrive at an operational definition of what constitutes ‘social investment’ on which 
Member State policies could be compared and judged. The EU has gone a long way to 
develop statistically robust measurements of social inclusion that allow meaningful 
comparison between Member States. A similar exercise should now be undertaken 
to measure Member State performance on indicators of social investment. 
More effective coordination of the EU internal economy is the key both to a stronger 
economic recovery and to more European clout on the global stage. The EU needs to 
become the strongest advocate of greater international policy coordination and 
macro­economic global governance. This requires taking the bold step where the  
EU must speak with a single voice in the international financial institutions. 
There can be no return to business as usual after the global recession runs its course: 
public policy cannot and will, in any case, be unable to return to ‘how it was’. Instead, 
MS need to focus on the new economic paradigms of the twenty­first century: 
economic globalisation, low­carbon transition and the ageing society. Overcoming 
these immense challenges, in tandem coping with the long­term impact of the 
current recession, will require a greater steering role for government. At the same 
time, this must happen within a strong and credible EU framework, otherwise the 
EU will succumb to ‘beggar my neighbour’ policies. 
The European Commission has so far been slow in thinking through the longer term 
implications of the economic crisis for EU policies. But to the extent UK experience 
is typical or at least half­typical, the following general observations hold:
• EU fiscal rules will have to be re­written: steady consolidation is essential in order to 
reduce public debt, but not on too rapid timetable, that would threaten recovery;
• in revising the rules, MS need an operational definition of social investment in order to 
highlight the need to protect it as much as possible in an environment of fiscal constraint; 
• a revised Lisbon strategy should give the concept of social investment pride of place and 
EU Budget funding should be made conditional on benchmarks of progress by MS towards 
Lisbon­type reforms; 
• the Single Market will have to adjust to a greater level of Member State industrial activism 
but within a robust EU framework that prevents the emergence of ‘beggar my neighbour’ 
policies;
• more effective EU policy coordination is a ‘sine qua non’ of Europe’s recovery from the 
financial crisis and influence on the world stage. If such coordination is effective, as a 
result of its contribution to faster growth, this will do more than any other policy to help 
maintain essential public expenditures; 
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• Germany is both the biggest player in the European economy and the likeliest obstacle  
to more effective cooperation. The EU should attempt to devise a package deal that meets 
German concerns. This would include a recognition that the Anglo American model of 
financial deregulation was seriously flawed and the need now for Europe wide regulation 
of markets. Also the case for greater tax coordination now needs to be examined seriously 
both to protect the business tax base and to ensure that carbon prices are set at levels that 
promote a wave of new low carbon investment to lead economic recovery. 
This is a package of policies that a British Government should now be prepared to 
buy into. The global crisis has swept away the assumptions that have shaped British 
policy and attitudes towards the EU since Britain’s withdrawal from the European 
exchange rate mechanism in 1992. Britain can no longer boast a superior economic 
model or particularly superior performance. We are landed in pretty much the same 
boat as our principal EU partners. We need them to grow if we are to grow and to 
prove capable of sustaining essential social investment. We need to be rowing in the 
same broad direction if we wish to weather the storm.
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The Quest for Sustainable  
Social Policies in the EU:  
Ageing, Crisis, and Beyond 
Joakim Palme 
Quest, denotes an undertaking, an exploit, or an experience involving hazards and 
requiring boldness. (Webster’s Dictionary)
Introduction
The development of the ‘social dimension’ of European integration is a long story 
with unclear consequences for the Member States of the EU. From time to time, it 
also appears to have got lost on the political agenda. I would argue that the various 
documents and proposals associated with the ‘modernisation of social protection’ 
(e.g. European Commission 1997) have, in several ways, succeeded in bringing back 
the social dimension of the economic and political integration of the EU, and 
contributed to a more future­oriented discussion of how to organise policies. Its 
basic message to the Member States is: adapt the system of social protection to 
socio­economic change. Three key areas are identified; the new gender balance,  
the ageing of populations, and the changing nature of work.
Why is modernisation necessary? One reason is that the system of social protection, 
designed decades ago, is no longer an effective means to, for example, fight poverty. 
Another reason is that the system is overburdened financially and cannot be fully 
financed, read: taxes cannot be raised without jeopardising competitiveness on the 
global market. It was further argued that policies have to be seen also as a productive 
factor, they have to be made employment friendly and they have to be financially 
stable when needs grow stronger as populations are ageing. Modernising the 
European welfare states has gradually been incorporated within a broader economic 
and social strategy, as claimed during the Lisbon Summit in 2000. The Lisbon Agenda 
can be seen as a social investment strategy that promotes the competitiveness and 
growth with employment and quality of jobs simultaneously.
The emergence of this ‘social investment strategy’ a decade ago can be seen partly as 
a response to the pressure for more redistribution by the European welfare states as 
a result of ageing populations. Moreover, the need to establish a new gender balance 
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and a flexible working life was seen as critical for sustaining the welfare states in  
the context of deregulated financial markets and mobile global capital. 
It seems that, so far, social policy with few exceptions is still referred to at national 
level. However, following the Lisbon Agenda, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
has been launched as a way of promoting common objectives in the social policy area. 
The OMC is about the goals and hence about common European values that deserve to 
be taken seriously. Furthermore, the President of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, declared that the European Social Model (ESM) is about ‘social 
inclusion and equality of opportunity’. The question is whether our social policy 
institutions are adequate for the defined goals. With regard to the OMC indicators,  
the poor performance of many countries casts serious doubts on their adequacy. 
The notion of a European Social Model should, of course, also be seen as a response  
to the political crisis of European integration. It appears that further economic and 
political integration can only be successful if the European populations support it. 
This will only happen if there is trust in governments to handle the social 
consequences of production and service markets being exposed to competition.  
The ‘destructive’ forces of market competition have simply to be met by ‘constructive’ 
and investment oriented social policies (cf. Kangas and Palme 2005). In other words, 
the sophisticated market­making policies of the EU have to be matched with policies 
and mechanisms that deal with market imperfections.
The European Union has been extended to now encompass 500 million people and 
27 Member States. What is the role of the EU in this new context? One challenge is to 
handle the increased diversity coming from the New Member States. The increased 
diversity is there along a number of dimensions, including social, economic and 
political factors. There appears to be a fear among the Old Member States that the 
more difficult social challenges, the severe economic constraints and the lack of 
political commitment to the social dimension are making it more difficult to 
promote social cohesion in Old and New Member States. Hence, the strong emphasis 
on these issues from several, if not all, corners of the EU Commission.
The setting has also changed in other ways as the global financial crisis has turned 
into a crisis of the ‘real’ economy, resulting in rapidly falling growth rates and 
increasing unemployment. The current global economic crisis is increasing 
uncertainties and pressures on governments as well as ordinary people. The 
consequences are difficult to overestimate, which makes it urgent to address the 
social agenda. The difficulties of raising new resources for long­term spending 
purposes are obvious. We can be sure that it will become more difficult, because not 
only will the tax bases be eroded and the public debt be huge but the expenditures  
on the systems of social protection, notably unemployment insurance, will also 
increase automatically and massively. In the absence of adequate social insurance 
programmes, some government have found themselves forced to launch additional 
spending programmes in order to deliver an adequate counter­cyclical 
macroeconomic response. 
The threat of a continued and aggravated downturn will hopefully force, or at least 
offer an opportunity for, governments to rethink past policy paradigms, though I must 
admit that the indications are very weak that they are actually doing this. An 
interesting aspect of the global crisis in the financial system is that it is changing our 
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views on what is possible. In our recent history we find other interesting examples of 
how big changes suddenly may appear possible, or even inevitable. The unification of 
Germany is one example; the enlargement of the EU is another. How can we rethink 
the European future; beyond the Lisbon Agenda, beyond the big spending on the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and with the time horizon being prolonged by the issue 
of climate change? Whereas investment in physical capital, such as infrastructure, has 
figured quite prominently as a policy instrument, human capital investments have 
perhaps received less attention in the debate. There are good reasons to change that.
Hence, the time has come to reflect on how the various components of the ‘social 
investment’ strategy fit this new setting. Where are the most important policy gaps 
to be found and how can they be filled? This chapter argues that the political and 
social sustainability of the European Social Model is dependent on how credible 
policies can be formulated and delivered. The future economic sustainability of the 
Model hinges, of course, on the number of taxpayers that can be mobilised and how 
productive they are. The chapter discusses policy dilemmas and gives examples of 
good policies for further reflection.  
 
Education, Growth and the Challenge of Interdependencies 
A few years ago, the Institute for Futures Studies published a report entitled: 
Sustainable Policies in an Ageing Europe A Human Capital Response, which was 
based on a study we had carried out for the European Commission (Institute for 
Futures Studies 2006). Our primary policy recommendation – to invest heavily  
in the future tax payers – was based on our observation of a causal structure where 
education is the central driving variable for GDP increases in Europe. It appears 
relevant to highlight some of the results from that study in the following.
The analysis of the statistical relations between GDP per capita, fertility and 
education produced the following results: the link between GPD per capita and 
fertility is rather weak while education and GDP have the expected positive 
association. On the other hand, there is a negative relation between fertility and 
education. As income rises we can afford more education and as education rises the 
work force becomes more efficient and our economies can produce more. This 
virtuous circle has been emphasised in the discourse on growth and development  
for several decades. However, the empirical growth literature has had some problems 
with actually establishing that this relation still holds for developed economies.  
The negative relation between fertility and education is not unexpected either. 
Increasing tertiary education intrudes on the prime reproductive ages, and unless  
it is offset by accommodating policies, will make it advantageous to delay fertility or 
even to decrease fertility aspirations. In the European societies, this mechanism is 
almost certainly behind some of the fertility drops. To the extent that it does not 
result in permanent decreases in cohort fertility it is not very problematic but there 
are reasons to fear that it might develop into such decreases. 
To establish the quantitative relations we estimated simple linear regression models, 
conditional on the age structure, because in all three cases there are strong reasons 
to expect that the variables are influenced both directly and indirectly as the age 
structure changes. We used data from New Cronos data set (Eurostat), as far as 
possible, and complemented them with other sources when necessary. We use the 
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total fertility rate (TFR) as the measure for fertility and average years of schooling  
as a proxy for the human capital stock. TFR is a measure of the number of children 
an average woman will have over her fertile period given the number of children 
born in each age group of women in the year that the number refers to. Due to data 
limitations and comparability issues, only 14 old EU countries were included: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Luxembourg was 
dropped since it appeared as a consistent outlier in test regressions. 
Table 1 reports the basic patterns in the data for our benchmark models. To simplify 
the presentation the table includes neither the control variables relating to the age 
structure nor the age specific participation rates. Yet, it is important to underline 
that these factors are important for understanding differences in growth rates.  
The regression model does not report the country­specific constants that have been 
estimated for each equation either; the patterns of these constants are neither 
informative nor stable over different specifications. All variables reported are in 
logarithms so the coefficients can then be interpreted as elasticities: a percentage 
change in the explanatory variable times the coefficient equals the corresponding 
percentage change in the variable explained by the regression. 
Table 1. Benchmark regression results: GDP/capital, total fertility rate and years of schooling. 
Dependent variable Log of GDP
 per capita
Log of total fertility rate Log of average 
years of schooling
Log TFR -0,46 -0,065
Log GDP/capita ­0,013   0,032
Log years schooling 0,13 -0,69
 
Source: PcGive regressions on New Cronos data.
Notes: Bold coefficients statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
Taken at face value, without worrying about the direction of causality, the results 
thus indicate the following relations between the three main variables: (i) GDP per 
capita has a positive effect on average years of schooling and average years of 
schooling may have a positive effect on income per capita (if fertility is excluded it 
increases and becomes significant). Thus we have a positive reinforcing feedback 
loop between education and GDP; (ii) fertility is negatively affected by average years 
of schooling but is not affected by GDP/capita. Although the latter coefficient is 
negative it is not statistically different from zero, and even if it were the effect would 
be exceedingly weak. However, fertility appears to have a strong negative effect on 
GDP per capita. This is, however, a statistical artefact mediated through the 
correlation between education and fertility. If we remove education, fertility loses its 
statistical significance and thus has no explanatory value on its own; (iii) there is a 
strong negative feedback loop between education and fertility. In sum, as the results 
stand, and with the appropriate caveats, we concluded that we observe a causal 
structure, where education is the central driving variable for GDP increases while 
fertility interacts mainly with education. 
Thus, our estimates of the statistical macro relations between income, education and 
fertility further illuminate the quantitative trade­offs that need to be taken into 
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account when designing sustainable social policies for Europe. We have to combine 
different policies in order to avoid trade­off when it comes to the expansion of 
education and fertility. Furthermore, there are reasons not to expect that success is 
automatic from high expenditures and high enrolment as such. More attention 
deserves to be given to the ways money is spent on education. Best practice can be 
found in the Finnish education system, which delivers world­class student 
performance when it comes to both levels and distribution.
As a starting point for discussing educational attainment and social background it is 
of interest to first briefly review the available evidence on educational performance. 
According to an OECD­report about the results of a literacy test given to 15­year­
olds in 25 countries (PISA 2000)1 educational performance varies across countries 
and correlates with several family background variables, such as occupational status, 
family wealth, parental education, possessions of items related to ‘classical’ culture, 
communication at home on social and cultural issues and immigrant status 
(especially language spoken at home). The strength of these correlations varies 
across countries as well, indicating that different education systems compensate for 
background disadvantages with varying success. Figure 1 shows that some countries 
have both more equal outcomes and average higher performance. In Finland and 
Sweden, the student performance in reading literacy is above the OECD average and 
at the same time less influenced by economic, social and cultural status than the 
OECD average. On the other hand, in for example the Czech Republic, Germany and 
Hungary the average performance is below the OECD average while the impact of 
socio­economic background results in much more variation in outcomes.
Figure 1. Variation in student performance on the combined reading literacy scale, mean
score and standard deviation.
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1. OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) www.pisa.oecd.org 
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However, according to the OECD report, there are other factors that in most 
countries are more important than family background for explaining the socio­
economic disparities in education. Those factors are schools’ socio­economic intake 
and the fact that advantaged students tend to go to schools with other advantages, 
such as more resources and policies and practices associated with better student 
performance. Wössman (2003) has conducted a study using TIMSS data for 39 
countries and finds that international differences in student performance are not 
due to resource differences but are related to institutional differences. Institutions 
which yield positive results on student performance are centralised examinations 
and control mechanisms, school autonomy in personnel and process decisions, 
individual teacher influence over teaching methods, limits to teacher unions’ 
influence on curriculum scope, scrutiny of students’ achievement and competition 
from private schools. But it should be noted that these results are still contentious  
in the research.
Moreover, evidence on educational performance indicates that educational 
attainment of mothers is important (for their own working opportunities as well as 
for their children’s development) and possibly increases in importance over time 
(Institute for Futures Studies 2006). And we cannot find any detrimental effects 
from maternal labour force participation in the data from the PISA study (Esping­
Andersen 2005; Institute for Futures Studies 2006). Combined, those two pieces of 
evidence give reason to believe that the need to enrol more women in the labour 
force in the future need not have negative effects on the cognitive development of 
children. Rather, it is likely to yield positive effects on educational attainment by 
reducing the risks of child poverty.
Attitudes to Life­long Learning 
We turn briefly to the attitudes of Europeans in relation to the important area of 
life­long learning. Life­long learning is related to questions of human capital 
formation and maintenance even if the focus here is exclusively on the population  
in working ages. The EU has pointed out life­long learning as a core element of the 
Lisbon strategy, central not only to competitiveness and employability but also to 
social inclusion, active citizenship and personal development. In our perspective on 
sustainable social policy, this part of human capital formation is of course of central 
importance. To explore the views of European citizens is highly relevant for the 
design of appropriate policy programmes along the lines of the Lisbon strategy.
The results from our study (Institute for Futures Studies 2006) made a clear 
distinction between some Northern European countries, above all the Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands, and several countries in southern Europe – above all 
Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal – as regards attitudes related to participation in, 
experiences of and motivations for learning. Even if these clusters are not definite, 
and there are important deviations, the following main characteristics can be 
ascribed to the ‘Northern European cluster’:
• a small ‘skills gap’; a low proportion of individuals stating that they do not possess the 
skills that are important for them in working life;
• a small ‘credentials gap’; a low proportion of individuals stating that they do possess the 
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skills that are important for them in working life, but that they can not provide concrete 
evidence to support this;
• a high proportion of individuals have recently taken part in studies or training; 
• a high proportion of individuals stating that there would be no obstacles to them taking 
part in training or studies;
• a small proportion of individuals stating that there is nothing that could encourage them 
to take up studies or training.
The ‘Southern European cluster’ can be regarded as a mirror image of the 
characteristics outlined above. 
We also found important differences between occupational groups as well as between 
men and women as regards the dimensions of life­long learning. The most important 
findings are that individuals working in occupations classified as ‘unskilled manual’ 
and ‘skilled manual’ are more likely to experience a ‘skills gap’ as well as a ‘credentials 
gap’ than respondents working in occupations classified as ‘management/professional’. 
Moreover, individuals in the former occupations are more likely to say that they have 
not participated in training or studies recently, and that there are obstacles to them 
taking part in such activities. The results hence indicate the importance of what can be 
called ‘socio­economic position’ for many of the dimensions of life­long learning and 
human capital formation examined in this chapter. This calls for a more socially 
justifiable investment approach to life­long learning.
There are also important differences between men and women, although these results 
are complex. Thus, whereas women are more likely to experience a ‘skills gap’, there is 
no such effect for the existence of a ‘credentials gap’. And whereas women are more 
likely to have participated in studies or training recently, women are also more likely  
to say that there are important obstacles to them taking part in such activities. This 
conclusion is further reinforced by the importance attached to educational 
attainment. In relation to the uneven burden of unpaid work, it is warranted to 
emphasise that women see family commitments and lack of family support as 
important obstacles to their participation in further education and training. 
The Dual­earner Approach as Best Practice
The coming fiscal problems in ageing societies are likely to require increased rates  
of labour force participation. As argued above, this particularly concerns female 
employment, which needs to be increased if one wants to reap the full benefits of the 
large increases in female education that have been achieved all over Europe. But if, 
due to lack of appropriate social policies, this leads to inability to achieve the desired 
fertility levels, the future sustainability of social and health security arrangements 
will be compromised. The main challenge here seems to be that policies in different 
areas are not fully integrated and may sometimes induce undesirable counteracting 
forces. The example we gave above indicates an interaction of education investment 
and family policies where insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that tertiary 
education and prime reproduction periods have begun to overlap for ever larger 
shares of the young cohorts with detrimental effects both for fertility and the young 
families that nevertheless still chose to have children.
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Raising children in modern societies is linked to a social dilemma since children 
impose a costly economic burden on parents but are very valuable to society as a 
whole. While children are a source of profound happiness for their parents, the 
economic benefits of having children are small at the household level and, if provided 
with efficient means of controlling their fertility, it appear that many parents will 
restrict their fertility in a way leading to population decline unless there are 
mechanisms introduced for some kind of substantial cost sharing (Lindh, Malmberg 
and Palme 2005). Governments have an interest in supporting family formation. But 
then they have to recognise another dilemma; modern women want to be engaged in 
paid employment and not just carry on unpaid reproductive work. Welfare state 
programmes can hence be seen as attempts to solve different kinds of collective 
action problems, the increasing costs of raising children in modern societies being 
one obvious example. 
Within the EU there are very different approaches to social policy in general and 
family policy in particular, with deep historical roots, often manifested in the 
attitudes of the respective populations. Our surveys and analyses of European 
attitudes as they are manifested in the Eurobarometers (Institute for Futures 
Studies 2006), however, emphasise that there seems to be a broad European common 
ground to go forward and implement many of the suggested policies that could ease 
the future fiscal burden of an ageing Europe.
The notion of a sustainable social policy needs to be linked to the welfare of 
individuals, in order not only to have a meaning, but also to provide a firm basis for 
benchmarking and policy evaluation. Since children cannot choose their parents, 
they constitute a particularly vulnerable but also strategically important group for 
the future, for which there ought to be special policy concerns, both from a social  
and economic perspective. This appears to be a fruitful starting point for identifying 
a sustainable family policy. A sustainable welfare policy for the elderly simply 
demands sustainable policy for the reproduction of the tax base. This means first 
and foremost a requirement for designing a sustainable family policy to ensure the 
welfare of the children who will bear the future.
Gender inequality in family­oriented institutions and outcomes show large cross­
national differences, something that has been related to the family policy models 
that have been developed in different welfare states. Several studies have also shown 
strong links between policies and various demographic and socio­economic factors. 
Family policy design has been linked to fertility and female labour­force 
participation as well as to socio­economic outcomes in terms of poverty and income 
inequality. Female labour force participation has furthermore been related to 
childbearing patterns (Ferrarini 2006). It has also been argued that family policy 
has a bearing on the formation of human capital in society. A family policy that 
enables women to participate in the labour market on equal terms with men is said 
not only to decrease gender inequality but also to improve the cognitive development 
of children (Esping­Andersen et al. 2002).
In the analysis of different welfare states, we apply a typology based on social policy 
legislation, which is a useful tool when focusing on links between driving forces, 
policy institutions and policy outcomes. Based on the institutional typology, 
originally developed by Korpi (2000), we can categorise the family policy in different 
countries. A clear advance for this typology compared to several of its predecessors 
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is that it is explicitly based on indicators of national family policy legislations of 
direct relevance for the structuring of behavioural outcomes regarding labour 
market participation, particularly in care work and childbearing decisions.
Figure 2 illustrates the ordering of family policies along the two underlying 
analytical dimensions (cf. Ferrarini 2006). Welfare states with highly developed 
support for the traditional family are grouped within a male breadwinner family 
support cluster, corresponding to cell A in the figure (typically the continental 
European countries). Countries with generous dual earner support are grouped as 
adhering to a dual earner model of family policy, illustrated by cell D in the figure 
(typically the Nordic countries), while the policy model in market­oriented 
economies (cell C) is followed by welfare states with smaller scope of family policy 
transfers and services along both dimensions (typically the Anglo­American 
countries). As is evident from the figure, a fourth model of family policy could exist, 
characterised by the criteria of the top right cell (B). This model would correspond  
to a situation of institutional pluralism, where family policies have high scores on 
support for both the traditional and the dual earner family. Such a combination of 
family policy is perhaps best described as contradictory, since the two dimensions 
reflect different underlying family ideologies. A highly developed support for the 
traditional family of course entails a strengthened housewife role, which seems to 
contradict motives of dual earner family support to increase female labour force 
participation. Empirically, the broad family policy indicators do not take on values 
corresponding to clear cases of such a contradictory model. However, several 
countries do have tendencies in this direction (Belgium and France, for example,  
in addition have relatively well developed dual earner support, and Norway also has 
relatively high support for traditional family patterns).
Figure 2. Models of Family Policy.
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The substantial changes in family patterns in all our family­policy models have been 
linked to women’s increasing economic independence as well as to ideational 
changes as the main factors in the demographic literature. The relationship between 
female labour force participation and fertility has received special attention in the 
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scholarly debate for decades, but the knowledge about any causal links between 
these variables is still rather limited. However, as mentioned earlier, ample evidence 
shows that family policy arrangements are important when explaining cross­
national patterns of both labour market behaviour and childbearing. Furthermore, 
family policy also has a potential to structure patterns of child poverty both directly 
and via the labour market behaviour of parents. For example, countries where family 
policy promotes dual earner family patterns have the lowest levels of poverty among 
families with children, both among two­parent households and single­parent 
households (Ferrarini 2006).
As for patterns of poverty in European welfare states, poverty risks among 
households with children seem to have several consequences for the well­being and 
choice­capacity of individuals. What appears to be an important emphasis in this 
chapter is that early childhood poverty may have substantial long­run life­course 
effects. It has been argued that the risk of poverty and social exclusion for an adult  
in large part originates in early childhood, when cognitive resources are acquired 
(Esping­Andersen et al. 2002). A lack of such resources among other things increases 
the risk of a precarious labour market position, which in turn is closely related to 
experienced poverty risks (for a review of previous research, see Haveman and Wolfe 
1995). Duncan et al. (1998) show that the economic living conditions during the first 
years of a child’s life are strong determinants of school completion, in particular 
among children growing up in households with the lowest incomes. 
Figure 3 sums up the macro relationships between the socio­political, socio­
economic and demographic factors in the European countries by the end of the 
twentieth century (cf. Ferrarini 2006). Whereas increased family policy generosity 
overall seems to decrease poverty and facilitate childbearing, it appears to have a 
more ambiguous relationship to female labour force participation. This is due to 
family policy in continental European countries being developed to support 
traditional family patterns, thereby holding female economic activity at lower levels, 
whereas female labour force participation is supported in countries with dual earner 
models of family policy. High female labour force participation is in turn related to 
both higher fertility levels and lower child poverty. No macro­link between child 
poverty and childbearing has been found, even though the existence that such a 
relationship may exist within different particular countries or population subgroups 
should not be ruled out. 
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Figure 3. Relationships between family policy, female economic activity, child poverty  
and fertility.
In the EU, increasing female labour force participation without providing 
possibilities to reconcile paid and unpaid work is likely to further decrease birth 
rates, since a large proportion of women opt for a career before having children, with 
those ending up childless becoming more numerous. Even if family support for a 
traditional gendered division of labour may increase the number of births, it is likely 
also to decrease both female involvement in paid work as well as male involvement  
in care work. Improving parents’ possibilities to reconcile paid and unpaid work, in 
particular family policies supportive of the dual earner family, might, besides 
maintaining childbearing at sufficient levels, have the benefit of improving family 
income and preventing poverty. This could indicate that efforts to improve gender 
equality through social policy can be combined with a stable social and economic 
social development in the European welfare states. 
A striking result in our analysis of Eurobarometer data (Institute for Futures Studies 
2006) is the large difference between men and women in the perceived consequences 
of having children. This is less of a surprise when we see the large differences in 
unpaid household work, where women tend to do much more than men. Yet this is an 
area where the cross­national differences are substantial and policy related. 
Exploring the differences between the family policy regimes, we find that dual­earner 
oriented programmes seem more successful in resolving these conflicts. 
Fertility is obviously the basis for human capital formation. A number of studies 
have demonstrated that attitudes towards childbearing are related to actual fertility 
behaviour and fertility patterns. Bearing in mind that, firstly, research on cross­
national differences in attitudes have demonstrated that such differences can be 
linked to differences in institutional settings, and secondly, that low fertility exists 
in countries with widely differing institutional structures, this would suggest that 
the question of how institutional contexts influence attitudes towards childbearing 
is important for understanding cross­national differences in actual fertility 
behaviour and patterns. The existence of a perceived conflict between levels of 
equality in individual­oriented social and family­oriented institutions can be seen  
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as an important factor affecting childbearing behaviour. Table 2 depicts how 
household and childcare tasks are divided between men and women, and for a few 
comparable childcare tasks (those available in the EB data), and also how women and 
men think that these tasks should be divided between men and women. 
Table 2. Percentage respondents (currently living with a partner) saying that the 
woman is primarily responsible for household tasks among couples with 
and without children, EU 15 (except Luxembourg).
Household tasks Household tasks
Couples without       
children
Couples with 
children
Cleaning 81,8 90,0
Preparing breakfast 66,4 81,2
Preparing dinner 80,3 88,9
Shopping 68,3 76,3
Doing the dishes 63,8 79,3
Gardening/painting 20,4 23,6
Ironing 87,2 93,0
Paying bills/paperwork 40,1 42,0
Source: EB 59.2 (2003).
The most striking piece of information in this table is the highly unequal division  
of both household tasks and the care of children, but also how this sharply contrasts 
against the attitudes individuals hold regarding how some central childcare tasks 
should be divided between the sexes. This picture of a highly unequal distribution  
of unpaid work is somewhat, but not in essence, altered when we look at household 
tasks. Disregarding the items ‘paying bills/paperwork’ and ‘gardening/painting’, 
about 75 per cent of the couples without children say that the woman has the 
primary responsibility for central household tasks. It is also worth noting that the 
responsibility for households tasks is more unevenly distributed among couples with 
children than among couples without children. The basic pattern of women doing 
the overwhelming majority of both household work and, for families with children, 
childcare tasks is the same in all countries (data not shown here). However, there are 
nevertheless some interesting cross­national patterns and differences. Among 
couples with children, men do more of both household work and childcare tasks in 
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. 
Pensions, Quality of Jobs and Retirement
The ageing of our modern societies has focused a lot of attention on pension systems. 
Partly this is also a result of the way institutions were built with mandatory or at 
least common retirement ages and strong disincentives for continuing work above 
these ages. All countries in the advanced industrial world have been affected by what 
the World Bank (1994) labelled the ‘old­age crisis’, and many of the countries have 
taken action. Some countries have acted promptly by shifting from defined benefit 
(DB) formulae to defined contribution (DC) formulae. Other countries have made 
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changes that in other ways have been aimed at improving the economic incentives 
for people to work longer.
The Swedish pension reform is a case in point (Palme 2003). The reform, as all 
pension reforms in mature welfare states, can be seen as a reaction to the problems 
and achievements of the existing systems of old­age security, as well as to the 
different interests generated by them. The design of the benefit formula follows the 
principle of making lifetime earnings the basis for determining the size of the future 
pension. A strong motive here is to provide a good incentive structure to increase 
labour supply. The Swedish pension reform can be seen as response to the pressures 
and constraints imposed by an ageing society, as well as to the critique of the welfare 
state of eroded incentive structures and poor cost control. In terms of both putting 
pensions on a financially stable ground in the longer run and improving incentives, 
there is little doubt that the reform has been successful. 
Population ageing will continue to put pressure on current institutions for the 
support of the elderly, even if changes such as DC­based pension reforms succeed in 
considerably dampening its fiscal impact. However, most of the discussion of these 
issues tends to avoid the real issue. No matter what we do about our institutions, the 
central economic problem is that the output produced by a smaller share of the 
population will have to be distributed to a greater share of dependents. This is the 
case whether or not we have public redistribution, private family responsibility or 
mandatory/voluntary pension saving. Hence, if the relative consumption level of 
dependents is to remain the same, the working population will have to consume  
a smaller share of what they produce. While this is obvious in the case of public 
transfers and not difficult to understand in the case of family responsibility, many 
people tend to overlook it when pensions rely on funded assets.
We also need to acknowledge that incentives are not enough. Our analysis of 
Eurobarometer data provides some insights (Institute for Futures Studies 2006).  
In the analysis of attitudes towards retirement there was an interesting change over 
the 1990s with regard to the fact that Europeans in 2003 expected to retire about 
one year later than they did in 1992. We can also conclude that the statutory 
retirement age has a normative effect on both when individual Europeans expect 
and when they prefer to retire. 
The strategy of increasing the retirement age is, however, not without problems in 
terms of the distributional concerns it raises. The concern is that the large number  
of people who suffer from health problems, often work­related, in the pre­retirement 
aged, actually do not have a real choice to continue to work. What is also striking here 
is the importance attributed to working conditions for the way people think about 
retirement. The analysis of Eurobarometer data clearly indicated that good working 
conditions was the single most important motive when respondents were asked what 
could make them work longer (Esser 2005, Institute for Futures Studies 2006). The 
Lisbon strategy, with its emphasis on high­quality jobs, appears appropriate in terms 
of responding to the concerns of European citizens. It should also be emphasised here 
that adequate statutory pensions per se do not discourage people to retire later. 
Why do people retire earlier? Recent trends may be accounted for by both supply­ 
and demand­side factors. Although the largest variation in individuals’ retirement­
age preferences depends on individual factors, significant country­level differences 
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were observed. At the individual level preference for later retirement was clearly 
related to higher age. The presence of a dependent child was found to have clear 
significant negative effects among women. Clear gendered effects were also found in 
relation to health status and workplace characteristics. At the country­level, effects 
of both welfare regime generosity and production regime coordination were found to 
be positive and significantly related to a higher preferred retirement age. This 
suggests that earnings­related pensions, which as such might constitute a pull factor 
into retirement, in reality create incentives for continued labour force participation 
(and thus higher benefits) which are stronger. More regulated production regimes 
also appear to foster a positive attitude to continued work, which could be 
interpreted as a result of the higher quality of jobs offered in such labour markets. 
The results indicate that retirement preferences are affected by both individual and 
country­level factors. However, policy challenges posed by population ageing may 
not be first and foremost of demographic or even of economic kind, but rather 
distributional, as proposed by Myles in Esping­Andersen (2002: 134). According to 
this proposition, policy changes need also to take into consideration how we see to  
it that the least advantaged are not disproportionately affected in relation to 
implementing policy changes, such as, for example, higher retirement ages. In view 
of the broad support for alternative pathways into retirement (Esser 2005, Institute 
for Futures Studies 2006), the opportunities for phased retirement deserve to be 
further evaluated. The search for sustainable policies hence faces challenges to 
incorporate adequate pensions for all with incentives for high levels of employment 
and also flexibility and predictability of pension benefits.
The findings are helpful in terms of giving insights about issues of central 
importance in ageing societies. When it comes to designing sustainable social policy 
programmes that are also politically viable in Europe, we can actually gain 
additional information for discussing alternatives.
Social Investment and Learning
There is no way around the fact that investment today means fewer resources  
for immediate consumption. It may be that we can afford the systems of social 
investment if we design the various programmes in an adequate fashion. The 
desirability of this is partly a question of value judgements. Whether or not it is 
possible to extract the necessary taxes now and in the future will depend on what 
people want, and probably on international cooperation. This makes the 
modernisation of our social and economic policies a democratic problem with 
national as well as international dimensions. Each and every step in the expansion  
of social policies in Europe has been subject to political conflicts and controversies. 
In the late 1990s, to mention increased taxes was somewhat of a ‘third rail’ in 
European politics. More recent trends and events suggested that there was room for 
change – that it was possible to think the unthinkable. But the global economic crisis 
is again putting the public finances in dire straits.
The important phases in this development have involved clear elements of learning 
and diffusion. With the kinds of challenges that we are facing, we have to try harder 
and act wiser. ‘Learning’ as a part of European integration carries a great – but 
largely under­utilised – potential. Good intentions and political commitments are 
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not enough to make the reform work successful. This warrants a re­examination of 
our social and economic policies. What is required to succeed in this endeavour is a 
balanced approach: a synthesis involving a concern with the way that the social 
investment supports different groups in society on the one hand, and a realistic view 
of how society works on the other hand. Such an approach could cast new light on an 
issue that is likely to be confused by zero­sum perceptions of social and economic 
development in ageing societies. 
How, then, can social science make a contribution to the discussion and reform of 
social policy programmes? Here it is important to sort out the normative and positive 
arguments for and against various approaches. The study of how institutions affect 
the conditions and behaviour of individuals lies at the heart of social science research. 
This makes it highly relevant for examining both the intended and unintended 
consequences of welfare state institutions. Comparative institutional research can 
contribute by contrasting different policy interventions in order to assess the impact 
of different kinds of policy programmes. This report gives number of examples; 
Bonoli, Lundvall and Lorenz, Morgan, Nelson and Stephens, and Nikolai.
I would argue for a research and policy agenda that goes beyond the concept of 
models of social policy and simple clustering of nations, and for an institutional 
perspective that is more specifically focused on program design. The use of broad 
typologies for classifying countries has proved to be a useful tool for simplifying 
complex patterns of differences and similarities. Yet, for the purpose of examining 
various consequences of welfare states, the advantage of such typologies becomes 
problematic insofar as it mixes causes, mediating variables and outcomes. Instead, 
we should use welfare state institutional structures as intermediary variables, which 
have the advantage of lending themselves to analytical purposes (cf. Palme 2006).
It also appears warranted to develop a wider approach to what a social model is all 
about; we also have to study labour market, education and migration policies in 
addition to the welfare programmes that we usually associate with the concept of 
‘social models’ and we have, as we have tried in this volume, to study how these 
policy programmes interact. I would, moreover, argue that it is not enough to analyse 
how the world works. What is demanded is political courage and leadership. We are 
in dire need of intellectual courage to critically examine the existing institutions.  
We further need political courage to deal with the political economy of reform, 
political courage to levy taxes high enough for ensuring insurance and investment 
with middle­class inclusion and political leadership to engage in global governance.
There are good reasons to – again – point to the common concerns generated by our 
common futures of ageing populations for the macroeconomic development. Weak 
growth of the European Single Market has repercussions for all countries. Hence,  
a more balanced population development in Europe should be a common concern. 
Moreover, within the OMC framework, the Member States of the EU have agreed on 
common objectives when it comes to employment, pensions, health care and social 
inclusion. There is very little to suggest that these objectives can be reached without 
a deeper and at the same time explicit concern with human capital formation 
(Institute for Futures Studies 2006). This is in congruence with the work in the 
Commission on Modernising Social Protection but would also benefit from being 
operationalised within the OMC framework. Human capital formation ought to be 
an integral part of the thinking also around other common objectives of the Member 
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States. The gap in the OMC process needs to be filled; the situation of children, youth 
and their families should be a new domain. The social deficits of the Member States 
need to be addressed promptly. This is not done overnight but Europe has to try 
harder and act more wisely.
Epilogue
Quest, is used chiefly in poetry or elevated phrases to suggest days of chivalry and 
romantic adventure and implies a search or pursuit, always of something elusive and 
often unattainable. <the quest of the Holy Grail> Webster
History shows that the reforms of social policy programmes are responses to 
changing economic and social structures, but that they never occur without political 
mobilisation. The history of the various European social models is about social 
democracy’s, Christian democracy’s and social liberalism’s attempts to apply ‘a 
strategy of cooperation’. The rise of neo­liberalism and the fall of the Iron Curtain 
shifted that balance. The previous ideological accords were challenged by neo­
liberalism for more than two decades. Yet that rhetoric appears to have lost steam. 
But the tilt of power in favour of ‘capital’, as a result of the exit options offered to 
capital in the wake of the deregulation of financial markets over the past decades, 
might be here to stay. The exit option offered to capital puts the question to the 
employers if they want to cooperate in a different light. Are they still interested to 
foster cooperation as way of achieving positive sum solutions for conflicting 
interests? What are the implications of the global financial crisis in this context?
The debate about the future of the European welfare state has highlighted pension 
reforms and savings to ensure future living standards for the elderly. This chapter 
has put focus on how social policy interacts with education, fertility and other 
fundamental determinants of the future tax base. In order to design sustainable 
social policies for the future we need to put our children and youth first (cf. Esping­
Andersen et al. 2002). The reason is simply that without massive attention to the 
future tax base in terms of both the number of tax payers and their productivity, 
there will be little left worth labelling sustainable pensions and health care systems, 
not to speak about social inclusion. At the heart of this is the urgent need to find new 
ways to reconcile production and reproduction. This is what the new gender balance 
is about. Working life needs to be made more flexible also when it comes to the needs 
of families to balance the two spheres. Moreover, given that a declining size of the 
labour force is problematic in a growth perspective, there are hence good reasons  
to suggest that a more balanced population development in Europe should be a 
common concern. 
For those of us who believe that change bears the potential for betterment there is 
always hope. Improvement is badly needed when it comes to ‘Social Europe’ as we 
know it. European leaders should join forces to make the necessary investments in 
human capital. This also applies to the fact that even if the ESM is about our self­
interests as European citizens, in the end it is also about our moral obligations 
towards our children. The efforts will, however, have to be very strong if Europeans 
are to put enough trust in the further and future European integration. Policy 
change may be coming late but it should not be too little. 
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In the 2000 Lisbon Agenda, the EU expressed its intention of making Europe 
become ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010’. With less 
than one year left until the deadline, it seems that these goals will be hard to 
meet, even more so with the current global crisis. 
Yet thinking has to go beyond immediate responses to the current crisis to 
discuss the kind of strategy that should be implemented in the medium to long 
term in order not to reproduce the failures of the recent past. In this respect, 
the ‘social investment’ paradigm that emerged in the mid-1990s may provide 
governments and the EU with some guidelines for the macro-economic and 
social policies that need to be implemented in order to promote sustainable 
economic growth and ensure the political and social sustainability of the 
European Social Model. 
This report assesses the diversity feasibility, but also the relevance of the 
social investment strategy in Europe. What policies have been implemented  
in different countries, with what success? What have been the key drivers of 
change or impeding factors in pursuing a social investment strategy? The 
report also questions whether the goals defined in 2000 are still relevant,  
and whether the social investment strategy can help face not only traditional 
European problems but also new issues created by the current crisis. 
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